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This dissertation explores the ethical meaning of the literary, sympathetic imagination in 
the novel by reading George Eliot and J. M. Coetzee. They share the idea that the novel can 
convey a fictional truth and, at the same time, contribute for the expansion of sympathy. My 
research undertakes the theoretical project of asking, first, how the two writers’ engagements 
with alterity proceed to the question of literary forms that contain their perspective on otherness 
and, secondly, whether the work of sympathy through the literary imagination has some limits in 
figuring otherness.  
Focusing on the ethical account of the novel in terms of the sympathetic imagination, the 
dissertation articulates the distinction between the writers’ self-consciousness about truth-telling 
and its literary representation in the novel. George Eliot’s Adam Bede shows eclectic aspects of 
the Victorian realism in which the aesthetic representation of eighteenth-century English country 
life, particularly for the effect of sympathy, depends on some literary conventions including 
tragedy. My research analyzes that Eliot’s perspectival view in creating the landscape of 
sympathy in her country novels necessarily uses stereotyped images and unfolds ideological 
inclinations. Like George Eliot, Coetzee’s strong self-consciousness about truth-telling yields 
confessional voices in his novels. The issue of authorial sincerity is examined particularly in his 
memoirs. In the context of apartheid South Africa, Coetzee’s struggle with truth-telling and 
alterity in literature has a significance. The animal issue and taste discussed in the final chapter 
of this dissertation testify that figuring otherness is related to the matter of the sympathetic 
imagination, which implies a social feeling that is based on the concept of inter-subjectivity.  
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J. M. Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello (2003) presents some interesting issues about the 
literary imagination and its ethical characteristics, although an ethical undertone in fact runs 
throughout his oeuvre. One of these issues is sympathy for others, which may be provoked by 
reading or writing a fiction, since the action “takes us out of ourselves, into other lives” 
(Elizabeth Costello 23). Of course, the notion of imagining others by means of literature is 
neither so unusual nor modern. But Elizabeth Costello is radical in that, in this fiction, the limit 
of the literary, sympathetic imagination has no limit or bound, especially when that imagination 
is brought to bear on sympathy for animals. For Coetzee, the sympathetic imagination is also at 
the root of the ideology of realism. And this mode is said by the heroine Costello to be 
“pioneered by Daniel Defoe” (4).  
My selection and comparison of George Eliot and J.M. Coetzee in this dissertation has 
its basis in the extended as well as time-ridden concept of realism. Rather than strictly applying 
to my consideration of Eliot’s and Coetzee’s work the meaning of literary realism grounded in 
the period with which it has been associated—the nineteenth century—what I try to examine by 
considering the works of Eliot and Coetzee is how this concept touches upon their common 
concern with reality and its truthful representation. More importantly, what makes me link them 
in this research is not only the strong self-consciousness underlying their formal, epistemological 
experiments in the service of truth in fiction, but also their deep commitment to moral 
imagination in the novel. Derek Attridge reads J. M. Coetzee’s fictions as “a continued strenuous 
enterprise in figuring alterity” (“Literary Form and the Demands of Politics” 249). This 
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statement helps us find a common ground between Eliot and Coetzee in this dissertation, because 
it almost corresponds to George Levine’s critique that “otherness is at the heart of the enterprise 
of Victorian literature” (3), and his comment that “No writer [other than George Eliot] had a 
clearer sense of how extraordinarily difficult it was to tell the truth” (Realism, Ethics and 
Secularism 11). All these comments indicate that, for both writers, exploring the limits of 
representation is linked to a radical approach to the unknowable reality of others. One of the 
most important thematic correspondences between George Eliot and J. M. Coetzee in this 
dissertation is their interest in alterity, which ultimately leads to the question of how fiction could 
be able to create a medium that represents others truthfully.  
This dissertation purports to establish a kind of dialogic inter-relationship between 
Coetzee and Eliot by way of the concepts of realism and of the sympathetic imagination; that is, 
this project is an attempt to read Eliot via Coetzee and Coetzee via Eliot. While the point of 
departure in this dissertation is literary realism, a careful treatment of the term would be 
necessary following its different contexts. For example, when Eliot criticizes Charles Dickens in 
her 1856 essay by saying that his description of “external traits” lacks “psychological character” 
and when she instead emphasizes the need of “the awakening of social sympathies” in the novel 
(“The Natural History of German Life” 110-11), what she regards as “truthful” representation in 
art does not follow the practices of mimetic realism and naturalism in the Continental style. 
Eliot’s version of realism in Adam Bede (1859), for example, rather has an element of tragedy 
which explains her specific choice of literary conventions. 
As a proponent of modernism, Coetzee takes a more critical stance on the conventions of 
realism. In fact, some of his novels are read as allegories and for that reason, for the absence of 
realist commitment to apartheid South Africa, he has received harsh criticism including from 
  3 
Nadine Gordimer. Whether this kind of criticism is appropriate or not, it should be noted that in 
Coetzee’s case, his novel writing under the censorship system of apartheid could function as an 
alternative to historical writing. Salman Rushdie, recollecting Indira Gandhi’s Emergency, once 
said that “the novel is one way of denying the official, politicians’ version of truth” and 
“literature can, and perhaps must, give the lie to official facts” (“Imaginary Homelands” 14). In a 
similar vein, Coetzee in the article “The Novel Today” (1987) argues that “in South Africa 
today,” there is a tendency to “subsume the novel under history” (2). In order to keep the value of 
“a greater truth,” however, Coetzee claims that the novel or “storytelling” can be in a “rivalry” 
with official history.   
In regard to Coetzee’s contrast between history and the novel, therefore, I propose the 
concept of “truth-telling” as a substitute for realism, since the latter evidently denotes an 
aesthetic, fictional frame in representation while the selected forms of “truth-telling” can be 
varied according to each writer’s conceptual understanding of reality. Although realism as 
discussed here might designate a literary mode showing affirmatively the connection between 
reality and text, the connection does not mean that literary realism is in itself a mode of “truth-
telling” in its pure sense. What should be noted is that a distinction exists between writers’ self-
consciousness about truth-telling in fictions and the literary, conventional application of truth-
telling in their novels.1 Accordingly, I choose the theme of “truth-telling” in comparing both 
                                   
1 For example, Michael McKeon’s research in The Origins of the English Novel (1987) shows that the 
claim to truth in the early novels was a very central issue of debate among literates in the eighteenth 
century. In the rise of the English novel, McKeon puts that the authorial “sincerity” (85) that guarantees 
the truthfulness of a fiction, as a moral virtue which consolidates the authentic voice of an individual 
experience, functioned as an essential factor distinguishing the genre of the novel from that of romance. 
Therefore, what is indispensable for the veracity of writers is their positive interest in the reality that 
underlies scientific observations. But confidence in an individual experience is one thing, and the 
reliability of its narration is another. This means that even “exhaustive factuality”(413) in the novel could 
be read merely as a device for “naïve empiricism,” and so there were some skeptical views about the 
novel’s claim of its truthfulness, as shown in Henry Fielding’s works. 
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George Eliot’s and Coetzee’s treatment of confessional voice in the novel. As their strong 
interests in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Confessions (1782) testify, in dealing with the question of 
truth-telling in literary representation, the identification of a writer’s sincerity and authenticity is 
finally concerned with a judgment about truth-telling. That means, for both writers, that if the 
novel can work as a medium for our expansion of sympathy for others, then how the novel meets 
the requirements of truth-telling for others without self-deception becomes serious ethical issue.  
Inspired by Coetzee’s questioning of Western realism in Elizabeth Costello, this 
dissertation will also provide a retrospective point of view on the ideologies of George Eliot’s 
Victorian realism. Interestingly, the underlying features of morality and idealism in Victorian 
fictions, or at least in Eliot’s fiction, offer an opportunity to discuss the ethics of representation, 
which this dissertation aims to do. That is, this dissertation pivots upon a question of whether the 
work of sympathy through the literary imagination has some limits in figuring otherness. In 
examining Eliot and Coetzee together, the dissertation will undertake the theoretical project of 
asking how the two writers’ struggles with alterity proceed to the question of literary forms that 
contain their perspective on otherness.  
In the first chapter “Literary Realism and the Landscape of Sympathy” I analyze George 
Eliot’s early novel Adam Bede (1859) by explicating the notion of the “landscape” of sympathy 
and its relation to George Eliot’s ideas on literary realism. My focus is on the necessity of the 
landscape of sympathy in Eliot’s novels in order to clarify how this concept works not only at the 
level of aesthetics and ethics but also with respect to ideological implications. George Eliot’s 
realism mediated as it is with moral visions and with the projection of memories onto the past 
landscape makes us question the validity of the narrator’s claim of offering “a faithful account” 
(Adam Bede 175). My argument is that since the “truthful” representation of the reality of 
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country life comes to terms with some purposive effects of tragedy used in this work, a revision 
of our understanding of literary realism as used by Eliot is necessary. And the fact that Eliot 
works with two meanings of sympathy in this novel—taking it as a moral value on the one hand 
and as a quality of the literary imagination on the other—adds to a more complex conception of 
realism.  
In regards to inherent complications in George Eliot’s literary realism, U. C. 
Knoepflmacher observes that “Instead of faithfully copying the circumstances of external life, 
George Eliot arranged reality to make it substantiate her moral values” (1). If so, judging the 
extent to which Eliot’s mimetic representation of country life is really truthful or not must be a 
secondary issue, since, as Jonathan Loesberg argues, “what need” Eliot’s “realist tragedy” of 
Adam Bede serves is a key point in understanding Eliot’s concern of realism (“Aesthetics, Ethics, 
and Unreadable Acts in George Eliot” 125). Considering the fact that an “ideal” purpose 
intervenes in the plot or characterization of “real” people of the novel, I attend to Raymond 
William’s discussion in The Country and the City in which he points out a kind of parallax view 
from the writer in which the past is visualized from the interest of the current standpoint.  
My second argument in the chapter is that although a stereotyped version of a pastoral 
life in eighteenth-century England in Adam Bede is in itself problematic for its artificiality, the 
stereotyping is an inevitable element that constitutes George Eliot’s country landscape. As E. H. 
Gombrich explains in Art and Illusion (1960), what can be seen, in paintings, is what the 
beholder’s projection of memory onto an object leads him or her to expect. This projection of 
memory is visible in George Eliot’s depiction of country life. 
       In thinking about Eliot, we must also consider the way the illusory concept embedded 
in the notion of sympathy requires a corroboration. The illusion of sympathy is ultimately 
  6 
concerned with one’s imaginative identification with someone else’s situation. According to 
Adam Smith’s argument in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), the act of sympathy is the 
representation of a spectacle, like a suffering subject, in the mind of a spectator. When George 
Eliot appeals to common experiences and memories in Adam Bede, what matters is that the 
sharing of these experiences and memories depends on the evocation of sympathy and nostalgia, 
about which we also read in The Mill on the Floss and Daniel Deronda. In thinking about 
memories of the past, the chapter considers the way the revisited past, which consists of a 
selected memory, provides ideological as well as historical references which make possible a 
collective perspective on the country about which Eliot is writing. That is, the sympathy 
produced by the function of memories in Eliot is connected with her consideration of the 
constant existence of a “tie” or “web” within a community, and this concept of 
interconnectedness is built on an ideological landscape of the country. I discuss first George 
Eliot’s inventive “perspectivism” in the country novel, which presupposes a sort of “distance” 
and means a kind of “inversion” of reality (Karatani Kojin) that is internalized in her literary 
realism of which, I think, Eliot is fully aware. Later in the chapter I criticize how Eliot’s 
description of the English country life, with its theme of the sympathetic imagination, is linked to 
her ideological inclination which is implicated in British Nationalism.  
The main argument in the next chapter “J.M. Coetzee’s Question of Truth-Telling and 
Otherness” is partially inspired by Jonathan Lamb’s argument: “Throughout Coetzee’s fictions 
there is evident his preoccupation with the problem of truth and how it might be elicited and 
stated” (J. M. Coetzee’s Austerities 178). Like Lamb, I am preoccupied in this chapter with 
Coetzee’s experiments with “truth-telling” in his fictions. I argue that this matter is related to his 
ideas about otherness because the act of “telling” implies a dialogic relationship between “I” and 
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“the other,” and so, fundamentally, a dialogic truth. In using the term “a dialogic truth,” I refer to 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (1984). According to Bakhtin, 
every individual has its own voice that cannot be reduced to secondhand discourse by others. “In 
a human being,” Bakhtin writes, “there is always something that only he himself can reveal, in a 
free act of self-consciousness and discourse” (58). He continues, “The truth about a man in the 
mouths of others, not directed to him dialogically and therefore a secondhand truth, becomes a 
lie degrading and deadening him […]” (59, italics original). For Bakhtin, the truthful 
understanding of a human being requires a dialogical relationship and always brings to light the 
ethical dimension of human dignity. This dialogism applies as well to the writer’s description of 
characters. That is, bearing on the real “depths of the human soul,” the author cannot command 
his authority freely when he figures his characters; dialogic relationships in the novel suggest 
that “the author speaks not about a character, but with him” (63; 251). In contrast to the 
solipsistic attitude in mono-logic realism, a dialogic approach does not aim to nullify the distance 
between the subject and the object and in fact this distance paradoxically “guarantees genuine 
objectivity in the representations of a character” (63). In Coetzee’s account, a fully dialogic 
novel is “one in which there is no dominating, central authorial consciousness, and therefore no 
claim to truth or authority, only competing voices and discourses” (“Fyodor Dostoevsky” 
Stranger Shores 123).  
Among the styles of his experiments with truth-telling in fictions, I notice Coetzee’s 
obsession with the form of confessional writings. Coetzee attentively examines a writer’s or 
speaker’s “sincerity” and “authenticity,” whose different nuances he self-consciously applies to 
his characters in the novels and in other writings. In selected texts such as Disgrace and 
Elizabeth Costello, I argue, the hero David Lurie and the heroine Elizabeth Costello, 
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respectively, each has a moment or a need to express his or her inner mind or “belief” before a 
public hearing. Their common reservations about that, I think, reflect the author’s own  
skepticism about the possibility of doing so. For Coetzee, the question of how to communicate 
one’s truthful thoughts and feelings with others in the mode of confession is regarded as a 
challenge because, according to Coetzee in his essay (“Confession and Double Thoughts: 
Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky”), there is an epistemological limit on the level of secular 
meanings. Instead, both speaker and listener must have an ethical and even religious attitude in 
order to experience the “faith and grace” requisite for the arrival of a “truth.”  
Because the dialogic concept of truth is significant in regard to trusting the sincerity of 
the observer or narrator, it bears on Coetzee’s ethical approach to otherness. And this approach, I 
argue, is simulated in his review of “Realism” in the first chapter of Elizabeth Costello. Coetzee 
here poses questions about realistic representation and its connection with the sympathetic 
imagination. In order to explain the concept of realism, Coetzee introduces in the review such 
words as “embodied” (in the sense of literary configuration between words and things) and 
“embedded” (in the sense of sympathy between I and you). Elizabeth Costello’s comment on the 
transfiguration of words is an example of “the embodied” : “There used to be a time…when the 
text said, ‘On the table stood a glass of water,’ there was indeed a table, and a glass of water on 
it” (19). Discussing Defoe’s description of the castaway in Robinson Crusoe with the line “three 
of their hats, one cap, and two shoes that were not fellows” (“Daniel Defoe” 19-20), Coetzee 
suggests that, though the belief in the word as mirror to the world is now broken, one of the 
conventional notions of realism, the formal representation of reality or “embodying” ideas into 
things through text, still remains alive as a pivotal concept of representation (9).2  
                                   
2 While Ian Watt argues that a writer’s claim in the early novels as “an authentic account of the actual 
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The matter of being “embedded in life” (32) is related to Coetzee’s notion of the 
sympathetic imagination. Embeddedness indicates a way of engaging with otherness. In the 
“Realism” chapter, Costello talks about Kafka’s ape in the short story “A report to an 
Academy. ” The ape’s personification is literal to the extent that it is “embedded” in the mind of 
the heroine. Coetzee’s treatment of Thomas Nagel’s famous question of “what is it like to be a 
bat?” in the “Lives of Animals” chapter is also a matter of thinking about animals. The 
association of sympathy with the literary imagination is, I argue, self-reflexive for the writer in 
that Coetzee, who as a “late modernist” has received criticisms for his dismal and even 
“unrealistic” representations of South Africa, comes to reevaluate the notion of realism 
particularly in terms of the sympathetic imagination. The notion of the sympathetic imagination 
is continually applied to other discussions in the novel: to a discussion of sympathy with animal 
rights, for example, in chapters three and four of Elizabeth Costello, to a consideration of 
violence and its censorship in chapter six, and to the writer’s confession in a meta-imaginary 
court in the final chapter. After this initial discussion of Coetzee’s review of truth-telling in 
confessional writings and its connection to sympathy, this dissertation’s second chapter goes on 
to consider how these topics are related to Coetzee’s “otherness that is the challenge” (Elizabeth 
Costello 12). 
                                   
experiences of individuals” (30) not only functions as an indispensable convention for the “formal 
realism” of the novel but also becomes a cause of “distaste” promoting “critical confusion” for its 
reliability (The Rise of the Novel 35), J. Paul Hunter remarks in Before Novels (1990) that the narrative 
styles in the early novels owe their forms to such traditional, contemporaneous ones as diary, spiritual 
autobiography, biography, travel writing, and memoirs. So “the early novel’s circumstantiality,” Hunter 
argues, “is not so much a device to establish factuality and credibility as it is an outcome of the habit of 
observing and reporting” (200). Subsequently, whether the claim to truth in a fiction was conventional or 
circumstantial, and however the authors understood themselves to write a “genuine,” “private History” 
based on their experiences, it was inevitable that some skeptical readers including Fielding did not read a 
novel as a truth.  
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In chapter four “The Distance of Sympathy,” I focus on the conditions of sympathy and 
on its connection to theories of taste. Among these conditions of sympathy, I pay particular 
attention to the concept of “distance.” Virginia Woolf says, “So much depends upon distance,” in 
To the Lighthouse. Many ideas derived from this sentence can be usefully applied as well to a 
discussion of George Eliot’s and J. M. Coetzee’s sympathy. We know that perspective is 
coincident with the supposition of “distance” and the sympathetic imagination is also possible 
for the existence of distance between the spectator and the spectacle. But George Eliot’s 
comment on “perspective” in Daniel Deronda reminds us of some of the problems of distance:  
Perspective, as its inventor remarked, is a beautiful thing. What horrors of damp huts, 
where human beings languish, may not become picturesque through aerial distance! 
What hymning of cancerous vices may we not languish over as sublimest art in the safe 
remoteness of a strange language and artificial phrase! Yet we keep a repugnance to 
rheumatism and other painful effects when presented in our personal experience. (155) 
 
Already Adam Smith has remarked our “repugnance” to those “painful effects” when the concept 
of distance disappears (The Theory of Moral Sentiments10). Smith presents the example of the 
antipathy of a spectator when he directly faces some people experiencing misery in a street. 
Nevertheless, to say that the optical illusion created with the help of distance is false and that the 
real details are much more desolate than we think would be only half a truth. On the other side of 
the question is George Eliot’s ironic sense that the illusory nature of both sympathy and artistic 
representations should be maintained (Eliot’s discussion of “the pier glass” in Middlemarch is a 
similar example). What is at stake for George Eliot, is how to conceive and how to evaluate this 
notion of distance, which also means for the author a kind of alterity.  
In relation to one’s ambivalent engagement between sympathy and antipathy before a 
suffering subject, Susan Sontag’s criticism in Regarding the Pain of Others (2003) about the 
images of “spectacle” from photos or paintings is ultimately concerned with our attitude to the 
real pain of others. And Sontag’s observation is that our feeling of sympathy with suffering 
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subjects without any commitments from us merely proves that “Compassion is an unstable 
emotion (101). Sontag is negative about the concept of distance in this case. But it is not the 
main point of this fourth chapter to determine whether “distance” should be regarded as good or 
bad for its conditioning of our engagement or our aloofness. Rather, what is ascertained is that 
distance works in tandem with otherness, particularly in terms of the act of sympathy. 
My research in this dissertation focuses on the idea that, though distance brings the 
effect of an illusion to bear on sympathy, for that very reason it can also work as an ethical sign 
for the respect of alterity. An important accompanying question is, then, the question of how to 
avoid sympathy’s misjudgment caused by the perspective that brings the effect of an illusion. In 
considering these questions, I introduce first Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism that affirms the 
concept of distance3 and secondly Kant’s ideas on “taste” in his third critique along with Hannah 
Arendt’s research. Briefly speaking, Bakhtin’s dialogism “celebrates alterity” (Clark and 
Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin 65), and Kant’s inter-subjectivity argues that “In taste egoism is 
overcome” (Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy 67). Much of their theories are 
inter-communicable, which is why my dissertation find them useful.  
The last question to be answered in this dissertation is about the limit of the sympathetic 
imagination. Graham Bradshaw aptly remarks the significant difference implicated in 
“imaginative sympathy” between George Eliot and J. M. Coetzee. Bradshaw distinguishes 
                                   
3 Bakhtin once discussed the significance of “distance” in The Problem of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, where 
he said “only a dialogic and participatory orientation takes another person’s discourse seriously, and is 
capable of approaching it both as a semantic position and as another point of view. Only through such an 
inner dialogic orientation can my discourse find itself in intimate contact with someone else’s discourse, 
and yet at the same time not fuse with it, not swallow it, not dissolve in itself the other’s power to mean; 
that is, only thus can it retain with fully its independence as a discourse. To preserve distance in the 
presence of an intense semantic bond is no simple matter. But distance is an integral part of the author’s 
design, for it alone guarantees genuine objectivity in the representation of a character” (64).  
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Coetzee’s notion of “thinking ourselves into the being of another” from George Eliot’s concept 
of “imagining an equivalent centre of self” (“Pity and Autonomy” 194-97). And George Levine 
uses the issue of thinking about animals in order to compare the two writers’ delicately different 
notions of alterity and sympathy. Coetzee’s persona Elizabeth Costello introduces Thomas 
Nagel’s question of “What is it like to be a bat?” and replies, “There are no bounds to the 
sympathetic imagination.” Meanwhile, George Eliot says “we should die” if we can hear “the 
squirrel’s heartbeat” (Middlemarch182). George Levine’s comparison centers on the matter of 
how to deal with “the unknowable reality of the other” represented by the squirrel (Realism, 
ethics, and secularism 248). But I think that what he describes as Victorian writers’ respects for 
alterity, “the unknowable reality” of the other, is also a little different from what Bakhtin calls the 
“genuine objectivity” of the other guaranteed from the respect of distance. Objectivity itself 
implies the possibility of our approach to the other. I read Coetzee’s fictions as a test of the 
possibility of objectivity for the other. This means seeing his sympathetic imagination as a 
novelistic attempt to configure the otherness of the other. Hannah Arendt, discussing Kant’s 
aesthetic judgment and its relation to moral philosophy in The Life of the Mind, mentions the 
subject who has an “enlarged mentality” which, I believe, corresponds to “those who have the 
wider vision” in The Mill on the Floss. Though it is ironical that the existence of distance is 
necessary for the coming of sympathy, the man of vision would be the person who know the 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERARY REALISM AND THE LANDSCAPE OF SYMPATHY 
 
2.1 The Illusion of Realism in Adam Bede 
Gordon Haight’s biography of George Eliot tells us that one of Adam Bede’s motifs was 
taken from a tragic real event. Haight mentions George Eliot’s Methodist aunt Mrs. Samuel 
Evans who told George Eliot about her visiting in prison “a young girl condemned to death for 
child murder, bringing her to confess, and riding with her to the scaffold.” George Eliot is said to 
have combined this story with her father’s “life and character” for “a country story—full of the 
breath of cows and the scent of hay” (Haight 249). Other biographical studies, like Barbara 
Hardy’s, tells us that George Eliot’s “conspicuous personal memory” related to her father Robert 
Evans is to some extent intertwined with specific features of the plot and characterization in 
Adam Bede (Hardy, George Eliot 18-19). Tim Dolin likewise points out affinities between Robert 
Evans and the character of Adam Bede. The father was “the kind of man who…would become a 
representative figure in the mid-Victorian middle-class ethos,” of which some characteristics, 
such as “physically strong, skilled, down-to-earth, socially ambitious, trustworthy, thrifty, self-
helpful” George Eliot attributed to the main hero of Adam Bede (Dolin, George Eliot 6). Denying 
their “portrait”-like resemblance, George Eliot wrote in her journal that “ ‘Adam is not my father 
any more than Dinah is my aunt. Indeed, there is not a single portrait in ‘Adam Bede’; only the 
suggestion of experience wrought up into new combinations’” (Bodenheimer 134, italics 
original). Nonetheless, since the novel was set in the year of 1799, which antedates Eliot’s birth 
by twenty years and which implies “less of personal experience” of the writer, the author had to 
research the historical background to be able to include “the most natural” in Adam Bede (Haight 
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249-50). All these facts demonstrate that Adam Bede was originally conceived with some 
selected memories on the part of the writer and supplemented by her with studied images of the 
period.  
In this chapter I first examine George Eliot’s perspective towards the past and its features 
in Adam Bede. In doing so, I argue that Eliot’s notions about sympathy and literary realism as 
manifested in Adam Bede are deeply concerned with the writer’s viewpoint on the matter of 
perspective. In particular, George Eliot’s emphasis on the sympathetic imagination in Adam Bede 
is coincident with the recollection of a projected image overlapped with the writer’s memories of 
country life. Briefly speaking, George Eliot’s perspective works together with memories and 
sympathy. In the process of their working together, George Eliot’s personal memories are 
converted into an appeal to the collective memories that functions as a buttress for British 
national identity. The historical details Eliot depicts serve as what Rolland Barthes calls “reality 
effects,” through which the revisited past contributes to “the sense of authenticity, the remarkable 
density of background her realism achieves” (Haight 250). I will not treat in detail the verities of 
Eliot’s memories and historical mise-en-scènes as these are represented in Adam Bede. Rather, 
this research attends more to Eliot’s “perspectival” view of the country, through which what 
Erwin Panofsky calls a “window” is constructed in order for viewers to see “a space” 
(Perspective as Symbolic Form 27). I propose that this virtual “space” invented in a perspectival 
painting be read as an analogy to the “landscape” created in Eliot’s novels about the countryside. 
The opening paragraph of Adam Bede is the first example of this virtual space of the novel:  
With a single drop of ink for a mirror, the Egyptian sorcerer undertakes to reveal to any 
chance corner far-reaching visions of the past. This is what I undertake to do for you, 
reader. With this drop of ink at the end of my pen, I will show the roomy workshop of Mr 
Jonathan Burge, carpenter and builder in the village of Hayslople, as it appeared on the 
eighteenth of June in the year of our Lord 1799. (Adam Bede 4) 
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As George Levine remarks, Eliot’s imagination here “create[s] reality as well as ‘penetrate[s]’ 
it.” (The Realist Imagination 266). I pay attention to two things in this passage. First, an image is 
“conjured up.” George Eliot asks readers to believe in the magical “ink,” the sympathetic 
imagination, since it will transport them from the present to the past. Secondly, the evocation of 
the imagination is helped by memories. At least for its effect, according to Neil Hertz, the 
imagined setting has its ground in reality due to those memories shared by George Eliot and her 
contemporary readers. Hertz’s study tells that “the Egyptian sorcerer” was not unfamiliar with 
those readers of 1859 who would have known “Abd-El-Kadir El-Maghrhabee, who lived in 
Cairo earlier in the century” (Miller 23). Therefore, despite its seemingly magical realism, 
hereafter we follow “a paradigmatic example of good old-fashioned mimetic realism, complete 
with circumstantial dates and places” (Miller 23). This means that the setting of Hayslope in the 
year of 1799 in Adam Bede is not a random choice, but a planned one made from the writer’s 
specific perspective. 
We are introduced to another perspectival view of the landscape of Hayslope in the 
beginning part of Adam Bede:  
It was just such a picture as this last that Hayslope church had made to the traveler as he 
began to mount the gentle slope leading to its pleasant uplands, and now from his station 
near the Green he had before him in one view nearly all the other typical features of this 
pleasant land. High up against the horizon were the huge conical masses of hill, like giant 
mounds intended to fortify this region of corn and grass against the keen and hungry 
winds of the north; not distant enough to be clothed in purple mystery, but with some 
somber greenish sides visibly specked with sheep, whose motion was only revealed by 
memory, not detected by sight. (16)  
 
While this situation is that of an unnamed traveler who passes by the district of Loamshire and 
now observes “this pleasant land,” “he” shows a peculiar perspective when picturing this land. It 
is noteworthy that this spectator tries to interpret his surroundings with his memories and 
expectations, brought to bear upon even faraway objects. For example, the sheep’s “motion” 
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captured in his eyes actually cannot be “detected,” but can only be “revealed” or imagined by 
“memory.” This signifies that the scenery in the traveler’s perception is already expected, 
brought about by the recollection of a certain image. We do not know whether this land is really 
“pleasant” or not. But the traveler’s imagination colored with nostalgia transforms it to a pastoral 
picture, and, in that process, the sheep seen from such far distance bring the effect of an illusion 
of “motion.” Following for a while the traveler’s eye, which could have enjoyed “other beauties 
in the landscape,” the narrator then suddenly introduces the traveler’s primary interest: “there 
was more interesting for him in the living groups close at hand” (17). So, we recognize that all 
those descriptions such as “hills,” “woods,” and “grass,” coupled with the traveler’s memories in 
this part, set up the exterior landscape as a pastoral, and his anticipated meeting with the “living 
groups” signals the opening of the inside of the landscape, “a country story—full of the breath of 
cows and the scent of hay.” But it is odd to see that this traveler, even as a “stranger,” is treated 
like a transparent being. Keeping his distance while riding on his horse, he does not mingle with 
the people gathered in the house of the blacksmith. Although they could watch him heading for 
Dinah’s preaching in “the Green,” we cannot find any conversation between them. Instead, his 
monologue about Dinah’s appearance is brief (“A sweet woman.…but surely nature never meant 
her for a preacher” 21), and he disappears soon. His role remains as a readers’ guide to the scene 
of the Methodist meeting, like a “vanishing point”4 in the novel. An analogy between this 
traveler and George Eliot is possible, particularly in terms of projecting a pastoral image onto the 
                                   
4 I borrow this term from Audrey Jaffe. We realize that this traveler’s temporary stay in the beginning 
with such limited role and spectrum thereof. Nevertheless, the traveler directs the readers’ perspective 
towards the country landscape, and his invisible entering into the Hayslope village evokes the illusion of a 
certain omniscience, the “Pan-opticon,” which critics often associate with the position of the omniscient 
narrator (Jaffe 3-5).  
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landscape. The traveler’s ethnological interest, in a sense, for the “people” and the community 
can be compared with George Eliot’s own, which I will discuss later in connection with Levi-
Strauss’s comments on Rousseau, whose works George Eliot read avidly.  
My next argument from this quotation is that if a writer attempts to retrieve an image of 
the country landscape with his or her memories, it is framed by the projection of a certain 
concept about the landscape. Applying E, H. Gombrich’s theory, we may call this embedded 
concept in the mind of the composer as “schema”5 so that the writer first begins “not with his 
visual impression but with his idea or concept” (Art and Illusion 73). I propose to compare this 
notion of the schema with George Eliot’s idea of the “stereotype,” derived from the following 
quotation: 
So I am content to tell my simple story, without trying to make things seem better than 
they were; dread nothing, indeed, but falsity, which, in spite of one’s best efforts, there is 
reason to dread. Falsehood is so easy, truth so difficult. The pencil is conscious of a 
delightful facility in drawing a griffin—the longer the claws, and the larger the wings, the 
better; but that marvelous facility which we mistook for genius is apt to forsake us when 
we want to draw a real unexaggerated lion. Examine your word well, and you will find 
that even when you have no motive to be false, it is a very hard thing to say the exact 
truth, even about your own immediate feelings—much harder than to say something fine 
about them which is not the exact truth. (Adam Bede 160-61)  
 
Here the narrator opposes drawing an imaginary griffin to drawing a real lion and argues that 
depicting a real thing is much more difficult than picturing something out of pure imagination. 
This judgment seems to be based on a few assumptions: first, that there would be no standard to 
judge the truthfulness of the griffin’s case; second, that discrepancy is inevitable between the 
original and the copied where each subjective condition intervenes. But my reading is that the 
objective “truth,” however it draws on our empirical observation, is not only “very hard,” but 
                                   
5 Gombrich says: “The schema is not the product of a process of “abstraction,” of a tendency to 
“simplify”; it represents the first approximate, loose category which is gradually tightened to fit the form 
it is to reproduce” (Art and Illusion 74). 
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also problematic in itself. At the surface level, George Eliot expresses the difficulty of mimetic 
realism through this passage. However, to suppose that someone meets a real lion unexpectedly 
and draws promptly its picture, following its movement, would not sound plausible. Rather, it 
would be more accurate or probable to say that his drawing of the lion cannot but use and 
combine those lasting memories of his observation and some previous lion images he is 
acquainted with. In other words, the actual representation of the lion is not from an automatic, 
pure perception, but instead it is aided more or less by its stereotyped figure. To sum up, there 
would not be as much difference between the griffin and the lion as we suppose, if only in terms 
of the process of their configuration in the mind of the painter.6 
It is true that George Eliot’s realism accentuates the writer’s empirical engagement with 
the real world. This idea is evinced early in her letter to John Blackwood about Scenes of 
Clerical Life (1857), where George Eliot writes that “My sketches both of churchmen and 
dissenters, with whom I am almost equally acquainted, are drawn from close observation of them 
in real life, and not at all from hearsay or from the description of novelists” (Haight 235). And 
George Eliot defines realism as “the doctrine that all truth and beauty are to be attained by a 
humble study of nature, and not by substituting vague forms, bred by imagination on the mist of 
feeling, in place of definite, substantial reality” (“John Ruskin’s Modern Painters, Vol. III” 368). 
The connection between “realism” and “truth” expressed several times in Eliot’s writings bears 
                                   
6 Although the narrator exclaims that “It is for this rare, precious quality of truthfulness that I delight in 
many Dutch paintings” (Adam Bede 161), it should be reminded that the Dutch painting is also, to some 
degree, dependent upon some traditional conventions. Gombrich argues as follows: “Even Dutch genre 
paintings that appear to mirror life in all its bustle and variety will turn out to be created from a limited 
number of types and gestures, much as the apparent realism of the picturesque novel or of Restoration 
comedy still applies and modifies stock figures which can be traced back for centuries. There is not neutral 
naturalism. The artist, no less than the writer, needs a vocabulary before he can embark on a ‘copy’ of reality” 
(87).  
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on its empirical sources. But choosing the subject from “nature” is one thing, and showing it as 
“truthful” is another. This is because, to borrow her expression, “[f]alsehood is so easy, truth so 
difficult” especially in representation, and so it needs to depend on certain conventions related to 
its formal illustration.  
As an approach to deal with the question of “truth” or “truthfulness” implicated in 
George Eliot’s realism, therefore, I focus on its aesthetic representation rather than on a 
philosophical account of it.7 Although there are a number of definitions of literary realism, 
Marshall Brown’s research in particular is helpful in conceptualizing the specific features of 
George Eliot’s Victorian realism. In the article “The Logic of Realism: A Hegelian Approach” 
(1981), Brown suggests some tenets useful in defining realism. The first is circular; as the realist 
text reflects the real world, realism is in itself realistic. The second comes from self-proclaimed 
realists such as Courbet and Flaubert; their credo is that an artist should maintain a style that 
conveys reality in its exactitude. The last is that realism comes from some features realistic 
novels have in common—for example, a number of facts, or “a meeting of high and low styles.” 
The conclusion Brown takes from this explanation is that any fixed concept of realism based on a 
single type brings counter-examples and is, accordingly, self-contradictory. So, for Brown, 
realism is “not an entity a novel can contain or possess.” Rather, it is regarded as “an attribute, a 
quality, an impression” created by the novel. Realism “describes not something ‘in’ the novel but 
                                   
7 Actually, it is beyond the area of this research to review the meaning of “truth” in detail here, nor do I 
expect to grasp its meaning with any essential notion. Instead, I introduce Bernard Williams’s argument 
for the distinction between those “theories of truth” and “truth” in itself:   
“philosophical theories of truth, whether more or less ambitious, quite certainly have a 
history, whereas the concept of truth itself does not…we should resist any demand for a 
definition of truth, principally because truth belongs to a ramifying set of connected 
notions, such as meaning, reference, belief, and we are better employed in exploring the 
relations between those notions than in trying to treat one or some of them as the basis 
of the others” (Truth and Truthfulness 61-63). 
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the novel’s impact on readers” (226).    
       If realism is understood in light of its reality-effect, we need to register what  
Roland Barthes terms “the cultural rules of representation” in literary realism (“The Reality 
Effect,” The Rustle of Language 145). Regarding illusionary effects in representation, Barthes 
and Gombrich are interconnected. If it is all right to say that what the writer, like the painter, asks 
to represent in his writing is “not the nature of the physical world but the nature of our reaction 
to it,” and also if “he is not concerned with causes but with the mechanisms of certain effects,” 
what is prioritized in representation is a kind of norm that regulates one’s perception of reality 
(Art and Illusion 49). As an example of George Eliot’s allusion to these “mechanisms,” I quote 
her criticism on Rembrandt’s painting:  
The third characteristic of great art is sincerity. The artist should include the largest 
possible quantity of truth in the most perfect possible harmony. All the truths of nature 
cannot be given; hence a choice must be made of some facts which can be represented 
from amongst others which must be passed by in silence. ‘The inferior artist chooses 
unimportant and scattered truths; the great artist chooses the most necessary first, and 
afterwards the most consistent with these, so as to obtain the greatest possible and most 
harmonious scene.’ Thus, Rembrandt sacrifices all other efforts to the representation of 
the exact force with which the light on the most illuminated part of an object is opposed 
to its obscurer portions. (“Modern Painters, VOL. III” 371, italics original) 
 
In this passage George Eliot discusses Rembrandt’s technique of “chiaroscuro” and argues how 
important it is for “the artist” to make a certain choice between what is essential and not. What 
draws our attention to the meaning of “truth” is that pictorial representation is viewed as a 
carefully selected, highlighted representation and not something full of raw perception that “the 
artist” gets and expresses. This makes us wonder why George Eliot links such effective treatment 
on the part of “the artists” to the concept of “sincerity.” She does not explain in detail its 
meaning nor clarify how the artist’s sincerity can be recognized. Inferring from George Eliot’s 
other remarks that “Art must be real and concrete” and “insincerity” equals “inaccurate 
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language” (Haight 239; A.S. Byatt, xvii), one may assume that this term is significant in the 
context of truth-telling. But still a question arises about whether the truth of sincerity is mainly a 
matter of its effective way of representation. Here I must repeat a classical philosophy question 
about the implication of distinguishing an original from its imitation. Does George Eliot believe 
what she calls “truth” arrives with its ideal form? If, as Roland Barthes says, “verisimilitude is 
never anything but opinable” (Barthes 147, italics original) and thus that there is no kind of pure 
representation but only the interpretation of the artist (Gombrich 363), what is the standard in 
decoding the “truth” in aesthetic representations? For the answers to these questions, I turn to a 
careful reading of a passage from George Henry Lewes’s writing: 
Realism is thus the basis of all Art, and its antithesis is not Idealism, but Falsism. When 
our painters represent peasant with regular features and irreproachable linen; when their 
milkmaids have the air of Keepsake beauties, whose costume is picturesque, and never 
old or dirty; when Hodge is made to speak refined sentiments in unexceptionable English, 
and children utter long speeches of religious and poetic enthusiasm; when the 
conversation of the parlour and drawing room is a succession of philosophical remarks, 
expressed with great clearness and logic, an attempt is made to idealize, but the result is 
simply falsification and bad art…Either give us true peasants, or leave them untouched; 
either paint no drapery at all, or paint it with the utmost fidelity; either keep your people 
silent, or make them speak the idiom of their class. (“Realism in Art” 87, italics original) 
 
The paragraph above may be fully correlated to Eliot’s famous discussion of realism in chapter 
seventeen of Adam Bede. As in George Eliot’s writing, pictorial realism is rendered a comparison 
for literary realism. Just as George Eliot emphasizes “sincerity” and “truthfulness,” Lewes sets 
up “fidelity” as the rationale of realism. Following his argument, we sense that there should be a 
correspondence between a presumed notion and the actual image when one is embodying, for 
example, those “milkmaids” and “peasants” according to “their class.” Just as George Eliot 
criticizes “idyllic” representation of the peasantry (“The Natural History of German Life”), 
Lewes here denounces such idealistic depictions of working-class people. But Lewes’s 
distinction of “Realism” from “Idealism” or even from “Falsism” also can be a matter of 
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judgment. If we follow his explanation above, the issue of whether the writer gets his or her 
subjects from factual sources or not is less important than the congruence between what readers 
assume as a stereotype a priori and what they now perceive as an authentic representation. If the 
act of reading an artist is “to mobilize our memories and our experience of the visible world and 
to test his image through tentative projection” (Gombrich 314), then what Lewes values in 
realism in the quotation above is close to affirming the illusion made by readers’ empathetic 
involvement in figuring the diction, clothing, or setting with which these characters are 
presumably fitted. Radically speaking, Lewes, too, has a fixed, ideal notion about their images. 
Interestingly, Lewes talks about “true peasants” and asks that the writer “make them 
speak the idiom of their class.” This comment is discursive. First of all, we need to ask who the 
final guarantor is of which “true peasants” are really the “true peasants.” In addition, we should 
ask on what basis Lewes can suppose that it is possible for someone to “make them speak.” I 
also pay attention to these sayings because Raymond Williams criticizes the very “idiom” used in 
Adam Bede by indicating a split between the idiom of the writer and that of the country “people” 
described in the novel. He points out, in Adam Bede, “the difficulty of the coexistence, within 
one form, of an analytically conscious observer of conduct with a developed analytic vocabulary, 
and of people represented as living and speaking in main customary ways” (The Country and the 
City 169). In order to criticize “the difficulty of the coexistence,” he refers to those “externally 
formulated attitudes and ideas” that George Eliot attaches to each character’s voice in Adam 
Bede. In this sense, it is reasonable to question whether those “customary ways” of stereotyping 
George Eliot applies to the characters militate against her own credo of realism. This is because 
“though George Eliot restores the real inhabitants of rural England to their places in what had 
been a socially selective landscape, she does not get much further than restoring them as a 
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landscape” (168, italics original). I think the Williams’s criticism does justice to George Eliot’s 
realism if, following his analysis, the “separation and observation” of the author from “the real 
inhabitants” results in the failure of those characters’ individual characterization, which means 
that George Eliot’s projection of her “memory and reflection” misrepresents something and that 
her self-conscious alignment of herself with working-class people merely remains at the level of 
moralistic narcissism. Nevertheless, I argue that insofar as George Eliot reflects on her position 
in treating this landscape of her perspective, George Eliot’s intended “separation” or distance 
embedded in describing the landscape needs to be justified. For the example, I use the same long 
passage Williams analyzes in his text: 
Leisure is gone - gone where the spinning-wheels are gone, and the pack-horses, and the 
slow waggons, and the pedlars who brought bargains to the door on sunny afternoons. 
Ingenious philosophers tell you, perhaps, that the great work of the steam-engine is to 
create leisure for mankind. Do not believe them: it only creates a vacuum for eager 
thought to rush in. Even idleness is eager now - eager for amusement: prone to excursion 
trains, art-museums, periodical literature, and exciting novels: prone even to scientific 
theorizing, and cursory peeps through microscopes. Old Leisure was quite a different 
personage: he only read one newspaper, innocent of leaders, and was free from that 
periodicity of sensations which we call post-time. He was a contemplative, rather stout 
gentleman, of excellent digestion, - of quiet perceptions, undiseased by hypothesis: happy 
in his inability to know the causes of things, preferring the things themselves. He lived 
chiefly in the country, among pleasant seats and homesteads, and was fond of sauntering 
by the fruit-tree wall, and scenting the apricots when they were warmed by the morning 
sunshine, or of sheltering himself under the orchard boughs at noon, when the summer 
pears were falling. He knew nothing of week-day services, and thought none the worse of 
the Sunday sermon, if it allowed him to sleep from the text to the blessing, - liking the 
afternoon service best, because the prayers were the shortest, and not ashamed to say so; 
for he had an easy, jolly conscience, broad-backed like himself, and able to carry a great 
deal of beer or port-wine, - not being made squeamish by doubts and qualms and lofty 
aspirations: life was not a task to him, but a sinecure: he fingered the guineas in his 
pocket, and ate his dinners, and slept the sleep of the irresponsible; for had he not kept up 
his charter by going to church on the Sunday afternoons? Fine old Leisure! Do not be 
severe upon him, and judge him by our modern standard; he never went to Exeter Hall, or 
heard a popular preacher, or read Tracts for the Times or Sartor Resartus. (Adam Bede 
459)  
 
The irony of this retrospection is that the landscape of “Old Leisure” is foregrounded “as a 
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landscape.” George Eliot must be aware that the “Fine old Leisure” personified here is not a real 
but an ideal image where a pastoral tone is dominant. If we consider George Levine’s critique 
that nineteenth century realism “self-consciously examines its own fictionality” when it posits 
“the reality of an external world” (The Realist Imagination 21), the question of George Eliot’s 
distortion of the reality of the rural past, which is affected by her childhood memories must be 
distinguished from the evaluation of the author’s self-reflection on the nature of nostalgia.8 On 
the contrary, it might be taken for granted that the projection of the writer’s perspective into the 
landscape is a necessary choice for the purposes of fictionality. I have explained that, rather than 
perusing such a “substantial reality,” this study more focuses on clarifying George Eliot’s 
position in the landscape and what she tries to represent from there. The starting point is that the 
nostalgic point of view cannot but produce a landscape, in which George Eliot’s underlying 
motif is related to her memories and her sympathy for the “common, coarse people”: 
It is for this rare, precious quality of truthfulness that I delight in many Dutch paintings, 
which lofty-minded people despise. I find a source of delicious sympathy in these faithful 
pictures of a monotonous homely existence, which has been the fate of so many more 
among my fellow-mortals than a life of pomp or of absolute indigence, of tragic suffering 
or of world-stirring action. I turn, without shrinking, from cloud-borne angels, from 
prophets, sibyls, and heroic warriors, to an old woman bending over her flower-pot, or 
eating her solitary dinner, while the noonday light, softened perhaps by a screen of 
leaves, falls on her mob-cap, and just touches the rim of her spinning-wheel, and her 
stone jug, and all those cheap common things which are the precious necessaries of life to 
her…. In this world there are so many of these common, coarse people, who have no 
picturesque sentimental wretchedness! It is so needful we should remember their 
existence, else we may happen to leave them quite out of our religion and philosophy, 
and frame lofty theories which only fit a world of extremes. Therefore let Art always 
remind always us of them; therefore let us always have men ready to give the loving 
                                   
8 Therefore, Son Jeong Cho regards the nostalgia in Adam Bede as a strategic pathway to describe the 
past by saying that “nostalgia is produced by the distance rather than by the actual relationship with the 
referent that is referred. In other words, the passage deconstructs itself by revealing the narrativity and 
rhetoricity of the nostalgia. The passage is an allegory of the way in which the entire narrative is 
constructed; the past is to be looked back to, and it produces the narrative” (219). As such, we can assume 
that the reality in this landscape is, as Panofsky says, “a purely functional and not a substantial reality” 
(30). 
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pains of a life to the faithful representing of commonplace things. (AB 161-62)   
 
George Eliot’s reason to remember these “common people,” “commonplace things” is because of 
their universal presence. For the writer, the ignorance of their existence in the area of “Art” 
hitherto cannot be agreed any longer. According to Erich Auerbach, one of the foundations of 
“modern realism” comes from “the serious treatment of everyday reality, the rise of more 
extensive and socially inferior human groups to the position of subject matter for problematic-
existential representation” (Mimesis 391). Nevertheless, when George Eliot selects peasants and 
craftsmen including Adam Bede in order to represent the moral virtue of these common people, a 
parallax view happens because the peasant class was actually recognized as part of “a vanishing 
reality” in her times (Linda Nochlin, Realism 115). She is not blind to this historical fact and so 
says that “In England, at present, when we speak of the peasantry, we mean scarcely more than 
the class of farm-servants and farm-labourers; and it is only in the most primitive districts, as in 
Wales, for example, that farmers are included under the term. In order to appreciate what Riehl 
says of the German peasantry, we must remember what the tenant-farmers and small proprietors 
were in England half a century ago” (“The Natural History of German Life” 113). As if to 
practice what she said two years ago in that article, Adam Bede’s period goes back “half a 
century ago.” In this context, the Dutch paintings George Eliot’s narrator mentions as a model 
for her literary realism cannot be taken at face value for its anachronism, if we suppose that Eliot 
could have chosen her contemporaries like Courbet or Constable as examples of more authentic 
realist, landscape painters.9 More precisely, the Dutch realist paintings she discusses are 
                                   
9 Nineteen-century critics found an analogy between seventeenth-century Netherlandish paintings and 
contemporary European novels mainly in light of “the domestic realism,” focusing on their similarities, 
such as detailed descriptive style and the subject matter of “lowness.” Eliot’s “delicious sympathy” in the 
quotation is symbolical in that sense, because it indicates an aesthetic dimension in that feeling as well as 
an intended distance the writer keeps between the actual object and an ideal stereotype she has in mind. 
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presented as a metaphor for her nostalgia. Following Knoepflmacher’s view that “George Eliot 
creates a complete setting in which the naturalistic and the emblematic coexist” in Adam Bede 
(92), I argue that the rural community George Eliot retrieves in Adam Bede may be read as the 
place of a paradigmatic model for her moral vision, in which Adam’s “Eden” is created and his 
suffering and regeneration—like that of the hero in Paradise Lost–is realized with the arrival of 
sympathy (Knoepflmacher 89-127). To go further, I suggest that we should read Adam Bede as a 
result of a thought experiment in which George Eliot’s ethnological or anthropological interest, 
however nostalgic, overlaps with that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This argument is based on a 
few hypothetical premises, for whose verification I will borrow Claude Levi-Strauss’s reading of 
Rousseau. 
The first premise is that, in spite of George Eliot’s “faithful account” based on her 
memories and experiences, the country landscape in the novel is a discovered one. And this 
invented landscape functions as a model for the “unheroic,” “social tragedy” of Adam Bede 
(Barbara Hardy, The Novels of George Eliot 1-31). I argue that that kind of “model” situated in 
the country may be compared with that of Rousseau, for example, in his discussion of the “state 
of the nature.” This idea comes from Karatani Kojin who remarks that “realism in modern 
literature established itself within the context of landscape. Both the landscapes and the ‘ordinary 
people’ (what I have called people–as—landscapes) that realism represents were not ‘out there’ 
from the start, but had to be discovered as landscapes from which we had become alienated” 
(Origins of Modern Japanese Literature 29). Karatani’s main point is that the landscape in 
literary realism is the result of a de-familiarization of our conventional perception of reality. But 
as Raymond Williams says, “a working country is hardly ever a landscape.” And the notion of 
                                   
See Ruth Yeazell’s Art of the Everyday: Dutch Painting and the Realist Novel (2009). 
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landscape implies “separation and observation” (120). If the landscape of the countryside 
becomes the object of aesthetic “observation,” then it signifies the country anyhow becomes 
“alienated” from the observer. That is why we should read carefully George Eliot’s statement 
that “we have to recall [the connection with the past] by an effort of memory and reflection; for 
though our English life is in its core intensely traditional, Protestantism and commerce have 
modernized the fact of the land and the aspects of society in a far greater degree than in any 
continental country” (“The Natural History of German Life” 129). Riehl’s ethnological study of 
the German peasantry must have created a moment for George Eliot to reflect on “our English 
life.” But, let me say it again, these “people” in England are actually assumed to exist in the past. 
Therefore, their representation cannot but depend on ideal notions and stereotypes about which I 
have discussed, although George Eliot feels “a recognition of other kinds of people, other kinds 
of country, other kinds of action on which a moral emphasis must be brought to bear” (Williams 
166). It is no wonder that George Eliot’s realism “became more and more eclectic” in between 
these two necessities (Knoepflmacher 33). 
 
2.2 Self-complicity in Truth-Telling and George Eliot’s Rousseau 
It goes without saying that, as Raymond Williams says, when reading a country 
landscape, it is necessary to consider the writer’s position because it is “part of the community 
being known” (165). But, as we have discussed, there is an irony that George Eliot as the 
observer is conscious of her position in the process of observation. And such self-reflection on 
the part of the writer is particularly concerned with the notion of truth-telling that George Levine 
notes in nineteenth-century realism. If only for the goal of an objective representation, 
Rosemarie Bodenheimer argues, “George Eliot was, and had always been, her own best resisting 
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reader and … the creation of oppositional voices in the novels is a fictional development of a 
writing procedure she had practiced all her life” (The Real Life of Mary Ann Evans: George 
Eliot, Her Letters and Fiction, 55). For an example of the self-reflection that shows the writer’s 
sincerity, I quote a passage in chapter seventeen of Adam Bede, in which we find a trace of 
Rousseau’s Confessions. For the purposes of comparison, I read the introductory part of 
Rousseau’s Confessions alongside it:   
Certainly I could, if I held it the highest vocation of the novelist to represent things as 
they never have been and never will be. Then, of course, I might refashion life and 
character entirely after my own liking; I might select the most unexceptionable type of 
clergyman, and put my own admirable opinions into this mouth on all occasions. But it 
happens, on the contrary, that my strongest effort is to avoid any such arbitrary picture, 
and to give a faithful account of men and things as they have mirrored themselves in my 
mind. The mirror is doubtless defective; the outlines will sometimes be disturbed, the 
reflection faint or confused: but I feel as much bound to tell you as precisely as I can 
what that reflection is, as if I were in the witness-box narrating my experience on oath. 
(Adam Bede 159) 
 
I have resolved on an enterprise which has no precedent, and which, once complete, will 
have no imitator. My purpose is to display my kind a portrait in every way true to nature, 
and the man I shall portray will be myself.…Let the last trump sound when it will, I shall 
come forward with this work in my hand, to present myself before my Sovereign Judge, 
and proclaim aloud: ‘Here is what I have done, and if by chance I have used some 
immaterial embellishment it has been only to fill a void due to a defect of memory. I may 
have taken for fact what was no more than probability, but I have never put down as true 
what I knew to be false. I have displayed myself as I was, as vile and despicable when my 
behavior was such, as good, generous, and noble when I was so. I have bared my secret 
soul as Thou thyself hast seen it, Eternal Being! So let the numberless legion of my 
fellow men gather round me, and hear my confession. Let them groan at my depravities, 
and blush for my misdeeds. But let each one of them reveal his heart at the foot of Thy 
throne with equal sincerity, and may any man who dares, say “I was a better man than 
he.”’ (The Confessions 17)   
   
George Eliot’s adoration for Rousseau throughout her life is well known. Especially his 
Confessions is said to have impressed her strongly from her beginning as a writer through her 
last published writing of The Impressions of Theophrastus Such (1879).10 When asked by 
                                   
10 Ruby V. Redinger’s biographical research tries to establish a connection between Confessions and The 
Impressions of Theophrastus Such, particularly in terms of the writer’s self-reflection on “self-
revealment” in writing autobiography. See George Eliot: The Emergent Self, 16-18.  
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Emerson in July 1848 “what had first awakened her to deep reflection,” she answered 
“Rousseau’s Confessions” (Haight 65).11 What we can read from both passages above is a 
certain determination for truth-telling in the form of confessional voices. In each case, what 
guarantees the sincerity of the voice is the narrator’s confession itself, which delivers its 
experience without trying to hide its limitation. It is interesting to see that, as Rousseau stands 
before the “Sovereign Judge,” George Eliot’s confession takes a legal form when it is described 
as taking place “in the witness-box narrating my experience on oath.”  
Rousseau’s confession aside, George Eliot’s method of its verification sounds solipsistic 
since only “I” is standing as the final instance to judge the truth. As George Eliot asserts her 
faithful pose in describing reality by professing the partial aspects of her experience, this 
assumed candid subjectivity based on framed, limited experiences, as shown in the metaphor of 
mirror, makes at first a sort of paradoxical contribution to the reality effects by which Eliot 
attests that her fictional story as a real fiction at first, especially when we read the fairy-tale-like 
introduction of Adam Bede; but it finally makes the story apparently more authentic story by 
authorizing her voice alone. A risk comes to the fore when Eliot’s valorization of truth is seen as 
dogmatic in another sense, as the narrator cannot but monopolize her experience and guarantee 
its truthfulness.  
It is not too much to ask whether George Eliot’s apology for her incomplete 
representation has some self-complicit dimensions, and also to ask what we perceive as the 
author’s sincerity, which she has emphasized, is appropriated with a different sense in the 
                                   
 
11 Another episode that shows George Eliot’s passion for Rousseau is her saying to William Hale White 
in 1853. She said that it was “worthwhile to undertake all the labour of learning French if it resulted in 
nothing more than reading one book—Rousseau’s Confessions” (Haight 65). 
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passage above. In Lionel Trilling’s definition, sincerity generally means “a congruence between 
avowal, and actual feeling” (Sincerity and Authenticity 2), and “the avoidance of being false to 
any man through being true to one’s own self” (5). With respect to being truthful to the self, the 
narrator’s confession appears to be sincere enough. But Arthur M. Melzer argues that sincerity is 
not the same as honesty or frankness. While honesty involves “a self-disciplined adherence to the 
truth or to one's word,” the former does “an adherence to the self” (“Rousseau and the Modern 
Cult of Sincerity” 5, my italics). To be clear in identifying what is characteristic of each concept 
in identifying element of self-deception in sincerity or honesty, first, we need to pay attention to 
the metaphor of mirror above. Modern subjectivity cannot be separated from the work of self-
reflection, as Descartes’s cogito implies. But the notion of self-reflection through the mirror is 
debatable because of the logic of self-complicity through which the self recognizes its own 
projected image on the mirror; the mechanism of the mirror is totally different from that of the 
photograph (Transcritique 2).12 Likewise, the reality reflected in this mirror-like representation 
should be questioned for its collusion with narcissism. For example, we must consider Hetty’s 
pose before the “looking-glass”:  
[s]he could see a reflection of herself in the old-fashioned looking-glass, quite as distinct 
as was needful, considering that she had only to brush her hair and put on her night-cap. 
A queer old looking-glass! Hetty got into an ill-temper with it almost every time she 
dressed. It had been considered a handsome glass in its day, and had probably been 
bought into the Poyser family a quarter of a century before, at a sale of genteel household 
furniture….But Hetty objected to it because it had numerous dim blotches sprinkled over 
the mirror, which no rubbing would remove, and because, instead of swinging backwards 
and forwards, it was fixed in an upright position, so that she could only get one good 
view of her head and neck, and that was to be had only by sitting down on a low chair 
                                   
12 I believe Karatani’s critique on the mirror-metaphor in reflective subjectivity needs to be more 
elaborated with other epistemological theories, but his comment of “ ‘pronounced parallax’ between the 
mirror image and photographic image” can be adequately applied to explaining the real difference 
between the two assumed “objective” images.  
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before her dressing-table….But she pushed it all backward to look like the picture, and 
form a dark curtain, throwing into relief her round white neck. Then she put down her 
brush and comb, and looked at herself, folding her arms before her, still like the picture. 
Even the old mottled glass couldn’t help sending back a lovely image, none the less 
lovely because Hetty’s stays were not of white satin—such as I feel sure heroines must 
generally wear—but of a dark greenish cotton texture. (Adam Bede 135-36)   
        
We observe that Hetty is standing before a “defective” mirror and is trying to “look like the 
picture.” It is true that George Eliot implicitly criticizes the narcissistic perspective through the 
gaze of Hetty. But we should ask how this episode is related to Eliot’ metaphoric use of the 
mirror in the narration. Does sincerity have a tricky aspect if it is possible to see self-deception in 
the subject who desires to look sincere but is actually not? The very example both Bernard 
Williams and J.M. Coetzee points out from the Confessions is the episode of Marion through 
which Rousseau’s feeling of remorse and shame in retrospection is self-serving (Williams 173-
75; Coetzee 205-15).13 As a word indicating one’s self-justified truthful feeling, Trilling 
suggests another term: authenticity. My reading of Trilling is that if sincerity is akin to 
phenomenology authenticity is psychology. That is, the phenomenology of sincerity is double-
bound and ipso facto inter-subjective. The subject who can confirm one’s sincerity is not only 
the self but also the other. What is significant for its valorization in authenticity is not so much 
the affirmation from other people as one’s own feeling and confidence, which Charles Taylor 
calls the “self-determining freedom” in authenticity. While Taylor criticizes both individualism 
and narcissism in the notion of authenticity (The Ethics of Authenticity 25-41), Trilling and 
                                   
13 When his theft of a ribbon was discovered, Rousseau blamed Marion in fear of other people’s public 
censures, and “the bitter memory” of his shameful act is said to grow “more painful” for him and so make  
him confess his guilty mind (The Confessions 85-89). However, analyzing Paul de Man’s reading of 
Rousseau’s Confessions, Ben Roth argues, “Rousseau tries to evade responsibility for his frequently 
abhorrent actions, rationalize his misdeeds, and explain his life in any way that would leave him 
faultless.” See Roth, “Confessions, Excuses, and the Storytelling Self: Rereading Rousseau with Paul de 
Man” (2012). 
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Melzer both point out that sincerity has been understood in a social context, such that one could 
“sincerely act the part of the sincere person” before the public even though his action would not 
reflect his actual feelings (Trilling 10). In this case, feeling is secondary to action. However, 
according to Melzer’s argument, such hypocrisy is not the same as dishonesty. While “being true 
to one’s own self” is proposed not “as an end but only as a means” and may signify the 
perversion of sincerity (Trilling 9), the judgment of hypocrisy here must be ultimately related to 
the self rather than to one’s own word or truth. But honesty or dishonesty is often treated in 
terms of private, “authentic feeling” for one’s own autonomy.14 My conclusion is that, in George 
Eliot’s case, the “I” ’s stance is actually closer to honesty or authenticity rather than to sincerity 
because the standard of truth is fundamentally self-centered and beyond others’ verification. In 
fact, one can say that George Eliot’s readers do not have to care about how much or even 
whether the narrator’s mirror is “defective” or not. If this kind of warning functions as an excuse 
for any misrepresentation in spite of her good intention, this means that we cannot ask the writer 
to be responsible for the truthfulness of representation. I have mentioned the risk of self-
complicity caused by the projection of narcissism, in representing not only the landscape but also 
the self; however it tries to reflect consciously over its position. When I take into account Claude 
Levi-Strauss’s comments on Rousseau, the purpose is at the first hand to investigate the latter’s 
                                   
14 “The ethic of authenticity,” according to Charles Taylor, “is something relatively new and peculiar to 
modern culture” (The Ethics of Authenticity 25). And both Trilling and Melzer regard Rousseau as a great 
precursor in establishing the modern concept of sincerity, particularly in his Confessions. Nevertheless, in 
Trilling’s research of Rousseau, the division between sincerity and authenticity is not so clear, and one of 
the reasons is that Rousseau redefines sincerity within the context of romanticism. Rousseau’s concept 
related with authenticity becomes the target of Coetzee’s criticism especially in regard to truth-telling. 
What Coetzee questions radically from the Rousseau’s autobiographical writing is whether the self-
exposing gesture of his shame and guilt connected with his sincerity, in Confession, is self-deceived or 
not. I will treat in-detail these issues about truth-telling in Coetzee’s section. See Coetzee’s article, 
“Confession and Double Thought: Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky.”  
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impact on George Eliot in a deductive way.15 Levi-Strauss’s evaluation of Rousseau may 
provide a way to detect George Eliot’s influence by Rousseau, although these connections 
between Rousseau and Levi-Strauss would remain as hypotheses that would be retroactively 
induced to George Eliot. Actually, Oliver Lovesey’s research in Postcolonial Eliot (2017) is the 
only research that I have found concerning the connection between anthropology and George 
Eliot’s novels. Lovesey argues that “[a]n approach to fiction through the lens of anthropology, 
including that provided by perhaps the first anthropologist, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, 
was central to George Eliot’s practice, as articulated in her poetics of fiction in essays and 
reviews, letters, and metafictional ‘pauses’ in the early fiction, often beginning as clerical 
apologies” (51). Applying Derrida’s work on Levi-Strauss to our reading of Adam Bede also 
finds some similar points. Though the Confessions is revealed as the Rousseau text that affected 
George Eliot most strongly, it is not absurd to surmise that George Eliot would be familiar with 
other Rousseau’s texts, and it is possible to see to what extent Rousseau’s certain ideas—
including those about  sympathy—are mirrored in the writing of George Eliot. First of all, we 
                                   
15 What George Eliot actually had read from Rousseau are scattered in her letters. She does not seem to 
care much about Rousseau’s “errors.” Instead, she says as follows: 
 “[…] it would signify nothing to me if a very wise person were to stun me with proofs that 
Rousseau’s views of life, religion, and government are miserable erroneous—that he was guilty of 
some of the worst baselessness that have degraded civilized man. I might admit all this—and it 
would be not the less true that Rousseau’s genius has sent that electric thrill through my intellectual 
and moral frame which has awakened me to new perceptions, which has made man and nature a 
fresh world of thought and feeling to me…the fire of his genius has so fused together old thoughts 
and prejudices that I have been ready to make new combinations” (Haight 60).   
Particularly in terms of Rousseau’s mindfulness and “sympathy,” George Eliot’s comment below is 
somewhat telling: 
“It may not be an original idea, but never mind, if it be a true one, that the proper result of 
intellectual cultivation is to restore the mind to that state of wonder and interest with which it looks 
on everything in childhood. Thus, Jean Jacques Rousseau, couched on the grass by the side of a 
plant, that he might examine its structure and appearance at his ease, would have seemed to a little 
child so like itself in taste and feeling, that it would have lain down by him, in full confidence of 
entire sympathy between them, in spite of his wizard-like Armenian attire” (Redinger 152). 
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must focus on the self-image—the image that the subject projects onto itself. Thinking about 
Levi-Strauss will help us to do this.  
In his essay “Rousseau, Father of Anthropology” (1963), Levi-Strauss claims that 
“Rousseau did not just foresee anthropology, he actually founded it”: 
Firstly, he did so in practice by writing the Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of 
Inequality Among Men which posed the question of the relationship between nature and 
culture, and is perhaps the first treatise produced on general anthropology. Secondly, he 
founded the science in theory by setting down with remarkable clarity and precision the 
aims of the anthropologist as distinguished from those of the moralist and the historian: 
 
“When one wishes to study men, one must look close at hand; but to study man, 
one must learn to look into the distance; one must first observe the difference in 
order to discern the properties.” (Essay on the Origin of Language, Chapter VIII.)   
 
This method of approach which Rousseau assigned to anthropology marks the birth of the 
new science and helps to clarify what at first may appear to be a double paradox: that 
Rousseau could at one and the same time advocate the study of men living in the most 
remote corners of the earth, but in effect devoted most of his attention to the one man 
nearest to him namely himself; and that in all his writings his systematic desire for 
identification with others went hand in hand with his total refusal of identification with 
himself. (11)   
 
Levi-Strauss values Rousseau’s self-negation, the recognition of “a third person ‘he’ that thinks 
within me,” the “total refusal of identification with himself,” in order to reach “unconditional 
objectivity” (12). He takes this negation of one’s ideal image as a necessary step not only in 
writing one’s confession but also in any anthropological study. Levi-Strauss adds that in “the 
work of anthropology,” “the observer uses himself as his own instrument of observation” that 
makes him conscious of his position and sets distance to himself, and, in doing so, “the principle 
of ‘confessions’” works within himself. Nevertheless, we need to be skeptical about whether a 
self-projected image in the process of confession can arise. Because of one’s monologic self-
assurance of his or her own truthfulness, “the removal of distrust by first-personal explanation” 
(Bernard Williams 179) cannot be objective in itself. For that reason, I am suspicious of the 
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overtly exaggerated phrase of “an image in which they recognize their own image” that Levi-
Strauss writes when emphasizing the imagined affinity between Rousseau and “they,” those 
descendent anthropologists including Levi-Strauss. Another part of Levis-Strauss’s methodology 
is critical: 
The study of these savages leads to something other than the revelation of a Utopian state 
of nature or the discovery of the perfect society in the depths of the forests; it helps us to 
build a theoretical model of human society, which does not correspond to any observable 
reality, but with the aid of which we may succeed in distinguishing between ‘what is 
primordial and what is artificial in man’s present nature and in obtaining a good 
knowledge of a state which no longer exists, which has perhaps never existed, and which 
will probably never exists in the future, but of which it is nevertheless essential to have a 
sound conception in order to pass valid judgment on our present state.’ I have already 
quoted this remark to bring out the significance of my study of the Nambikwara. 
Rousseau’s thought, which was always in advance of his time, does not dissociate 
theoretical sociology from research in the laboratory or in the field, which he recognized 
as being necessary. Natural man did not precede society, nor is he outside it. Our task is 
to rediscover his form as it is immanent in the social state, mankind being inconceivable 
outside society; this means working out a programme of the experiments which ‘would 
be necessary in order to arrive at a knowledge of natural man’ and determining ‘the 
means whereby these experiments can be made within society.’ (Triste Tropiques 392)  
 
Levi-Strauss defends Rousseau by saying that Rousseau has been unfairly “maligned” and 
“misunderstood” because Rousseau is said to have glorified “the state of nature” (392). He tries 
to correct that prejudice by saying that it merely functions as a theoretical “model.” If we take 
Levi-Strauss’s comment without reservation, Rousseau’s approach to his anthropology is no 
more than the thought experiment he undertakes by entertaining “the model” (Triste Tropiques 
392). Actually, the “man” Rousseau concentrates on for his study turns out not to be other men 
but himself. Rousseau’s “model” or, in other words, “utopia” has been regarded as untrustworthy 
and so problematic by some critics because, according to Judith N. Shklar, the utopia is “a 
perfect way to express ideas that were dictated by personal imagination and by a profound need 
for self-revelation and self-vindication.” Simply speaking, Rousseau’s model lacks historicity 
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(Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory 1-12). Levi-Strauss seems to be aware 
of this censure when he says that “By taking as our inspiration a model outside time and place, 
we are certainly running a risk: we may be underestimating the reality of progress.” The word 
choice of “progress” sounds very unclear and even insincere, because there he erases the subject 
of “progress” and does not believe in its possibility in history (Triste Tropiques 392-93). Here I 
recollect J.M. Coetzee’s words that “[a]uthenticity does not demand that language reproduce a 
reality; instead it demands that language manifest its ‘own’ truth,” (“Confession and Double 
Thoughts” 209), and, in that sense, I argue that the language of a confessional anthropologist also 
needs to be checked with “historical verification.” This critique is related to Derrida’s comments 
on Levi-Strauss, in which Derrida criticizes particularly about Lévi-Strauss’s un-methodological 
projection of his empirical impression of the Nambikwara tribe in Brazil: 
Neither Descartes nor Husserl would ever have suggested that they considered an 
empirical modification of their relationship with the world or with others as scientific 
truth, nor the quality of an emotion as the premise of a syllogism. Never in the Regulae 
dose one pass from the phenomenologically irrefutable truth of “I see yellow” to the 
judgment “the world is yellow.” Let us not pursue this direction. Never, at any rate, 
would a rigorous philosopher of consciousness have been so quickly persuaded of the 
fundamental goodness and virginal innocence of the Nambikwara merely on the strength 
of an empirical account. (Of Grammatology, 127) 
 
While Levi-Strauss paints the landscape of the Nambikwara based on his personal experience in 
Triste Tropiques, Derrida questions the way his biased perspective is mixed with his “emotion.” 
It is obvious that this “emotion” is intertwined with Levi-Strauss’s feeling of nostalgia for the 
primitive past, which can be similarly compared to George Eliot’s. I suggest, then, that we revisit 
the passage in “The Natural History of German Life” where George Eliot’s self-conscious 
concern about “memory and reflection” turns toward the past. It is noteworthy that the subject of 
memory is not an individual but “we,” “English” people.  
The nature of European men has its roots intertwined with the past, and can only be 
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developed by allowing those roots to remain undisturbed while the process of 
development is going on, until that perfect ripeness of the seed which carries with it a life 
independent of the root. This vital connection with the past is much more vividly felt on 
the Continent than in England, where we have to recall it by an effort of memory and 
reflection; for though our English life is in its core intensely traditional, Protestantism and 
commerce have modernized the face of the land and the aspects of society in a far greater 
degree than in any continental country. (128-29) 
 
George Eliot’s relation to British nationalism is evident. For George Eliot, collective memories 
are possible, they are grounded in the country, and it is necessary to revivify them for the 
national identity. George Levine attends to this feature of George Eliot’s ideal landscape 
embedded in memories which are not “out there,” but in the “heart.” Although he does not 
explicate how or for what purpose George Eliot has to place these memories in the “heart,” the 
concept of “heart” should be discussed with other themes, such as George Eliot’s sympathy, that 
presuppose the distance of the observer before a spectacle. Let us consider the passage from 
Adam Bede that Levine uses as an example: 
What a glad world this looks like, as one drives or rides along the valleys and over the 
hills! I have often thought so when, in foreign countries, where the fields and woods have 
looked to me like our English Loamshire—the rich land tilled with just as much care, the 
woods rolling down the gentle slopes to the green meadows. I have come on something 
by the roadside which has reminded me that I am not in Loamshire: an image of a great 
agony—the agony of the Cross. It has stood perhaps by the clustering apple-blossoms, or 
in the broad sunshine by the cornfield, or at a turning by the wood where a clear brook 
was gurgling below; and surely, if there came a traveler to this world who knew nothing 
of the story of man’s life upon it, this image of agony would seem to him strangely out of 
place in the midst of this joyous nature. He would not know that hidden behind the apple-
blossoms, or among the golden corn, or under the shrouding boughs of the wood, there 
might be a human heart beating heavily with anguish….No wonder man’s religion has 
much sorrow in it: no wonder he needs a Suffering God. (327) 
 
This passage is about Hetty’s “journey” after she was informed of Arthur’s message of 
separation. A contrast occurs between the view of “joyous nature” and of the human “agony” 
hidden in the nature, whose difference is dramatized from each position (“over” and “by”) of the 
narrator. Reading this passage, George Levine refers to Ruskin’s interpretation of the sublime 
beauty of the Alps as seen in “a Turneresque painting,” which, according to him, is not yet 
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internalized as a feeling of “sadness.” Meanwhile, in George Eliot’s depiction of the nature 
above, Levine writes: “The extremes of experience are shifted from the Alps to the heart; there is 
the peril of the sublime, and there its idealization” (The Realistic Imagination 215). We cannot 
say exactly whether this feeling of “sadness” springs from Hetty herself. On the contrary, one 
would feel that it comes from the observer who keeps his distance and beholds Hetty’s journey in 
the context of these surroundings. Radically speaking, Hetty’s agony above is presented as a 
spectacle for the spectator’s sympathy. We must consider Raymond Williams’s comment that 
Hetty is not fully represented as an individual subject but merely as “an object of confession and 
conversion—of attitudes to suffering” (173, italics original). This means even Hetty’s “heart” is 
described for the ideal “sadness” in tragedy. All of this suggests that the spectacle of sympathy is 
another version of the landscape of sympathy. According to Karatani Kojin, it is Rousseau who 
initiated this kind of “idealization” when facing a real landscape.16 I add that Immanuel Kant 
follows that inversion of “romanticism” when discussing “sublimity” in his third Critique, where 
feeling is not in the outside nature, not in “the things of nature,” but is regarded by Kant as 
internalized in the “mind.”17 I think that George Eliot’s notion of the “heart” is influenced by or, 
                                   
16 Karatani Kojin says as follows: 
 “Rousseau, in his Confessions, describes his sense of oneness with nature when he was in the 
Alps in 1728. Although the Alps at that time were regarded simply as an annoyance and 
obstruction by Europeans, they began to flock to Switzerland to discover what Rousseau had 
seen. The Alpinist was a virtual creation of literature. Needless to say, it was Europeans who 
discovered the Japan Alps and initiated Japanese into the sport of mountain climbing…In the 
very moment when we become capable of perceiving landscape, it appears to us as if it had been 
there, outside of us, from the start. People began to reproduce this landscape. If this is “realism,” 
it has actually emerged from an inversion of romanticism.” (Origins of Modern Japanese 
Literature 29) 
 
17 Kant’s “sublimity” is expressively not in the physical “nature” but in the subject’s inner consciousness. 
He argues as follows:   
“Sublimity, therefore, does not reside in any of the things of nature, but only in our own mind, in 
so far as we may become conscious of our superiority over nature within, and thus also over nature 
without us (as exerting influence upon us). Everything that provokes this feeling in us, including 
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at least, has correlation to both Rousseau’s and Kant’s thoughts. 
 
2.3 The Tragedy of Sympathy and the Law 
If George Eliot’s sympathy is in the “heart,” what is in the outside is not only nature but 
also laws. Their contrast is highlighted especially when the author considers in-depth legal issues 
such as crime and responsibility for it. We find examples of this in Eliot’s novels from Hetty’s 
infanticide in Eliot’s first novel through Gwendolen’s willful negligence of Grandcourt’s 
drowning in the last novel. While Hetty’s punishment follows a due course with respect to 
consequences, Gwendolen is acquitted by Daniel because Daniel judges that her inaction is not a 
direct cause of Grandcourt’s death. These different processes of understanding the crimes, 
according to whether they are in action or in the mind, result in different consequences. Hetty’s 
“unthinking violence” (Hardy 27) makes her act not a sympathetic but merely a catastrophic 
event, although the narrator pities Hetty’s situation after that. Meanwhile, Gwendolen’s inability 
to actualize her desire of killing her husband ironically saves her from its penalty. Nevertheless, 
from the perspective of a moral standard, Gwendolen’s intention in itself could be castigated. As 
seen from these cases, Eliot’s complication of morality with judicial judgments in her novels 
presents a difficulty in rationalizing jurisprudence. To analyze George Eliot’s treatments of legal 
issues in the historical context of nineteenth-century’s criminal laws is beyond the range of this 
research. The point is that George Eliot presents a dilemma between duty as a law and sympathy 
as an ethical call in her moral philosophy. I argue that when Eliot emphasizes the practice of 
                                   
the might of nature which challenges our strength, is then, though improperly, called sublime, and 
it is only under presupposition of this idea within us, and in relation to it, that we are capable of 
attaining to the idea of the sublimity of that being which  inspire deep respect in us, not by the 
mere display of its might in nature, but more by the faculty which is planted in us of estimating 
that might without fear, and of regarding our estate as exalted above it.” (The Critique of 
Judgement 64) 
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sympathy for “the responsibility of tolerance” (The Mill on the Floss 404), it could be at odds 
with legal approaches to crime.  
This dilemma between the need of sympathy for the subject after an event like a crime or 
misbehavior and the observance of laws before the event denotes an inconsistency. That is, there 
exists a self-contradictory appeal between duty and sympathy regarding the event. Furthermore, 
the people who are asked to feel sympathy could be different from the people who should take 
the responsibility for the fact.18 Another problem is, if “man’s trespass had fortunate results” 
(Merleau-Ponty 177), and if the experience of suffering is a kind of pattern in tragedy for the 
growth of a hero, like Adam (Hardy 32), then, the question of how one’s pain or trespass should 
be judged with the premise of tolerance needs to be answered. Merleau-Ponty askes an 
existentialist question about this moral “ambiguity.” He takes an example of a Christian who 
should follow the commandments of “the Father”: 
The ambiguity of Christianity on the political plane is perfectly comprehensible: when it 
remains true to the Incarnation, it can be revolutionary, but the religion of the Father is 
conservative. Hindsight may reveal that sin helps create the general good and that man’s 
trespass had fortunate results. But one cannot say this at the moment of decision, for at 
that moment sin is still forbidden. Adam would therefore have done better to avoid sin. 
Perfection is behind rather than before us. The Christian always has the right to accept 
existing evil but may never purchase progress with a crime. He rally to a revolution that 
is already over, he can absolve it of its crimes, but he cannot start it (“Faith and Good 
Faith”177). 
                                   
18 George Eliot must have been aware of this dilemma before writing Adam Bede, at least when she 
reviewed Sophocles’ Antigone in 1856. In the article “The Antigone and Its Moral,” Eliot points out that 
this Greek tragedy highlights the conflict between Antigone’s “reverence for the dead and the importance 
of the sacred rites of burial” and “obedience to the State (laws)” decreed by Creon (364). Both of these 
seemingly antagonistic principles are justified in their own right, since there is “a good” in each part. Eliot 
concludes that the conflict between the two represents “that struggle between elemental tendencies and 
established laws by which the outer life of man is gradually and painfully being brought into harmony 
with his inward needs” (365). Yet, as Simon Goldhill explains, the matter of how to make the “harmony” 
in the tension “between inner freedom and external necessity” cannot but set up a significant ethical 
challenge. Goldhill remarks that such an interest in the conflict between legal and ethical issues was one 
of main concerns of nineteenth-century German Idealism. See Simon Goldhill, “The Ends of Tragedy: 
Schelling, Hegel, and Oedipus,” p. 636. 
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In relation to the “Hindsight” where “Perfection” always lies, U. C. Knoepflmacher discusses the 
paradox of a “fortunate fall” of Adam, which alludes to Milton’s Paradise Lost. According to 
Knoepflmacher, Hetty is compared to Eve and her eviction from Loamshire is regarded as a just 
punishment by the providence of “Nature,” whereas Adam’s regeneration through the awakening 
of his sympathy is regarded as an ideal ending according to George Eliot’s moral ideas on 
tragedy. Yet, when Knoepflmacher suggests that Eliot creates “a ‘cosmos’ containing both natural 
and moral laws” in Adam Bede, which corresponds to “the combination of ‘realism’ and 
moralism” (Knoepflmacher117), there exists a dilemma concerned with the responsibility of the 
subject. In the case of determinism in which “Nature” rules, as Kant explains, no human actions 
are free and so the question of responsibility is impossible. Meanwhile, the invocation of duty in 
one’s moral behavior presupposes the one’s autonomy free from the laws of the “Nature.”  
In chapter sixteen of Adam Bede, the rector Mr. Irwine and Arthur Donnithorne talk 
about the final subject of responsibility. Arthur insists that if someone is driven to make a 
mistake by external causes like “moods” or “circumstances,” he or she cannot be blamed. 
Arthur’s point is that if external factors precipitate a deed and so a certain action is inevitable, 
then the subject is free from its responsibility. But Mr. Irwine retorts that the “moods” are already 
conditioned by one’s “nature,” and “A man can never do anything at variance with his own 
nature.” Mr. Irwine repeats the word “nature” and reiterates that the final cause of a deed is from 
the actual agent who is supposed to act according to his or her own “nature.” For Mr. Irwine, 
neither taking into account one’s initial intention nor acknowledging the outer circumstances can 
be an excuse for one’s falling into a “folly.” Making legal judgments is, first of all, related to 
“Consequences” and they are beyond one’s compassionate understanding:  
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‘Ah, but the moods lie in his nature, my boy, just as much as his reflections did, and 
more. A man can never do anything at variance with his own nature. He carries within 
him the germ of his most exceptional action; and if we wise people make eminent fools 
of ourselves on any particular occasion, we must endure the legitimate conclusion that 
we carry a few grains of folly to our ounce of wisdom.’ 
‘Well, but one may be betrayed into doing things by a combination of circumstances, 
which one might never have done otherwise.’ 
‘Why, yes, a man can't very well steal a bank-note unless the bank-note lies within 
convenient reach; but he won't make us think him an honest man because he begins to 
howl at the bank-note for falling in his way.’ 
‘But surely you don't think a man who struggles against a temptation into which he 
falls at last as bad as the man who never struggles at all?" 
‘No, certainly; I pity him in proportion to his struggles, for they foreshadow the 
inward suffering which is the worst form of Nemesis. Consequences are unpitying. Our 
deeds carry their terrible consequences, quite apart from any fluctuations that went 
before—consequences that are hardly ever confined to ourselves. And it is best to fix 
our minds on that certainty, instead of considering what may be the elements of excuse 
for us.’ (Adam Bede 172-73) 
 
Lisa Rodensky argues that, in Adam Bede, George Eliot is in a degree inclined to what is called 
“Consequentialism,” a moral theory supported by the nineteenth-century’s utilitarianism (The 
Crime in Mind 100-122). Actually, what “[t]hat inexorable law of consequences” (“R. W. 
Mackay’s The Progress of the Intellect” 271) means for George Eliot is ultimately the natural 
law mastering the process of cause and effect, or a kind of determinism with which Eliot is said 
to be much preoccupied (Adam Bede 584).19  
In terms of the law with respect to consequences, Eliot’s notion of responsibility or duty 
departs from any humanitarian understanding. We read that after his secret love affair with Hetty 
is discovered by Adam, Arthur consoles himself by thinking that he “had been led on by 
circumstance.” As his feeling of shame overtakes his feeling of duty, Arthur makes up his mind 
                                   
19 The editor of Adam Bede Valentine Cunningham explains at the endnote that Eliot’s concern for 
determinism is in parallel with such as “Darwinians, Social Scientists, Sociologist, Marxists” (584). 
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to leave Hetty with a “sort of implicit confidence that he was really such a good fellow at 
bottom, Providence would not treat him harshly” (315). Though Arthur has a fear of 
“Providence,” he thinks it is on his side. The writer’s tone in here, nevertheless, sounds ironic 
and even sarcastic in that Arthur’s interpretation of “Providence,” which signifies a kind of 
divine justice in context, looks so personalized. It is almost like a belief in superstition. Most of 
all, Arthur’s moral judgment of his action and its consequence is based upon what George Eliot 
terms “egoism” for its abstract banality. Appealing to “Providence” has no ground in reality but 
is just regarded as an expression of “fear of consequences” which George Eliot regards as “only 
one form of egoism, which will hardly stand against half-a-dozen other forms of egoism bearing 
down upon it” (“The Poet Young” 202). Mr. Irwine understands Arthur’s appeal to one’s inner 
struggles in the process of an action. So, he tells Arthur that he would pity “in proportion to his 
struggles,” and explains the reason: “for they [struggles] foreshadow the inward suffering which 
is the worst form of Nemesis.” We can derive a concept of duty from Mr. Irwine’s saying that 
one should abstain from the attraction of a desire to a misleading, although the desire is 
instigated by its surroundings. Such words as “pity,” “inward suffering,” and “Nemesis” all 
indicate some allusions to the Greek tragedies. That is, sympathy and laws altogether are staged 
for the reader’s judgment.  
That the spectator’s sympathy is a surrogate for the actual pain of Hetty to the extent that 
it can be sustained implies that it is ultimately ideological and so could be staged like a theatrical 
performance. This observation resembles the eighteenth-century’s discourses on sympathy, 
especially from Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). Audrey Jaffe argues that 
“Smith depicts sympathy not as a direct response to a sufferer but rather as a response to a 
sufferer’s representation in a spectator’s mind” (Scenes of Sympathy 4). For instance, when 
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Smith mentions beggars in the street and other “wretches,” what he describes as the spectator’s 
first response is “horror” with such an “uneasy sensation” like “itching” (Smith 10). Then, the 
subsequent feeling of sympathy towards the beggars arises only when they are represented, not 
presented, to the spectator. During this process, Adam Smith reveals, the spectators are in an 
uncomfortable situation: “the thought of their own safety, the thought that they themselves are 
not really the sufferers, continually intrude itself upon them.” He continues: “though [“the 
thought of their own safety”] does not hinder them from conceiving a passion somewhat 
analogous to what is felt by the sufferer, [that thought] hinders them from conceiving anything 
that approaches to the same degree of violence” (22).20 As David Marshall notes, sympathy is 
possible in so far as some distance is maintained such that the spectator can have a perspective 
(The Figure of Theater 180-81). And for that reason, Marshall continues, sympathy entails 
skepticism. As “the age of sensibility [the eighteenth-century] must be played out in the age of 
skepticism,” both sympathy and skepticism “address the question of whether one person could 
enter into the thoughts and sentiments of someone else” (The Surprising Effects of Sympathy 
180). Hetty’s “agony” below shows this theatrical aspect of sympathy:  
Poor wandering Hetty, with the rounded childish face, and the hard unloving despairing 
soul looking out of it—with the narrow heart and narrow thoughts, no room in them for 
any sorrows but her own, and tasting that sorrow with the more intense bitterness! My 
heart bleeds for her as I see her toiling along on her weary feet, or seated in a cart, with 
her eyes fixed vacantly on the road before her, never thinking or caring whither it tends, 
till hunger comes and makes her desire that a village may be near. What will be the 
end?—the end of her objectless wandering, apart from all love, caring for human beings 
only through her pride, clinging to life only as the hunted wounded brute clings to it? 
God preserve you and me from being the beginners of such misery. (Adam Bede 389, 
emphasis mine) 
 
                                   
20 Jaffe associates this impossible identification with sufferers such as from social losers or the low-class 
people with the feeling of “horror,” and explains how the middle-class Victorian readers were wary of the 
risky invitation of sympathy in reading fictions. See Jaffe, Scenes of Sympathy: Identity and 
Representation in Victorian Fiction. 1-23. 
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The narrator appears to have a strong compassion for Hetty. The expression “My heart bleeds for 
her” testifies to the authenticity of that feeling. But the irony is that George Eliot exposes the 
ambivalent position of sympathy. Hetty’s suffering makes “you and me” recognize that they are 
exempted from the “misery.” That means, as Adam Smith says, the arrival of sympathy 
accompanies “the thought of [our] own safety.”  
Therefore, the caution of observers’ direct exposure to “terrifying” events in tragedies is 
necessary, and we can read it in Leonardo da Vinci’s lesson for representing a tragic spectacle in 
painting. In Regarding the Pain of Others (2003), Sontag introduces da Vinci’s words about how 
to create a tragic spectacle where beholders’ feeling of pity, not fear, can arise. Simply speaking, 
this is possible through the way a painter obscures detailed depictions of bloody scenes in a war 
to the extent that they do not look horrible but rather look beautiful (75). In contrast, Sontag says, 
we take different attitudes when watching a suffering body in a photograph. To make the 
suffering object appear as beautiful or “aesthetic” by cameras would be denounced as “heartless” 
and “inauthentic,” since a photograph is taken “as a transparent account of reality” (81).21 What 
makes the difference between the two is that, on the one hand, the reality effect of an image more 
or less depends on each medium’s technical specialty of conveying the verisimilitude of realness. 
On the other hand, choosing a medium for the representation of tragic events incurs not only 
aesthetic but also ethical issues. That is, if necessary, the experience of “shock” needs to be 
controlled in order for observers to exercise their sympathetic imaginations. George Eliot must 
have been conscious of this caution. While working on Adam Bede, George Eliot had received 
                                   
21   In a similar way, Peter Brooks notes that if only in terms of each medium’s technically mimetic 
accuracy, photography is given, unlike painting, with a sense in which it “records a moment of the real” 
That is to say, the function of “representation” in painting is replaced by “presentation” in photography 
(Realist Vision 86). 
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John Blackwood’s message, in which, after reading the manuscript of Scenes of Clerical Life 
(1857), the publisher asked Eliot to “soften” her depictions of the characters. Eliot answered as 
follows: 
The real town was more vicious than my Milby: the real Dempster was far more 
disgusting than mine: the real Jane alas! had a far sadder end than mine, who will melt 
away from the reader’s sight in purity, happiness and beauty. My sketches both of 
churchmen and dissenters, with whom I am almost equally acquainted, are drawn from 
close observation of them in real life, and not at all from hearsay or from the descriptions 
of novelists. . . Such of your marginal objections as relate to a mere detail I can meet 
without difficulty by alteration; but as an artist I should be utterly powerless if I departed 
from my own conceptions of life and character. There is nothing to be done with the 
story, but either to let Dempster and Janet and the rest be as I see them, or to renounce it 
as too painful. (Haight 235, italics original) 
 
Haight writes that throughout this letter Eliot “earnestly defends the artistic integrity of her 
realism” (234). Certainly, George Eliot stands firmly to Blackwood’s complaint that the writer’s 
depiction of characters is “harsher” than necessary. She stipulates that the representation of “the 
real town” is already a softer one than what it is supposed to be. Based upon her “close 
observation,” Eliot says, the depicted objects in each novella in a way come to terms with her 
“own conceptions of life and character.” What is clarified then is that, first, the novelist avoids 
trying to transcribe what is considered “the real” in a fiction for its accuracy, since it should be 
mediated by her conception. And, secondly, in order to invite readers’ sympathy, such a 
naturalistic illustration of “the real” is discarded for its “vicious,” “disgusting” effect. All these 
indicate that a sort of idealism becomes essential in Eliot’s country novels. 
 
2.4 Perspectivism and Memories in the Landscape of Sympathy  
If there exists an intended distance to the past from the position of the writer and if the 
writer herself is conscious of it in novel writing, I have argued, it deserves our critical attention. 
Perspectivism is inevitable for the writer in order to induce a realistic illusion, and this illusion 
  47 
has a relationship with Eliot’s emphasis on sympathy in particular. George Eliot is conscious 
about this point throughout her writing. As we think about this, we need to pay attention to the 
beginning sentence of Daniel Deronda (1876): “Men can do nothing without the make-believe of 
a beginning.” Before introducing the main story, the narrator pauses in the epigraph to ponder the 
function of the beginning of the novel. This pondering is a question about the conventions of the 
realistic novel, a wondering about whether there cannot be any other type of beginning. We see 
soon the appearance of main characters such as Deronda and Gwendolen and we see their 
surroundings in the beginning. But George Eliot takes a moment in the proceeding to make 
readers consider if the entering point to the first scene is really “the true beginning,” since the 
initial focus (like the “in medias res” poetry) can be understood as arbitrary. To paraphrase the 
narrator’s words, it is merely one of the many possible beginnings. There cannot be an absolute, 
necessary choice among them, and instead the choice is taken from the narrator’s virtually fixed 
perspective, which the narrator compares to the position of an astronomer who needs to fix his 
time and place in relation to the moving stars in watching them. There must be some difference 
in the parallax viewpoint. Likewise, George Eliot thinks it is impossible to capture the “true-
beginning.” Nevertheless, to whatever extent the beginning is but “a fraction of that all-
presupposing fact,” “make-believe” itself must be a condition for the start of the novel and, 
furthermore, as I will discuss in detail later, for the start of the sympathetic imagination.  
The reason I point out the invented dimension in the landscape of Adam Bede is because 
George Eliot thinks that it should be discovered, although it is shown as “a landscape” as 
Raymond Williams criticizes. Eliot’s discovery of the country landscape and its “people” 
registers that there comes a new perspective and a new necessity for describing them. However, 
it cannot be denied that what Nochlin calls a “myth” is attached to the novel. Concretely 
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speaking, the myth indicates “[t]he image of the toiler on the land as the very embodiment of that 
near-metaphysical entity ‘le peuple,’ that prototypical figure of quarante-huitard virtue, a figure 
of unchanging, unassailable value in the midst of an all-too-swiftly changing industrial, urban 
and commercial world” (Nochlin 115). Since the decline of the peasantry in England accelerated 
with the Enclosures in the early nineteenth-century, what remained in the British countryside 
could not present the writer a pastoral picture at the time when Eliot was trying to remember 
these “common” people and to restore the value attributed to them. I have already briefly 
mentioned George Eliot’s comment on collective memories projected into the rural past and their 
connection to the British nationalism. The final criticism in this chapter goes to this mythical link 
between the concepts of memory and the country in which George Eliot’s ideological inclination  
unfolds. I argue that the politics of memory works within Eliot’s country novels, especially when 
it is exclusive for its selectiveness. For this argument, I wish to discuss Adam Bede alongside 
other country novels of George Eliot such as The Mill on the Floss (1860) and Silas Marner 
(1861). 
According to Elizabeth K. Helsinger, the rural community can be taken as a place to 
locate national characteristics, since “rural scenes” are “at the center of a nationalizing culture as 
touchstones of moral scenes and social stability, not sites of contemporary struggle” (Rural 
Scenes and National Representation: Britain, 1815-1850, 218). Thus, the connotation of the 
“country” in the novel implies its parochial setting and the existence of a national readership at 
the same time. In her country fictions, George Eliot repeats the word “tie” and emphasizes the 
theme that “we” are linked together and that “We are children of a large family” (Adam Bede 
264). Leaving aside the factuality of that “tie,” we can surmise that the audience George Eliot 
has in mind in the usage of “we” must be English readers, if their boundary transcends the 
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British islands into the colonial worlds. My premise is that the “we” “tied” by “our” collective 
memories would accept “our” identity without any reserve; but those who do not share “our” 
memories and do not look like “us” and do not keep the same beliefs may incur disorders and 
may feel wary of the insiders in the community of that “we.” Such a contrast can be more easily 
represented in a rural community than in an urban one because, as Raymond Williams says, “In 
the city kind, experience and community would be essentially opaque; in the country kind 
essentially transparent” (165). I criticize here the limitation of the “we” that George Eliot 
imagines, especially when its mechanism is exclusive for the British nationalism.  
Except in the case of a few novels such as Romola and Daniel Deronda, the main settings 
in Eliot’s novels are concentrated on small villages and country towns, perhaps because she feels 
it needful to describe the “commonplace things,” the life of “vulgar citizen” with the help of 
“vulgar details” (Adam Bede 161-62). Notwithstanding this microcosmic focus in Eliot’s novels, 
I pay attention to those neglected or insignificantly treated people, like the gypsies in The Mill on 
the Floss, because I think they are missed from the link created by the word of “tie.” Let me 
suggest two explanations for this argument in advance: first, Eliot has little concern about the 
existence of non-British citizens, whether they live in the country or not, because they are not 
qualified to enter the public sphere as legitimate citizens of the British empire; the second is that 
George Eliot realizes British identity by discovering the “common people” and, at the same time, 
by contrasting their identity with the cultural “other22” through the negative representation of the 
other.  
                                   
22 For the definition of the “other” in this chapter, I follow that of Alicia Carroll in Dark Smile. In using 
the term of “(cultural) Other,” she writes it from “a perspective which reorganize Otherness as an 
invention of a dominant culture, here the culture of Victorian England” (xvii). Although she capitalizes 
the first initial of “Other” in order to suggest “its constructedness,” I will use the word “other” with the 
same context. 
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For George Eliot, one of the elements that constitute one’s identity is one’s consciousness 
and experience of time. Only the self who keeps its time consciousness can build its identity 
from the past to the present. Such consciousness and experience in the duration of time, (which 
can be translated otherwise as memory, tradition, or history), are treated with great importance in 
George Eliot’s novels. For example, we can think about the loss and recovery of Silas Marner’s 
memory in the eponymous novel. When he leaves Lantern Yard and settles in Raveloe, he 
discards his past memory as it is affiliated with the treachery of his friend William Dane. It is no 
wonder then that when he becomes integrated within his community later and regains his 
happiness with the help of his neighbors, his mind “grows into memory” (Silas Marner 134). 
That is, he recovers a “consciousness of unity between his past and present” (151). We see that 
the hero’s reconciliation with his past is possible only with the accumulation of small 
“fragments” of his memories and when he is helped by the patient listener Dolly Winthrop, who 
“revolve[s] what she had heard till it acquired some familiarity for her” (152). By repeating the 
narration of the past, he cures himself and now the past story becomes not only his but also hers. 
As he himself recovers his lost memory, the past is no more his “other,” but his identity. 
Therefore, the adaptation of Silas Marner into a new community reminds us of George Eliot’s 
emphasis on the role of community. Because of this, I do not think that Silas Marner’s transition 
from an exile to the citizen of Raveloe is a real representation of “other” people in the British 
society. To the contrary, his belonging consolidates the role of community. As Josephine 
McDonagh puts, Silas Marner is “a fable of assimilation within English Communities” (“Space, 
Mobility, and the Novel” 64). 
For another example of cultural otherness, I discuss the gypsies in The Mill on the Floss. 
The episode of Maggie’s journey into the gypsy community in The Mill on the Floss has 
  51 
attracted some critics’ attentions, especially in terms of the issue of race and colonialism. What 
they discuss in this episode is, briefly speaking, the correspondence between Maggie’s marginal 
position in her society and the characterization of the gypsies as another colony or cultural other 
in this society.23 Susan Meyer remarks the “tragic tension” of Maggie with her society that is 
symbolized by her pigmentation (Imperialism at Home130) ; the appearance of Maggie in her 
childhood incurs the titles of “mulatter” and “gypsy.” Her skin color looks “twice as dark as 
usual” when she is by the side of a white cousin Lucy (Mill on the Floss 52). The comment of 
Tom and the narration of Maggie’s inner consciousness about the gypsies seem to be a raw, 
unfiltered expression of stereotypes about gypsies: they are “thieves, and hardly got anything to 
eat, and had nothing to drive but a donkey” (88). As such, whatever drives Maggie to meet the 
gypsy community and makes her wish to see the queen of gypsies, her impression of the 
community cannot but remain fragmented and illusionary. That is, Maggie’s alienated position 
cannot lead her to have a real relationship with the Gypsies, because the gypsies are, in reality, 
absolute others or total strangers in British society.24 The benevolent action of Maggie who tries 
to be their friend and teacher can be interpreted as an expression of her good will, though it 
                                   
23 Philip Fisher says that with the gypsies this novel creates “its symbols of those live in the land but not 
in the society.” The gypsies represent “a pole outside the social life, a pole of those who accept being 
outlaws and wanderers” (“Self and Community in The Mill on the Floss” 541). Similarly, in the article 
“History’s Progress in The Mill on Floss,” Susan Meyer follows such polarizing schema that posits the 
stance of Maggie in the borderline between the white Anglo-Saxon’s civilized society and the dark 
gypsies’ savage world. Meyers’s study reveals that although George Eliot criticizes the conservative 
norms and customs that regulate the feminine individuality of young Maggie, her fleeing into the gypsies 
cannot be an alternative she can take, because Maggie’s link with and her similitude to the gypsies are, 
fundamentally, just “metaphorical,” not “literal” (134). 
 
24 In Dark Smiles: Race and Desire in George Eliot (2003), Alicia Carroll explains how Europeans had 
thought about gypsies: “Marked by the darkness of their skin, hair, and eyes, Gypsies could embody 
multiple European fears and fantasies of racial contamination and sexual debauchery” (33); “The Gypsy 
was a highly visible scapegoat, breaking laws not just of towns and country but of culture and gender as 
well, and Gypsies found a special place as kidnappers within the burgeoning Victorian cult of the child” 
(34). 
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seems also to be childlike. However, the failure of Maggie’s friendly gesture toward the gypsies 
shows allegorically that the imaginary coexistence and communication between the British and 
the gypsies are not so successful.  
 As we have discussed, George Eliot’s limitation in imagining a community in her works 
makes her focus on the construction of British identity and of British memory, rather than try to 
include the foreign, racial others. In that sense, it would not be so wrong to say that the process 
of exclusion of the “other” operates also at the level of memory: 
There is no sense of ease like the ease we felt in those scenes where we were born, where 
objects became dear to us before we had known the labor of choice, and where the outer 
world seemed only an extension of our own personality; we accepted and loved it as we 
accepted our own sense of existence and our own limbs. Very commonplace, even ugly, 
that furniture of our early home might look if it were put up to auction; an improved taste 
in upholstery scorns it; and is not the striving after something better and better in our 
surroundings the grand characteristic that distinguishes man from the brute, or, to satisfy 
a scrupulous accuracy of definition, that distinguishes the British man from the foreign 
brute? (Mill on the Floss 127, my emphasis) 
 
This scene is from the part of the novel when Tom return to his home for the reunion with his 
family at Christmas. George Eliot expresses here how the feeling of Tom’s familiarity with his 
home town and the experience contacted with small, common things around him could be 
precious for his identity. Needless to say, this is an emphasis on (the British) tradition and 
community. But the British identity here is consolidated again by the distinction of the “British 
man” from the “foreign brute.” And this “foreign brute” may indicate for George Eliot the 
vagrant who cannot hold his furniture and fix his memory at a certain place, like the gypsies in 
The Mill on the Floss.  
As Helsinger says, “by making scenes of English village life crucial to stories of 
personal and national identity,” Eliot invites English readers to their “nostalgia” (Helsinger 218). 
We may guess, then, that the “other” cannot receive the invitation to the nostalgia of rural 
community because the “other” and the British do not share together any memory. In that sense, 
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the small country settings in Eliot’s novelistic landscapes are, in themselves, ideological places 
that contain the British nostalgia or history, and identity. It is no wonder that the morality 
including sympathy in both family and neighborhood are examined as central issues in some of 
Eliot’s novels. This is because these communities are moral axes that support the nostalgia of 
British society, which in Eliot’s times met some crises brought about and affected by the 
Industrial Revolution:   
The other main consequence was the destruction of the peasantry. Brutal and heartless 
though the conclusion appears, there are strong grounds for holding that this contribution 
to peaceful democratic change may have been just as important as the strengthening of 
Parliament. It meant that modernization could proceed in England without the huge 
reservoir of conservative and reactionary forces that existed at certain points in Germany 
and Japan, not to mention India. And it also of course meant that the possibility of 
peasant revolutions in the Russian and Chinese manner were taken off the historical 
agenda. (Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 30) 
 
According to Barrington Moore’s analysis, the demise of British peasantry in the nineteenth 
century is a necessity for the growing of British democracy. If “there is no private life which has 
not been determined by a wider public life” (Felix Holt: The Radical, 50), it can be said that the 
destiny of each character in Adam Bede is likewise a determined one, as the concept of “Nature” 
implies. Nevertheless, George Eliot’s appeal to sympathy and the evocation of the “common 
people” in Adam Bede can be read as a response to this “[b]rutal and heartless” change that she 
experienced. At least, George Eliot would have thought that her response is meaningful because 
“Art is…a mode of amplifying experience and extending our contact with other fellow-men 
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CHAPTER III 
 
J. M. COETZEE’S QUESTION OF TRUTH-TELLING AND OTHERNESS 
“getting to the real self (finding the Mystery I) is a life’s task, like cleaning the Augean 
stables.” (Coetzee, Giving Offense 231) 
 
3.1 Coetzee’s Autobiography and Truth-Telling in Youth 
In order to discuss Coetzee’s thought about truth-telling in autobiographical writing, I 
take the example of Coetzee’s second memoir Youth (2002).25 If, according to Coetzee, “what 
calls to be confessed” in one’s confession is “a truth about himself that he does not yet know,” I 
think the text shows much of his unknown truth or hidden desire in a way (“Confession and 
Double Thoughts 194).26 There we meet a somewhat fictional representation of the inner 
dialogue between two persons across the time of the past and the present. Coetzee here embodies 
himself as a young man who has left his native country South Africa and has now settled in 
London. In the job interview with IBM for computer programming, “he” says that “he has left 
South Africa for good” since “the country is heading for revolution” (44-45). While working 
there, he spends his weekends going to the cinema, reading in the British Museum, and trying to 
write poems sometimes. Finally, he comes to write a bit of prose intrigued by an unknowable 
impulse within: 
The story is set in South Africa. It disquiets him to see that he is still writing about 
                                   
25 Coetzee’s biographer J. C. Kannemeyer says that Youth also can be read as Künstlerroman following 
the tradition of James Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (Kannemyer 506).  
 
26 Coetzee has published three autobiographical works until now: Boyhood (1997), Youth (2002), and 
Summertime (2009). David Attwell and J. C. Kannemeyer call these texts as Coetzee’s “autobiographies” 
(Attwell 153) or “autobiographical trilogy” (Kannemeyer 607) while Derek Attridge classifies them as 
confessions (see Derek Attridge. J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading. 138-61.) In order to tell some 
differences from these terms, it would be useful to refer to Coetzee’s own definition. First of all, the 
confession is distinguished from the memoir and the apology, “on the basis of an underlying motive to tell 
an essential truth about the self” (“Confession and Double Thoughts: Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky” 
194). 
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South Africa. He would prefer to leave his South African self behind as he has left 
South Africa itself behind. South Africa was a bad start, a handicap. An 
undistinguished, rural family, bad schooling, the Afrikaans language: from each of these 
component handicaps he has, more or less, escaped. He is in the great world earning his 
own living and not doing badly, or at least not failing, not obviously. He does not need 
to be reminded of South Africa. If a tidal wave were to sweep in from the Atlantic 
tomorrow and wash away the southern tip of the African continent, he will not shed a 
tear. He will be among the saved. (62) 
 
The young Coetzee’s antagonism towards South Africa seems to be obvious. He decides to get 
away from the colonial influences by consciously “becoming English.” To achieve this goal, he 
has chosen the way of the middle-class, not the working class, of English life (103). In spite of 
strenuous efforts to be assimilated into English life, however, he could not get rid of “an air of 
colonial gaucherie” (71). He feels himself still treated as a foreigner and sometimes confused by 
those haunting images and memories of the past. Ironically, while reading street names of South 
Africa in the library with “an eerie feeling,” he is “captivated by stories of ventures into the 
interior, reconnaissances [sic] by ox-wagon into the desert of the Great Karoo, where a traveler 
could trek for days on end without clapping eyes on a living soul” (137). We know that this 
Karoo, with which the narrator is familiar, forms the background of Coetzee’s early two novels 
In the Heart of Country (1977) and Life & Times of Michael K (1983). Therefore, we see a 
contradiction. On the one hand, the young Coetzee wants to “cut all bonds with the past” (Youth 
98). But, on the other hand, he has recuperated it in the first prose writing. Whereas “South 
Africa is a wound within him” (116), it appears to be an attractive item for the first story. This 
memoir stops before Coetzee’s next migration to Austin, Texas where he lived while doing his 
doctoral course in English literature.    
One of the thematic concerns in this memoir is the young immigrant’s inner conflict 
between his colonial heritage and his artistic ego that aspires to be recognized as a writer in the 
Western world. In order to review this conflict, Coetzee practices what he said in the inaugural 
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speech as a full professor at the University of Cape Town in 1984: that is, to “write down an 
explanation” to himself in this autobiography. Entitled “Truth in Autobiography,” Coetzee’s 
speech takes the example of Rousseau’s Confessions and points out an ambivalence in 
confessional writing “between finding the truth and telling the truth”:   
Telling the story of your life […] is not only a matter of representing the past [,] but 
also a matter of representing the present in which you wrestle to explain to yourself 
what it was that really happened that day, beneath the surface (so to speak), and write 
down an explanation which may be full of gaps and evasions but at least gives a 
representation of the motion of your mind as you try to understand yourself. Indeed, the 
lies and evasions may be more interesting than the visit itself. (qtd. in Kannemeyer 434, 
italics original)  
 
In terms of “telling the truth” about oneself, Coetzee postulates that the process of self-dialogue 
or self-persuasion is preliminary to the representation of “I.” In the case of “finding the truth,” 
Coetzee stresses that the “lies and evasions” are inevitable and, ironically, “more interesting” for 
that reason. Now let us see how Coetzee tells and finds his own truth in this writing. 
Coetzee explains to himself why he left his native country and chose a metropolitan city 
in Europe.27 The narrator, who speaks in the present tense but must be assumed to have a 
dialogue with the Coetzee in the past, comments that “he cannot accept that the life he is leading 
here in London is without plan or meaning” (59). In fact, his initial plan “was to qualify as a 
mathematician then go abroad and devote himself to art” (22). Although he has quickly become 
“exhausted all the time” with his London life, Coetzee reminds himself of the determination he 
made before coming to England and reminds himself of those modernists like T. S. Eliot, Frantz 
Kafka, and Wallace Stevens, all of whom once had to earn their living doing something besides 
                                   
27 Beside London, the narrator, who represents the young Coetzee’s inner voice, mentions other big cities 
such as Paris and Vienna for his options in order to live a proper life as an artist. He believes that “Destiny 
would not come to him in South Africa,” but would come only in these cities “because only in the great 
cities of Europe does destiny reside” (Youth 165). 
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writing (60). In the end, he finds his own answer to account for the “meaning” of his living in 
London—“Experience”: 
That is the word he would like to fall back on to justify himself to himself. The artist 
must taste all experience, from the noblest to the most degraded. Just as it is the artist’s 
destiny to experience the most supreme creative joy, so he must be prepared to take 
upon himself all in life that is miserable, squalid, ignominious. It was in the name of 
experience that he underwent London—the dead days of IBM, the icy winter of 1962, 
one humiliating affair after another: stages in the poet’s life, all of them, in the testing 
of his soul. (164) 
 
Reading in context, we may think that the idea that “The artist must taste all experience” should 
be from the young Coetzee. However, since the present tense is mixed with the past tense in this 
passage, it brings about the effect of double retrospections of the narrator. That is, we cannot 
decide who is actually speaking when reading, for example, this statement: “It was in the name 
of experience that he underwent London.” This can be spoken from the past, from young 
Coetzee’s perspective, or from the present, from old Coetzee’s perspective. Likewise, we may 
wonder whether the “plan or meaning” aforementioned is, in fact, invented or, at least, redefined 
from the narrator’s present moment of writing. The reason is that the diction of “experience” 
itself proves the narrator’s hindsight, which would be or would have been necessary “to justify 
himself to himself.” So, if a sort of self-persuasion is proceeding in this writing moment, this 
means that the “artist’s destiny” is, in a sense, re-justified at a meta-autobiographical level.  
Nevertheless, Coetzee’s remarkable virtuosity in this memoir is that he makes himself 
appear as the most critical biographer about himself. The justification of his London life in the 
name of “experience” incurs another “countervoice” within himself as he senses that there is an 
element of pompousness. Even though a self-comforting fantasy would be required for his living 
with “plan or meaning,” he realizes that this comes out of his false consciousness. After all, he 
acknowledges that this self-justification is “contemptible sophistry”: 
It is a justification that does not for a moment convince him. It is sophistry, that is all, 
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contemptible sophistry. […] so telling self-justifying lies to oneself is getting to know 
intellectual squalor at first hand, then the sophistry will only become more 
contemptible. There is nothing to be said for it; nor, to be ruthlessly honest, is there 
anything to be said for its having nothing to be said for it. As for ruthless honesty, 
ruthless honesty is not a hard trick to learn. On the contrary, it is the easiest thing in the 
world. As a poisonous toad is not poison to itself, so one can soon develops a hard skin 
against one’s own honesty. (164-65)    
   
The main criticism above is about the self-complicity in telling the truth about oneself. He 
reflects that “ruthless honesty” is not a quintessential factor in judging one’s truthfulness to 
oneself. Rather, he argues that this honesty could be used as an illusion for self-deception when it 
is blind to “self-justifying lies.” To clarify the reason he had to speak these lies to himself and, at 
the same time, to make the narrator apologize for these errors would be the final end of this 
autobiography. Frankly speaking, this exposition aims to excavate Coetzee’s unconscious desire, 
which is unknown to him, and it requires our recognition of his sincerity in this trial. This is the 
writer’s confessional approach to the distanced self who is supposed to exist in that specific 
period. Notwithstanding this, what is problematic in this narration is that “he” is in a paradox in 
which he keeps a self-reflective distance enough to know that he has been making the “self-
justifying lies to oneself.” We need to be careful in detecting an invisible voice that continues 
this self-interrogation within the text. It is reasonable for the reader to question Coetzee’s meta-
critical position and the underlying motif of “sophistry” that “he” also criticizes here. I do not 
argue that Coetzee here performs “lies and evasions” intentionally. But, as George Eliot says in 
her last work Impressions of Theophrastus Such (1879), “half our impressions of his character [in 
an autobiography] come not from what he means to convey, but from what he unconsciously 
enables us to discern” (5). What we have discerned up to now is Coetzee’s performative 
skepticism about his truth-telling in this recollection.  
The ending part of Youth shows “his failure as a writer.” Instead, an awakening shows 
that “At thirty one is too old to be a programmer: one turns oneself into something else…or one 
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shoots oneself” (168). Coetzee’s interview with David Attwell tells that “in the mid 1960s he 
[Coetzee] quits computers in favor of an academic life.” He adds that this was “a life-saving 
decision on his part” (Doubling the Point 393). Hence, despite his failure as a poet or as any 
other type of a writer in England, the young Coetzee’s decision to continue his self-exile in 
America thereafter may need to be justified in some way. His answer is that it was a matter of 
survival for him so that he did not want to shoot himself.  
Coetzee’s adoration for the European culture that is affiliated with his literary ambition 
has a history. His 1991 lecture entitled “What Is a Classic?” is a good reference. What attracts 
my attention in this lecture is Coetzee’s confession based on a memory when he was fifteen. 
Discussing the canonicity of a classic, Coetzee revisits his past experience of having heard 
Bach’s Well-Tempered Clavier:  
   One Sunday afternoon in the summer of 1955, when I was fifteen years old, I was 
mooning around our back garden in the suburbs of Cape Town, wondering what to do, 
boredom being the main problem of existence in those days, when from the house next 
door I heard music. As long as the music lasted, I was frozen, I dared not breathe. I was 
being spoken to by the music as music had never spoken to me before… 
The revelation in the garden was a key event in my formation. Now I wish to 
interrogate that moment again, using as a framework both what I have been saying 
about Eliot—specifically, using Eliot the provincial as a pattern and figure of myself—
and, in as more skeptical way, invoking the kinds of questions that are asked about 
culture and cultural ideals by contemporary cultural analysis.               
The question I put to myself, somewhat crudely, is this: Is there some non-vacuous 
sense in which I can say that the spirit of Bach was speaking to me across the ages, 
across the seas, putting before me certain ideals; or was what was really going on at that 
moment that I was symbolically electing high European culture, and command of the 
codes of that culture, as a route that would take me out of my class position in white 
South African society and ultimately out of what I must have felt, in terms however 
obscure or mystified, as an historical dead end—a road that would culminate (again 
symbolically) with me on a platform in Europe addressing a cosmopolitan audience on 
Bach, T. S. Eliot, and the question of classic? In other words, was the experience what I 
understood it to be—a disinterested and in a sense impersonal aesthetic experience—or 
was it really the masked expression of a material interest? (“What Is a Classic?: A 
Lecture” Strange Shores 9)   
 
As for the truthfulness of the “experience,” it is beyond our criticism because the word 
“revelation” guarantees its authenticity. We may guess that “revelation” here is an analogy to the 
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“epiphany” in the classic modernist conceptualization. (Coetzee’s comment on T. S. Eliot and 
Ezra Pound in this lecture proves their connection). Suffice it to say that a certain kind of 
subjectivism is necessary in this case. Coetzee is aware that, valorizing Bach as a classic aside, 
his personal experience could affect the evaluation of the music as a canon, and that, in this 
evaluation, a certain prejudice like Coetzee’s “class position” or “material interest” could 
intervene. That is to say, if this experience was very special for Coetzee, much of the reason is 
affiliated with Coetzee’s “social marginality” in South Africa.28 Referring to this experience of 
“revelation,” the biographer Kannemeyer notes Coetzee’s “unconscious decision…to align 
himself with a European canon and tradition.” Kannemeyer continues, “he would not get stuck in 
a small corner of provincial South Africa, but that he would enter the greater world of the 
metropolis. He became determined to escape from the periphery to the epicenter; to escape 
colonial restriction and become part of the mainstream of Western civilization. (Kannemeyer 74-
75). As we have read from Youth and this passage as well, it is not certain whether we should 
regard this decision as an “unconscious” one because Coetzee has already interrogated the self-
complicity of his interest in remembering Bach’s music.   
Recounting these examples of T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound, Coetzee writes in the essay 
that “to such young people” who live in the colonial world, “the high culture of the metropolis 
may arrive in the form of powerful experiences” (“What Is a Classic?” 6). It goes without saying 
that such impact connotes Coetzee’s own experience. When South Africa is denounced as a place 
of “boredom,” the young colonial boy’s dream to escape the country would work as a catalyst for 
the reception of the “spirit of Bach.” And the next step, as shown in Youth, is to emigrate to the 
                                   
28 Coetzee says in an interview that “by the age of twelve he [Coetzee] has a well-developed sense of 
social marginality” (Doubling the Point 393). 
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“father country” of Europe and make a success as an artist. The self-appraisal of his artistic life 
in the London period appears not to be so satisfactory. But what should be redeemed is the 
willingness to overcome his provincialism. The desperation he had felt at that time cannot forbid 
his desire to be recognized as a serious writer. Hence we may understand why Youth keeps the 
subtitle of Scenes from Provincial Life attached first to the memoir Boyhood (1997). Inspired by 
Gustave Flaubert’s Emma Bovary, Coetzee remarks that the provincial’s inclination is “to blame 
their environment for not living up to art and to take up residence in an art-world.” Coetzee 
regards it as a “colonial fate” (7). So, there is a match between Coetzee’s “artist’s destiny” as 
expressed in Youth and this “colonial fate.” In retrospect, the fatalism indicates Coetzee’s 
recognition in the Western world. If it is true that “The classic defines itself by surviving” (16) 
and thus Bach’s music overcomes its provincialism, Coetzee’s consciousness for his survival 
likewise should be endorsed. I think this could be one of the unknown truths or desires in the 
confessional writing of Youth. Kannemeyer writes, “Underlying Coetzee’s essay [“What Is a 
Classic?”] is a tacit autobiographical subtext, the question whether Coetzee, as somebody from 
South Africa, somebody from the colonies, could ever succeed in writing a classic” (499). 
Coetzee’s frankness seems to leave room for us to look into his inner thoughts in his recollection 
of the Bach story. However, even though Coetzee owns that there can be his “material interest” 
in the evaluation of the Bach piece, it is not thorough enough to dissolve our doubt about the 
self-complicity between his class origin in that appreciation and his valorization of the music. 
Therefore, when dealing with the motivation of his emigration to England, we cannot overlook 
the connection between his literary taste as cultural capital and his entrance to the “middle class” 
of English life with a profession. If Aijaz Ahmad’s criticism has some relevance here, it is about 
the fact that, with respect to immigrants and immigration, “in many cases need and ambition 
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have become ambiguously and inextricably linked” (Ahmad, In Theory 86).29  
On the one hand with respect to his confessional writing in Youth, there is a need to 
explain to himself why he came out of South Africa and, instead, chose England for his new 
start. What is shown is his long-cherished wish to be a cosmopolitan, modernist-like writer. And 
Coetzee does not hide his secular desire to be a success as well. On the other side with respect to 
the writing, there is Coetzee’s reckoning with truth-telling about himself. So, even though he is 
eager to prove his sincerity, he acknowledges that there can be “self-justifying lies.” In regards to 
these “evasions and lies” in this memoir, Kannemeyer tells us that in the spring of 1963, Coetzee 
returned to South Africa, finished his M.A. thesis about Ford Madox Ford, and married a woman 
named Mauna Philippa Jubber (130). Another odd thing the biographer raises is the question of 
whether Coetzee “was truly as unhappy as he often suggests in Youth” (134). Kannemeyer writes 
another observer’s testament relating Coetzee’s stay in London. At last, we do not need to 
believe all the records concerning Coetzee’s re-awakening that ensued from the London life of 
early 1960s, nor do we need to disbelieve Coetzee’s spell-bound experience of Bach when he 
was fifteen.30 Nevertheless, what must be assured is that he cannot be the only person who can 
                                   
29 Of course, as shown in Boyhood, we may need to understand more attentively Coetzee’s Afrikaan 
background connected with the Afrikaans language that had been in tension with his education of English 
language at home and school in his boyhood, which appears as one of the main sources of Coetzee’s 
anxiety over his national identity: 
There is the English language, which he commands with ease. There is England and 
everything that England stands for, to which he believes he is loyal. But more than that 
is required, clearly, before one will be accepted as truly English: tests to face, some of 
which he knows he will not pass. (Boyhood 129) 
We read here the child in this colonial world who “stands to attention when God Save the King is played 
in the bioscope and the Union Jack waves on the screen” (128) is painfully conscious of some “tests” for 
becoming a true English. What is ironical is that he knows already its results. Coetzee’s continued “tests” 
in his London life does not seem to be so satisfactory at least regarding their outcomes. 
 
30 Coetzee’s tribute to Bach is repeated in twenty-third chapter of Diary of a Bad Year (2007). The music 
of Bach is regarded by Coetzee as a sort of religious “grace”:  
The best proof we have that life is good, and therefore that there may perhaps be a God 
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save himself from the quagmire of skeptical truth-telling about himself.  
 
3.2 Dialogism and Confessional Truth 
Lionel Trilling says that “The subject of an autobiography is… a self, bent on revealing 
himself in all his truth, bent, that is to say, on demonstrating his sincerity” (Sincerity and 
Authenticity 25). And Mikhail Bakhtin confirms the inherent dialogism in autobiography. He 
claims that “discovery of the inner man” is the ultimate goal in autobiographical writing 
(Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 120). To combine their words, each reader of an 
autobiography may be a judge about whether the writer is sincere in addressing the reader his 
“inner man.” However, according to Coetzee, “Autobiography is dominated by self-
interest…The only sure truth in autobiography is that one’s self-interest will be located at one’s 
blind spot” (Doubling the Point 392). If this saying has a ring of truth, this signifies that even 
Coetzee himself could be blind to his “self-interest” in any of his autobiographical writings.  
Some critics remark that as part of the experiment of distancing himself from such a 
self-interested arrangement of truth, Coetzee uses such literary devices as third person narration 
and the present tense. Analyzing Coetzee’s “voices” in his memoirs and novels, Carrol Clarkson 
draws a schema that makes a distinction between “I” and “Not I” (the third person within the 
self) by which “I” is viewed from the perspective of the “He” (Clarkson 19-46). (This is like 
when Rousseau calls himself “this man” in his Confessions.) Consequently, the effects of the use 
of the third person and the present tense, Clarkson argues, “pre-empt the possibility of seeing the 
event from the past as unambiguously severed from the present, and the ‘he’ as unconnected to 
                                   
after all, who has our welfare at heart, is that to each of us, on the day we are born, 
comes the music of Johann Sebastian Bach. It comes as a gift, unearned, unmerited, for 
free. (221)  
 
  64 
the ‘I’ who writes” (39). The point is that by de-familiarizing those conventions in 
autobiography, Coetzee tries to expose the illusion of its objectivity and its formal textuality 
mediated by the writer’s currently hidden, personal desire. Derek Attridge expresses a similar 
opinion. He writes that that “The use of third person implicitly dissociates the narrative voice 
from the narrated consciousness, telling us that this was another person…At the same time, the 
use of the present tense both heightens the immediacy of the narrated events and denies the text 
any retrospection.” Their final effect is then that “the reader is refused the comfort of a 
metanarrative model or perspective from which authorial judgments (here, judgments on his 
earlier self) could be made (J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading 143). Then, those effects of 
“immediacy” and “non-retrospection” that Coetzee is said to achieve in his memoirs would 
disillusion the self-reflexive distance in autobiographical writing and reading. Nevertheless, I 
argue that we need to ask whether these effects paradoxically affirm the fact that this text is 
“written by me,” J. M. Coetzee. 
For example, George Eliot writes in her 1879 letter that “The best history of a writer is 
contained in his writings—these are his chief actions” (Bodenheimer 239).31 In a similar vein, 
Virginia Woolf writes that “every secret of a writer’s soul, every experience of his life, every 
quality of his mind is written in his works” (Orlando: A Biography 211). Following their ideas, 
Coetzee adds that, “All autobiography is storytelling, all writing is autobiography” (Doubling the 
Point 391).  
Simply speaking, “All autobiography is storytelling” means that autobiography is a 
                                   
31 Declining to write Lewes’s biography after his death, George Eliot added in the same letter that 
biographies “generally are a disease of English Literature.” But that does not mean she was not always 
negative in writing or reading (auto)biographies. See Nancy Henry. The Life of George Eliot. 1-21. 
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fictional construct. The diction of “storytelling” implies not only the fictional plot in 
autobiography but also ambiguity in discerning factual information. When it is presented 
according to the writer’s selected memories, as Walter Benjamin says, memory in storytelling 
“encompasses its varieties” (“The Storyteller” 98). If “the writer has privileged access to 
information” in autobiography, we cannot but agree that its reliability is contingent upon the 
correctness of his memory. Therefore, when someone tells his life story “by selecting [material] 
from a reservoir of memories” and “fashions it into a narrative that leads into a living present in a 
more or less seamless way” (Doubling the Point 17; 391), what Hayden White calls 
“emplotment” is necessary. That is, whether or not the connection of events in one’s life story 
look coherent or “real” depends on the work of the fictional plot. To the extent that the historical 
narrative depends on a “specific plot structure” (White 85), we also might expect it from one’s 
personal history. 
At the same time Coetzee suggests in the second clause (“all writing is autobiography”) 
that any writing has a self-reflexive connection to the writer’s inner consciousness. Coetzee’s 
reasoning is based on the thought that “writing writes us”: 
It is naïve to think that writing is a simple two-stage process: first you decide what you 
want to say, then you say it. On the contrary, as all of us know, you write because you 
do not know what you want to say. Writing reveals to you what you wanted to say in 
the first place. In fact, it sometimes constructs what you want or wanted to say. What it 
reveals (or asserts) may be quite different from what you thought (or half-thought) you 
wanted to say in the first place. That is the sense in which one can say that writing 
writes us. (Doubling the Point 18) 
 
According to Coetzee, the act of writing itself makes the writer realize his desire or purpose 
unknown to him until the initiation of the writing. So it is not absurd to suppose that the 
reciprocal interplay between the writer’s psyche and the development of his biographical story is 
imitated in novel writing. David Attwell argues that Coetzee’s novels “get beyond the 
conventional realism” and instead have a metafictional level on which the writer’s self-
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consciousness reveals his “autobiographical implication” in the form and the story. Attwell’s 
example is the medical officer of Part Two of Michael K who represents “the form of a second 
narrator” (Attwell, J.M. Coetzee and the Life of Writing 114-23). His confessional monologue 
provides an alternative observation to read K’s silence in the refugee camp. The similar motif is 
repeated in Foe (1986). There appears Susan Barton’s imaginary dialogue with Friday. Through 
this dialogue she hopes to get access to Friday’s consciousness. Confronting Friday’s dumbness, 
her speech attempts to get over the limit of an impressionistic monologue. Competing with Foe 
(or Defoe) for the erased history of Friday, Susan Barton’s “endeavor to be father to my story” 
(Foe 123) can be compared with Coetzee’s endeavor. 
But it should be remembered that such a demonstration of Coetzee’s “evidence of me” 
(qtd. in Attwell 115) within the novel does not purport to establish the writer’s authority over the 
texts. To the contrary, Coetzee’s self-consciousness as a writer withdraws it. In the interview 
with Attwell, Coetzee says that “writing is not free expression.” Refuting the writer’s omnipotent 
presence in his or her text as a “phantasm,” Coetzee instead draws on dialogism in the novel, 
which certainly reminds us of Bakhtin’s concept. What Coetzee means by “writing is dialogic” is 
that it is “a matter of awakening the countervoices in oneself and embarking upon speech with 
them.” Coetzee continues, “It is some measure of a writer’s seriousness whether he does not 
evoke/invoke those countervoices in himself, that is, step down from the position of what Lacan 
calls ‘the subject supposed to know’ ” (Doubling the Point 65).  
The concept of “countervoices” designates the opposition between different 
consciousnesses in oneself. When recognizing other voices within himself, the self’s privileged 
position of knowledge is negated. And this otherness is what Derek Attridge points out as the 
primary modernist aspect in Coetzee’s texts. Attridge writes, “One consistent aspect of Coetzee’s 
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techniques as a novelist is to deny the reader any ethical guidance from an authoritative voice or 
valorizing metalanguage” (J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading 7). Coetzee’s critical stance 
towards literary realism, especially concerned with the omniscient perspective, would be a 
relevant example. But, as this requires in-depth study particularly in the context of the apartheid 
and South African literature, I will set it aside when discussing those various receptions of 
Coetzee’s Disgrace. By all means, if the self becomes “its own interlocutor” (Coetzee, 
“Confession and Double Thoughts” 216) and, in doing so, different consciousnesses come to 
speak with each other in one’s mind, it is possible to ask whether this self-dialogue is merely 
ventriloquism. In relation to this question, Bakhtin’s imaginative description below is revelatory:  
Imagine a dialogue of two persons in which the statements of the second speaker are 
omitted, but in such a way that the general sense is not at all violated. The second 
speaker is present invisibly, his words are not there, but deep traces left by these words 
have a determining influence on all the present and visible words of the first speaker. 
We sense that this is a conversation, although only one person is speaking, and it is a 
conversation of the most intense kind, for each present, uttered word responds and 
reacts with its every fiber to the invisible speaker, points to something outside itself, 
beyond its own limits, to the unspoken words of another person. (Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics 197) 
 
Following Bakhtin, we understand that the distinction of dialogism from monologism depends 
on the (invisible) presence of the second speaker.32 The point is that this presence should be felt 
or imagined at one’s consciousness. So Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist argue that 
Bakhtin’s dialogism is fundamentally a mechanism of human consciousness which “modulates 
the constant exchange between ‘I’ activities and all that is ‘not-I-in-me’” (Mikhail Bakhtin 65). 
While they say that such dichotomy of the self and the other does not lay emphasis on the self 
alone as in Romantic philosophy, it is not clear how they separate the otherness of “not-I-in-me” 
                                   
32 Of course, the character of the “second speaker” could be diverse according to the first-person’s 
situation. For example, when Coetzee uses this passage in discussing a South African poet Breyten 
Breytenbach’s prison writings, the office of censorship in the apartheid South Africa appears as the poet’s 
invisible “second speaker.” Needless to say, their dialogism is antagonistic (Giving Offense 215-32).  
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from the real otherness outside of the “I.” Rather, one may be dubious whether all these ideas of 
dialogism and otherness do not go beyond the level of one’s self-consciousness.  
Of course, Bakhtin argues dialogism is not a solipsistic self-dialogue. When Bakhtin 
puts that “Dostoevsky overcame solipsism,” Bakhtin means there are plural “I’s” in his novels. 
(Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 99-100). However, if the guesswork of “the image of the 
speaking person and his discourse” becomes “the object of creative, artistic imagination,” this 
image of other person “within an individual’s consciousness” is definitely an “experimental” one 
in the author’s mind (Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination 348). What I wish to emphasize here is 
that the inner dialogue between consciousnesses of the self cannot be equal with the actual 
dialogue between two, different persons. Above all, their qualitative differences must be noted. 
That means that the otherness of the self is derivative and artificial in a sense, compared with the 
otherness of my actual Other. The first reason I heed their difference is because of the ontological 
distance between the self and the Other. The second is the possible inauthenticity of these 
“countervoices” in oneself. Though a writer needs to step down from the position of an 
authoritative voice in his novel and consider other voices within himself, their artistic 
representation must be mediated by the writer’s self-consciousness. Whether or not such 
“decentered” or “multileveled” self-consciousness is peculiar to modernists’ cases as Charles 
Taylor argues (Sources of the Self 480-81), its subjectivism is evident. As for the [in]authenticity 
of the “countervoices” in oneself, in fact, I have put some questions in the previous chapter, 
particularly about the matter of self-complicity in confessional writing. When it is said to show 
its true self by mirroring itself, I have asked again whether it is possible to suppose a totally 
alienated, objectified other self from its current consciousness. Consequently, this question is 
related to the matter of self-assurance about truth-telling in one’s autobiographical writing. 
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Radically speaking, this is a question about one’s sincerity and authenticity in autobiography.   
Especially when discussing Coetzee’s attention to the matter of truth-telling in the form 
of monologue, we need to consult Coetzee’s essay “Confession and Double Thoughts: Tolstoy, 
Rousseau, Dostoevsky” (1985). This essay is significant for several reasons.33 First, it shows 
Coetzee’s early passion with the issue of truth-telling in autobiography and his elaborate 
academic explication of it. Second, this essay heralds Coetzee’s continuing experiments with 
confessional writing in his novels. Finally, in terms of the secular confession, Coetzee’s criticism 
here has an implicit connection later to the TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) of 
South Africa. I will apply some critical concepts outlined in this essay to reading Disgrace 
(1999).  
 Coetzee’s interview with Eleanor Wachtell in 2001 is telling. In the middle of their 
conversation, Wachtell asks Coetzee, “You’ve written about the nature of confessional writing, 
and specifically about Tolstoy, Rousseau, and Dostoevsky. As you described it, Dostoevsky was 
skeptical that the self could tell the truth to itself. Why is self-delusion so apparently 
inescapable?” Coetzee gives this answer:  
One’s dealing here with a major dialogue taking place across time between Jean 
Jacques Rousseau and Dostoevsky. In Rousseau’s mind one had only to be very honest 
with oneself, and brave—considering the possible consequences—and one could tell 
the truth about oneself. Rousseau’s confessions are exactly that; they’re an exercise in 
being ruthlessly frank and honest about one’s, what Rousseau would have considered 
his, most deeply shameful character traits. The dialogue is taken up by Dostoevsky 
when he says that it simply is not good enough to look in your heart and write, that 
what comes out when you write is quite as likely to be some self-serving lie as it is to 
be the ruthless truth about yourself. I must say that, in this confrontation, my sympathy 
is wholly with Dostoevsky. The basis of his position is simply that the heart of our own 
desire is unknown to us and, perhaps even further, that it’s in the nature of human 
desire not to know itself fully, to have some kernel of the unknowable in it. That, 
perhaps, is what animated desire, namely that it is unknowable to itself. (“The 
                                   
33 Coetzee’s own explanation for why the essay is “pivotal” for him is two-folded. First, it treats his 
continuing interest of “how to tell the truth in autobiography.” Second, in retrospection, a self-dialogue 
for his own truth is embedded in this essay (Doubling the Point 391-92). 
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Sympathetic Imagination: A Conversation with J.M. Coetzee” 45, my emphasis) 
 
Coetzee again makes sure that sincerity is not the same with honesty. As we will see, this passage 
echoes much of what Coetzee has argued in the essay “Confession and Double Thoughts: 
Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky.” The key point is that the claim of truth-telling in one’s 
autobiography is vulnerable to the criticism of the writer’s sincerity, whose example Coetzee 
mentions is Rousseau’s Confessions.34 Even though one’s memoir or confession is structured by 
the writer’s authentic belief on his or her memory, it is partial and even tricky. Furthermore, since 
the self is blind to its hidden desire, the self’s verification of its truthfulness about itself cannot 
be reliable. For that reason, the final decision about the real truth cannot be done at the self’s 
conscious level nor depend on the speaker’s honest, authentic feeling. Coetzee’s judgement of 
authenticity is definitely dissenting for its solipsism. Coetzee says that “Being authentic includes 
being able to lie and steal and cheat as long as you don’t pretend to yourself that you are not a 
liar and a thief and a cheat.” (Coetzee and Kurtz, The Good Story 85).35 
Instead, Coetzee argues, “True confession does not come from the sterile monologue of 
the self, or the dialogue of the self with its own self-doubt, but from faith and grace” (230). 
Through this statement, Coetzee seems to resort to somewhat spiritual or ethical absolution of 
one’s confession where a certain reconciliation should be entrusted. Though Coetzee does not 
make clear how “faith and grace” can guarantee the truthfulness of the confession, it is certain 
that these “faith and grace” cannot be willed by the confessant but rather they are something like 
                                   
34 Coetzee argues that in the ribbon story, for example, there is Rousseau’s hidden desire for “self-
exhibition” before an “unconquerable fear of shame” (206-07). 
 
35 As to such non-reflective immediacy of authenticity, Coetzee puts as follows: “what distinguishes 
authenticity from sincerity” is the abolition of the “distance between the writing self and the source of the 
feelings it writes about” (“Confession and Double Thoughts” 209). 
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a “blessing” (Attridge 180). To go further, I think “charity” is close to the meaning of “faith and 
grace.” This charity or, in other words, love, also introduced as caritas in Elizabeth Costello 
(156), is regarded by Coetzee as a secular, allegorized version of grace. Like Bach’s music that is 
given as a “gift, unearned, unmerited, for free” (Diary of a Bad Year 221), both grace and charity 
are given without expecting their compensation: 
Against the endlessness of skepticism Dostoevsky poses the closure not of confession 
but of absolution and therefore of the intervention of grace in the world…To the extent 
that I am taken as a political novelist, it may be because I take it as given that people 
must be treated as fully responsible beings: psychology is not excuse. Politics, in its 
wise stupidity, is at one with religion here: one man, one soul: no half-measures. What 
saves me from a merely stupid stupidity, I would hope, is a measure of charity, which 
is, I suppose, the way in which grace allegorizes itself in the world. Another way of 
saying this is that I try not to lose sight of reality that we are children, unreconstructed 
[…], to be treated with the charity that children have due to them (charity that doesn’t 
preclude clear-sightedness).” (Doubling the Point 249) 
 
In a practical sense, I argue that the absolution of confession aims to achieve a sort of 
reconciliation between confessor and confessant, whose example we will see in David Lurie’s 
hearing in Disgrace. Above all, I think this existence of the other is quintessential to the concept 
of “intersubjective truth” that Coetzee develops later with the psychologist Arabella Kurtz 
(Coetzee and Kurtz, The Good Story 6). In order to approach the concept, I first review the 
implications of dialogic truth in a monologue.  
Let us say again that, in terms of a secular point of view, testifying about oneself alone 
cannot be objective. To prove his testimony or confession truthful, one needs the other person. 
That is, a truth should be built upon dialogic relationships (Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoyevsky's 
Poetics 120). What is at stake is a testimony or confession in the form of a monologue. In this 
case, according to Bernard Williams in Truth and Truthfulness, two premises need to be fulfilled 
in conveying a truth (11). First, a subject’s proposition should be accurate description (accuracy), 
and secondly, the speaker himself should be sincere (sincerity). But the question of how to deem 
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the speaker as a sincere man belongs to the area of trust and judgment. Even though someone 
believes himself to be sincere, he must check his self-confidence about his inner motivation 
previously and then should affirm his belief that he is sincere (Coetzee, “Confession and Double 
Thoughts” 194). Nevertheless, the belief in one’s sincerity entails a successive question about the 
sincerity (or believability) of that belief so as to clear his self-complicity. This process of 
verifying one’s sincerity by oneself leads to but an endless circular reasoning between belief and 
skepticism (204), which can be compared with the concept of self-reflection through the 
metaphor of the mirror.36  
Coetzee, analyzing Dostoevsky’s novels, argues that, with a secular standard, we cannot 
reach true confession because of “the nature of consciousness” (230). Though it is a very rare 
example, facing death can temporarily bring a moment of truth-telling as a revelation in which 
“earthly time ends” (225) insofar as people would not have any doubt whether there is hidden 
thought. But according to Coetzee’s reading of Dostoevsky, it is not always successful because 
self-deception can happen unintentionally. To the extent that our extreme skepticism about telling 
and hearing a truth stops only through the moments of crisis, then our everyday life truth seems 
to be too far away to catch it. Though some kind of silent action without any verbal explanation 
like suicide could appear to work as a guarantee of one’s sincerity (226), the violent feature 
embedded in this notion must be criticized.37  
                                   
36 Michael Neill regards this state as “a kind of psychological mise en abyme in which the confessant 
endlessly interrogates not only his own truthfulness, but even the sincerity of that interrogation itself” 
(“The Language of the Heart” 86). 
 
37 In relation to this matter, an insightful discussion is from Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution. Arendt 
regards the idea as absurd and even dangerous that only one’s deeds without speech can prove one’s 
truthfulness. For example, what is called “the divine truth” tends to posit itself beyond questions and 
skepticism through human dialogues. What Hannah Arendt criticizes from the character of Melville’s 
Billy Budd and Dostoevsky’s Jesus in The Brothers Karamazov, both of who remain in a mood of mute 
compassion, is that kind of non-secularism that, by nullifying human dialogues, negates those human 
  73 
In Coetzee’s view, telling a truth is a difficulty, and we should know how it is difficult. 
His words that true confession comes from faith and grace must have a somewhat religious 
dimension, but this argument shows a new approach to the issue of finding and accepting a truth: 
an ethical approach to reconciliation. That means the absolution of confession, which means “the 
end of the episode, the closing of the chapter, liberation from the oppression of the memory” 
(194) can occur in an intersubjective relationship where mutual trust is elicited so that sincerity 
can work between the confessant and the confessor. For example, Coetzee introduces 
Dostoevsky’s reading of Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina in which a spirit of “mutual all-forgiveness” is 
revealed (231). We have already seen that some of Coetzee’s novels have narrators who tell their 
experience in the form of personal recollection or monologue. In spite of such partial 
perspectives derived from their first-person narration, there appear several moments of ethical 
decision that ask us to suspend our epistemological skepticism of truth and, instead, to believe 
the sincerity of the narrator and its narration without any condition. The confession of the 
heroine Mrs. Curren in Age of Iron (1990), for example, is such a case, where a reader’s trust is 
required since the impending end of her life mostly makes her voice sound sincere. Thus the final 
guarantor of her truth-telling is not the crisis but the combination of “truth and love together at 
last” (Age of Iron 129). I argue that the “love” here has kinship to Coetzee’s words “faith and 
grace” aforementioned, and that it also has a link to Martha Nussbaum’s compelling concept of 
“loves’ knowledge”:  
It insists that knowledge of love is not a state or function of the solitary person at all, 
but a complex way of being, feeling, and interacting with another person. To know 
one’s own love is to trust it, to allow oneself to be exposed. It is, above all, to trust the 
other person, suspending Proustian doubts. Such knowledge is not independent of 
                                   
conditions for doing goodness. But such “goodness beyond virtue” as holy “innocence” is incompatible 
with judging and proving a truth with “human standards,” with human, secular voices (On Revolution 77-
83). 
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evidence. Typically it is built upon a good deal of attention over time, attention that 
delivers a lot of evidence about the other person, about oneself, about patterns of 
interaction between the two. Nor is it independent of powerful feelings that have real 
evidential value. But it goes beyond the evidence, and it ventures outside of the inner 
world. (Love’s Knowledge 274)    
  
In contrast to the optimism that expects the arrival of “grace” or “love” in one’s 
confessional writing, there is “cynicism.” Cynicism signifies “the denial of any ultimate basis for 
values” (Doubling the Point 392). I add that what Coetzee calls “the failure of love” underlies 
this notion of cynicism. What I would like to explore, then, is the cynical perspective towards 
confessional truth and the need of the sympathetic imagination as these are expressed in 
Disgrace. 
 
3.3 The “failure of love” in Disgrace 
In his speech at the Jerusalem Awards of 1987, Coetzee talked about “the failure of love” 
in South Africa. This comment is remarkable because this theme has been treated with great 
significance in Coetzee’s novels, including Disgrace (1999):  
  In the early 1950s, the heady years when the great city of apartheid was still being 
built, a law was passed making sexual relations between masters and slaves a 
crime….What was the meaning of this deeply symbolical law? Its origins, it seems to 
me, lie in fear and denial: denial of an unacknowledgeable desire to embrace Africa, 
embrace the body of Africa; and fear of being embraced in return by Africa….    
At the heart of the unfreedom of the hereditary masters of South Africa is a failure of 
love. To be blunt: their love is not enough today and has not been enough since they 
arrive on the continent; furthermore, their talk, their excessive talk, about how they love 
South Africa has consistently been directed toward the land, that is, toward what is least 
likely to respond to love: mountains and deserts, birds and animals and flowers. 
(“Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech” 96-97)  
 
I attend to two ideas shown from the speech above. First, Coetzee says that the “failure of love” 
in the system of apartheid is in tandem with the absence of the sympathetic imagination from 
these white “masters” of South Africa. Secondly, Coetzee believes that the poor love in South 
Africa is the result of a reification of those things in “the land.” As examples of the “failure of 
love” in Disgrace, I consider two events. First is David Lurie’s violation of Melanie Isaac. The 
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second is his daughter Lucy’s rape by three black strangers. In that the absence of sympathy and 
love leads to the feeling of hatred, Lurie’s lecture is telling for its theoretical approach to the 
issue. 
Analyzing the part of Wordsworth’s Prelude that depicts the poet’s climbing the Alps 
(Book 6), Lurie examines the co-existence of the imagination and the real consciousness 
recollected in the mind of the poet. Lurie says to his students, “Yet we cannot live our daily lives 
in a realm of pure ideas, cocooned from sense-experience. The question is not, How can we keep 
the imagination pure, protected from the onslaughts of reality? The question has to be, Can we 
find a way for the two to coexist?” (Disgrace 22). Lurie’s solution is to avoid a direct 
confrontation with reality and instead to keep a fancy for an object that enables him to retain the 
memory of its “sense-image.” He compares it to “being in love.” But we soon realize that this 
“love” is a projection of his ideal image. The “goddesslike form” that Lurie wants to maintain 
turns out to be his sexual fantasy for Melanie (22-23). Meanwhile, when reading Byron’s poem 
“Lara,” Lurie talks about the absence of love between the fallen angel Lucifer and “us.” He holds 
that the feeling of sympathy cannot happen between the two, different species. Because “he is 
not one of us,” Lurie argues, “there is a limit to sympathy” (Disgrace 33-34). Ironically, though 
Lucifer is depicted as “a thing of dark imaginings” in the poem and regarded as “a monster” with 
“a mad heart” by Lurie, this character has a parallel with Lurie. We read that the “dark” image 
attached to the fallen angel is used later in Lurie’s appearance at Melanie’s home. There Lurie is 
described as “the unwanted visitor, the man whose name is darkness” (168). Hence, if Melanie is 
treated like a “thing” in Lurie’s sexual fantasy, it is because Lurie has no sympathy with Melanie 
but instead has an unknowable desire for her from the start. He thinks to himself that “I was a 
servant of Eros” (89).  
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The matter of reification is connected to the concept of “Lösung” [solution or 
processing] of the dogs in Bev Shaw’s hospital (142). Implying an analogy between the Jewish 
victims in the death camps and the euthanized dogs in the hospital, the word indicates the thing-
like-ness of the animals. Therefore, the “dishonour” inflicted on the dogs is read as a comparison 
to the disgraced living of Lucy who “has become a dog-man” (146) and of Lurie who should live 
“like a dog” after the rape incident (205). The most incomprehensible aspect of her rape for Lucy 
was the reason she was hated by them: “It was done with such personal hatred. That was what 
stunned me more than anything. The rest was…expected. But why did they hate me so?” (156). 
Lurie replies that this “hatred” or, in other words, this “failure of love,” has a historical context in 
their country: “It was history speaking through them…A history of wrong. Think of it that way, 
if it helps. It may have seemed personal, but it wasn’t. It came down from the ancestors” (156). 
We understand that Lurie tries to see their tragic event as an allegory of the colonial history to 
which they commonly belong.  
Despite their isolation within “their territory,” Lucy’s decision to stay in the farm 
carrying her baby sounds unrealistic to Lurie. Above all, the Lucy’s own claim that she is not a 
minor character, but has a right to insist on her own life style testifies that she has an alterity on 
which Lurie’s paternity cannot encroach. In a sense, we can say that her voice here represents a 
“countervoice” in the writer’s consciousness. That is, while Lurie’s acts and ideas hitherto have 
been dominant in leading the plot of Disgrace, Lucy now tries to change the perspective not only 
of his father but also of readers particularly in regard to the division between the main and the 
minor voice in the novel.38  
                                   
38 Michael G. McDunnah argues that “[Coetzee] sets us the ethical challenge of understanding and 
sympathizing with Lurie by charging us to ‘think ourselves’ into this being. Even as we resist association 
with Lurie we are required to follow his journey exclusively through his own limited perspective, without 
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You behave as if everything I do is part of the story of your life. You are the main 
character, I am a minor character who doesn’t make an appearance until halfway 
through. Well, contrary to what you think, people are not divided into major and minor. 
I am not minor. I have a life of my own, just as important to me as yours is to you, and 
in my life I am the one who makes the decisions. (198)   
 
What Lucy says fully attests that the father and the daughter are not “on the same side.” But, as 
Elizabeth Lowy remarks, it should be noted that Lurie is depicted from the beginning as “an 
unnatural father, a predator rather than a protector” (“Like a Dog”). If his growing sympathy 
with animals in the second half of the novel has some significance, the limit of his sympathy 
caused by the severed “normal ties of affection” in the “colonial situation” also should be 
considered (Lowry). According to Mike Marais, “Coetzee gives his protagonist [David Lurie] the 
ethical task of developing a sympathetic imagination and… places his protagonist in positions 
which seemingly enable precisely such a growth.” However, Marais argues that this work 
“undermines, even as it installs, the possibility of his development, thereby questioning the 
ability of the imagination to achieve what it is supposed to achieve” (Secretary of the Invisible 
163). Lurie’s sympathetic imagination of Lucy’s rape scene is the test of the possibility. We read 
that Lurie’s being “capable of imagining” what had happened to Lucy leads him to reflect over 
his violation of Melanie Isaacs. Feeling contrition, he visits Melanie’s house to make an apology 
to her father. Notwithstanding, what is unfinished for Lurie is the “imaginative task” (Marais 
170) “to be the woman.” This is a radical question about whether Lucy’s alterity is beyond 
Lurie’s sympathetic imagination.   
You weren’t there. You don’t know what happened. He is baffled. Where, according to 
Bev Shaw, according to Lucy, was he not? In the room where the intruders were 
committing their outrages? Do they think he does not know what rape is? Do they think 
he has not suffered with his daughter? What more could he have witnessed that he is 
                                   
the comfort of any authorial presence to assist us in making ethical judgment” (“‘We are not asked to 
condemn’: Sympathy, Subjectivity, and the Narration of Disgrace” 16). In spite of the relevance of this 
analysis in general, I think Coetzee’s countervoice of Lucy here subverts our one-sided empathy with the 
character Lurie. 
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capable of imagining? Or do they think that, where rape is concerned, no man can be 
where the woman is? Whatever the answer, he is outraged, outraged at being treated 
like an outsider. (140-41)   
 
You don’t understand, you weren’t there, says Bev Shaw. Well, she is mistaken. Lucy’s 
intuition is right after all: he does understand; he can, if he concentrates, if he loses 
himself, be there, be the men, inhabit them, fill them with the ghost of himself. The 
question is, does he have it in him to be the woman? (160).   
 
I argue that it is necessary to distinguish the failure of sympathy from the difficulty of 
sympathy. In the animal issue, for example, Lurie’s position in the beginning is that “We are of a 
different order of creation from the animals. Not higher, necessarily, just different. So if we are 
going to be kind, let it be out of simple generosity, not because we feel guilty or fear retribution” 
(Disgrace 74). For that reason, Lurie follows the decision of the “Church Fathers” that “Their 
[animals’] souls are tied to their bodies and die with them” (78). That is, he calls for the 
differentiation of sympathies between different kinds of beings. Then, passing through his 
sufferings and helping Bev Shaw’s work, his mind towards them changes and cannot bear to 
“inflict such dishonour upon them” (144). His expanded imagination drives him to oppose Bev 
Shaw’s saying that “You don’t “understand, you weren’t there,” and he tries to imagine Lucy’s 
rape scene. Lurie shows a strong, emotional repulsion to the violence and at the same time 
blames Petrus’s irresponsibility and his assumed complicity with the incident. While Petrus 
“took care not to be in the vicinity,” Lurie says, “I know what Lucy has been through. I was 
there.” However, Bev Shaw’s brief retorts dispels his position within the affair. She says, “But 
you weren’t there, David. She told me. You weren’t.” Though Lurie first feels “baffled” and 
“outraged” because of their separation, he seems to finally succeed in imagining himself within 
the position of the men who raped his daughter. But “does he have it in him to be the woman?” is 
an open-ended question like “What is it like to be a bat?” in Elizabeth Costello. I believe Coetzee 
presents a positive answer at least in the novel Elizabeth Costello. It is possible through the work 
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of fiction: 
“But my mother has been a man,” he persists. “She also has been a dog. She can think 
her way into other people, into other existence. I have read her; I know. It is within her 
powers. Isn’t that what is most important about fiction: that it takes us out of ourselves, 
into other lives?” (Elizabeth Costello 22-23)  
 
As we see, the essence of the novelistic imagination from Elizabeth Costello is the sympathetic 
imagination. And she claims that “There are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination” (77). 
Certainly, “if he loses himself,” Lucy can become the black intruders as they are the same kinds. 
But owing to his failure of love caused by his lacking “the lyrical” (171), his sympathy for 
femininity is frustrated. And I note that Lucy’s difficulty in the imagination “to be the woman” is 
no more than Coetzee’s. Attwell’s biography shows how Coetzee had felt some trouble in 
describing Lucy’s “inner life.” Attwell reveals Coetzee’s note written on 1 May 1997: “The 
problem is Lucy. Whatever she is going through, I can’t feel it from the inside” (Attwell 205). 
Let us say again that, this difficulty does not indicate directly the impossibility of sympathy or 
love between different races, genders, or even species. If feeling sympathy or love for others is 
taken as a must in Lurie’s case, the essential element in expanding his sympathy is, I argue, the 
willingness of the subject who yearns to feel it. Whether or not sympathy is a duty is a topic that 
will be discussed in the next chapter. Nonetheless, if there is a common ground between the 
dialogic imagination of the opera about Byron’s life, to which Lurie devote himself in the final 
part of the novel, and the sympathetic imagination “to be the woman” or to be an animal in the 
novel, it is the consideration of the otherness of the other.39  
In the essay “Apartheid Thinking” (1991), Coetzee remarks that “Apartheid will remain 
                                   
39 I agree with Peter D. McDonald’s argument that this Byron opera is “another attempt at redress on 
David’s part.” McDonald continues, “Testing his daughter’s claims about the limits of his imagination, he 
tries to see the woman’s side of the story by putting Teresa Guiccioli, one of Byron’s spurned mistresses, 
at its centre.” (“Disgrace Effect” 328)  
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a mystery as long as it is not approached in the lair of the heart. If we want to understand it, we 
cannot ignore those passages of its testament that reach us in the heart-speech of autobiography 
and confession” (“Apartheid Thinking” Giving Offense164). Coetzee’s point in this statement is 
about sincerity in the confession, and we know this has some relation to the motif in the hearing 
of the TRC.40 Roughly speaking, they share the idea that, in order to reflect over the wrong 
history of apartheid, heartfelt confessions from those wrongdoers should be first provided.  
Whether or not Coetzee expected it, some critics find a parallel between David Lurie’s 
trial in Disgrace and the historical hearings of the TRC.41 As his only two novels Age of Iron 
and Disgrace are set in contemporary South Africa, such comparison would be unavoidable. 
However, Attwell argues that their relation is “remote” and that it is “very unlikely” that Coetzee 
would take into account the TRC as a direct critical context when writing the novel. Attwell says 
that Coetzee started writing Disgrace before the TRC assumed its role. And he adds that the 
showing of remorse on the part of wrongdoer was not in the program nor in the “ethos” of the 
TRC. Rather, he links the confession’s theoretical implication to Roland Barthes’s idea of 
“fascist” language and, especially, to Michel Foucault’s discourse of “power” (Attwell, 198-
200). According to Foucault, “Western societies have established the confession as one of the 
main rituals we rely on for the production of truth” (The History of Sexuality 58).  
Setting their connection aside, I raise the issue of “cynicism” that Coetzee mentions in 
discussing the secular confession. Cynicism, in opposition to “faith and grace,” is skeptical about 
                                   
40 The TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) was the president Nelson Mandela’s effort to bring 
reconciliation in South Africa in 1995. The chair was Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the task of the 
commission was to “investigate violations of human rights since 1960, with the power to grant amnesty to 
transgressors who mad a full confession” (Kannemeyer 473). 
 
41 See Rebecca Saunders. “Disgrace in the Time of a Truth Commission.” 
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the arrival of truth in one’s confession and radical in distinguishing sincerity from the 
performance of sincerity. As Michael Neil aptly points out, confession “requires and abhors an 
audience” and it is “as much a social as a personal act” (“The Language of the Heart” 83). 
Therefore, the dilemma in the process of confession is two-fold. The first is about how to detect 
the voice from the “heart,” and the second is about who can have the authority to judge the 
sincerity of the voice. After Melanie charges Lurie for his sexual harassment, the university 
investigates the affair and makes Lucy confess his fault in the hearing. In the conversation 
between Lurie and “They” of the university committee, Lurie shows his cynicism toward 
confessional truth:  
 ‘What do you want the statement to contain?’ 
 ‘An admission that you were wrong.’ 
 ‘I have admitted that. Freely. I am guilty of the charges brought against me.’ 
 ‘Don’t play game with us, David. There is a difference between pleading guilty to a 
charge and admitting you were wrong, and you know that.’ 
 ‘And that will satisfy you: an admission I was wrong?’ 
 ‘No,’ says Farodia Rassool. ‘That would be back to the front. First Professor Lurie 
must make his statement. Then we can decide whether to accept it in mitigation. We 
don’t negotiate first on what should be in his statement. The statement should come 
from him, in his own words. Then we can see if it comes from his heart.’ 
 ‘And you trust yourself to divine that, from the words I use—to divine whether it 
comes from my heart?’ 
 ‘We will see what attitude you express. We will see whether you express contrition.’ 
 ‘Very well. I took advantage of my position vis-à-vis Ms Isaacs. It was wrong, and I 
regret it. Is that good enough for you?’ 
 ‘The question is not whether it is good enough for me, Professor Lurie, the question is 
whether it is good enough for you. Does it reflect your sincere feeling?’ 
 He shakes his head. ‘I have said the words for you, now you want more, you want me 
to demonstrate their sincerity. That is preposterous. That is beyond the scope of the 
law….’ (54-55) 
 
According to Rebecca Saunders, David Lurie’s position in this part is that “justice is a matter of 
calculable adequation, of indemnity and exchange” (Saunders 100). I do not totally agree with 
this argument. When Lurie pleads guilty, that does not mean that Lurie acknowledges his ethical 
responsibility to the committee. On the contrary, Lurie insists that there should be a division of 
morality from legality in confessing his fault. To borrow Paul de Man’s argument, “[t]o confess 
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is to overcome guilt and shame in the name of truth: it is an epistemological use of language in 
which ethical values of good and evil are superseded by values of truth and falsehood” 
(“Excuses” Allegories of Reading 279). Therefore, Lurie thinks that while he can admit or 
confess that “I was wrong,” the morality concerned with his integrity is beyond their indictment. 
That is the reason why Lurie refuses to “demonstrate” his sincerity before them. He claims that 
they cannot read his ‘heart” nor do have the right to ask him to show it. However, what “they” 
want to see is a kind of spectacle that would be assumed to show Lurie’s attitude of repentance. 
Lurie says to Lucy later as follows: “They wanted a spectacle: breast-beating, remorse, tears if 
possible. A TV show, in fact” (66). What Lurie denies in his confession before the hearing is, 
therefore, the idea that one’s sincerity or the statement “from his heart” can be enforced out in 
order to be communicated with others. This is like, to borrow Mahmood Mandani’s expression, 
“an institutionally produced truth” (“The Truth According to the TRC” 177).42  
We can find the same kind of denial of the performance of sincerity in Elizabeth 
Costello. In the final chapter of the novel (“At the Gate”), Costello is urged to speak her “belief” 
in an imaginary court. Just as Lurie is asked to show his “heart,” Costello is asked to show her 
“passion” before the examiners, who note that Costello displays “cynicism” and so she is a 
“disbeliever” (Elizabeth Costello 201). Ironically, she is told by a woman that “It is not belief 
that the boards are after. The effect is enough, the effect of belief. Show them you feel and they 
will be satisfied” (214). In other words, what “they” want to see is a kind of “ritual” of 
confession (Foucault 62). The desperation Costello feels comes from the thought that her passion 
or belief is not a substance to be measured by herself or others. Costello’s question of “How do 
                                   
42 Coetzee expresses his reservation in judging the accomplishment of the TRC in an interview with Jane 
Poyner. Coetzee remarks that “Only the future will tell what the TRC managed to achieve” (J.M. Coetzee 
and the Idea of the Public Intellectual 22). 
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you know where your voice come from?” (204) designates, at the fundamental level, a cynicism 
about sincerity especially when it is treated as a means, not as a purpose. And this cynicism is the 
other side of an agnosticism that suggests that one cannot know “what one believes in” (219). In 
relation to this, I attend to Coetzee’s saying that “the heart of our own desire is unknown to us” 
(“The Sympathetic Imagination: A Conversation with J.M. Coetzee” 45). For example, we can 
think about Lurie’s mystic comment that he was “a servant of Eros” when he tries to explain why 
he violated Melanie. In spite of his unknowable desire, Lurie knows this saying is not only 
“vanity” but also “not a lie, not entirely” (89). Hence, although he can say to himself that he was 
faithful to his desire, he cannot say his self was responsible for this desire. Because of this 
skepticism about the self, Coetzee says that “getting to the real self (finding the Mystery I) is a 
life’s task, like cleaning the Augean stables” (Coetzee, Giving Offense 231). 
I argue that “heart” is at the core of Coetzee’s emphasis on the sympathetic imagination 
and so it is concerned with a matter of the will or the active mind of the subject who cares and 
listens to the voice of the heart within. For example, Elizabeth Curren in Age of Iron says that the 
word caritas is “from the Latin word for the heart.” And she adds that “A lie: charity, caritas, has 
nothing to do with the heart,” because “the spirit of charity has perished in this country.” Instead, 
she says, “Care: the true root of charity” (22). The work of heart then has both a spiritual and a 
corporeal concept. Needless to say, care to others is a quintessential element in feeling sympathy. 
Therefore I attend to the fact that when Coetzee argues that Bakhtin’s dialogism has a spiritual 
meaning, it is ultimately a dialogism of sympathy: 
…at a deeper level dialogue requires a power of projecting oneself, via a faculty of 
sympathy, into the life-view and ultimately the being of the other. This projection of 
oneself cannot be into some imagined version of the other: it has to be into the actual 
being of the other, no matter how difficult and unpleasant and even boring that may be. 
This power seems to me more than simply a professional one—a power that can be 
learned and passed on from one generation of the caste of healers to the next. In essence 
it seems to me spiritual. (Coetzee and Kurtz 52) 
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I think Coetzee is not so pessimistic finally in the realization of sincerity. If the heart also 
indicates something to be felt within one’s body, there is no reason to deny its existence. This is 
like what Costello says in her belief in the ram and the frog. The sacrificed ram in the story of 
Odyssey is “not just an idea, the ram is alive though right now it is dying” (211). According to 
Louise Bethlehem, this reading is to “lend our own corporeality to text to animate the fiction of 
hers” (“Elizabeth Costello as Post-Apartheid Text” 25). Also the frog in her memory is “no 
allegory, it is the thing itself, the only thing” (Elizabeth Costello 217). Likewise, if Lurie helps 
Bev Shaw’s work “out of the goodness of [his] heart” (Disgrace 77) and “tears flow down his 
face” after assisting killing the dogs, we do not have to distrust the tears. All these descriptions 
testify the work of sympathy for the animals. In terms of the sympathetic imagination, the 
connection between the animal issue and the motion of the heart will be discussed in next 
chapter, where we can discuss such issues as whether sympathy is a duty and whether a fiction is 
necessary for the sympathetic imagination.  
 
3.4 Coetzee’s Defense of the Novel 
  
Coetzee says, “I had left South Africa to be part of a wider world. But now I discovered 
that my novelty value to the wider world, to the extent that I had any value, was that I came from 
Africa” (Attwell 336). This African identity is reflected in the chapter “The Novel in Africa” in 
Elizabeth Costello. The novelist Egudu talks about some African traits in the indigenous stories 
and their appealing to the Western world for their exoticism. Against him, Costello criticizes the 
role of interpreter, “interpreting Africa to their readers” (51). Though she is also from the “third-
world,” Australia, her theory of the novel is a little abstract:  
Like history, the novel is thus an exercise in making the past coherent. Like history, it 
explores the respective contributions of character and circumstances to forming the 
present. By doing so, the novel suggests how we may explore the power of the present 
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to produce the future. That is why have this thing, this institution, this medium called 
the novel. (Elizabeth Costello 39)    
 
The notion that the novel is an “institution” attracts our interest.43 And this comparison of the 
novel and history is already made in Coetzee’s essay “The Novel Today” (1988). Actually, to 
circumscribe Coetzee’s writings within the contours of South Africa seems no longer possible 
now. Since Coetzee emigrated to Adelaide, Australia in 2002 and acquired Australian citizenship 
in 2006, he has published some “Australian novels.”44 In a letter to Paul Auster, Coetzee says 
that his literary career has come to have a new phase:  
One can think of a life in art, schematically, in two or perhaps three stages. In the first 
you find, or pose for yourself, a great question. In the second you labor away at 
answering it. And then, if you live long enough, you come to the third stage, when the 
aforesaid great question begins to bore you, and you need to look elsewhere. (Auster 
and Coetzee, Here and Now 88)  
 
Though it is too brief, Coetzee’s retrospection in this passage provides an overview for his entire 
career. Of course, “the third stage” indicates Coetzee’s settlement in Australia. Consequently, we 
are led to ask what the “great question” was that Coetzee had had in his first stage and what if 
any answer he had made in the second. Although Coetzee does not stipulate the “great question” 
in the letter, David Attwell explains that it is the question “What script has my history written for 
me, and how can I rewrite it?” (Attwell, J. M. Coetzee and the Life of Writing 209). I believe the 
“history” here cannot but have complex meanings for Coetzee. As seen from his memoirs, such 
                                   
43 With respect to the feature of “institution” in fiction, I attend to Masao Maruyama’s argument that 
when there is a “specific attitude that underlies a belief in fiction,” it is “one that evaluates man’s 
intellectual productivity in the highest term.” See “From Carnal Literature to Carnal Politics.” 245-67. 
 
44 This term “Australian Novels” is from J. C. Kannemeyer’s biography, J. M. Coetzee: A Life in Writing 
(575). After his emigration, Coetzee has published six novels until now: Elizabeth Costello (2003), Slow 
Man (2005), Diary of a Bad Year (2007), Summertime (2009), The Childhood of Jesus (2013), and The 
Schooldays of Jesus (2016).  
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as Youth, the personal history in Coetzee’s early “stages” is not separated from the public history 
of colonial South Africa. That Coetzee “rewrites” this history signifies that Coetzee reviews 
some problems in this history through his post-colonial perspective. And it is true that many 
critics have read Coetzee novels – including Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), Life & Times of 
Michael K (1983), Age of Iron (1990), and Disgrace (1999) – as allegories of the (post-)colonial 
situations of South Africa.45 One of the debates incurred by means of this is whether his works 
are truthful representation of South Africa. 
For example, the reactions to Coetzee’s winning the Booker prize with Disgrace in 1999 
were not entirely favorable in South Africa. Although Gerald Kaufman, the chairman of the 
judges’ panel for the prize in that year, commented that Disgrace is “a millennial book because it 
takes us through the 20th century into a new century in which the source of power is shifting 
away from Western Europe,”46 some readers in South Africa took it as an unrealistic and even 
“racist book.” Nadine Gordimer says, “In the novel Disgrace there is not one black person who 
is a real human being. I find it difficult to believe, indeed more than difficult, having lived here 
all my life and being part of everything that has happened here, that the black family protects the 
rapist because he’s one of them. If that’s the only truth he could find in the post-apartheid South 
Africa, I regretted this very much for him” (qtd. in Kannemeyer 528). In a similar vein, Chris 
van Wyk remarks that “The white characters are fleshed out, the black evildoers are not” (528). 
While in the outside of South Africa the novel was read as “an allegory about what is happening 
                                   
45 However, Derek Attridge, who emphasizes the “singularity” of a literary text and its reading as an 
“event” (64), goes against such an allegorical reading of Coetzee’s works. See Attridge, “Against 
Allegory.” J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading. 32-64. 
 
46 Sarah Lyall. “South African Writer Wins Top British Prize for Second Time.” The New York Times 26 
Oct. 1999. Web. 27 Dec. 2007. 
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to the human race in the post-colonial era” (Kaufman) the ANC (African National Congress) 
used it as an “historical witness to the persistence of racism among white South Africans” in an 
oral submission to the Human Right Commission’s Hearings in the media on 5 April 2000 
(McDonald 323). According to the submission, Coetzee’s depiction shows “the white ‘perception 
of the post-apartheid black man’” (Kannemeyer 529). Another harsh but significant criticism 
came from Jakes Gerwel, former professor of literature and Director-General of the President’s 
Office under Nelson Mandela: 
  J. M. Coetzee’s recent award-winning novel has now for some time been nagging at 
one with the bleak view it projects of the social decline, moral disintegration and 
fraying of the national fabric of South Africa. How come that one of our most potent 
creative spirits—and undoubtedly one of the most best-known internationally—would 
be inspired by such images in his fictional recreation of the country?…The question I 
am left with after Coetzee’s prize-winning novel is: what does it say about the rest of us 
if the homelessness of the white-in-Africa is cast in these images?  
It is not just an existential homelessness of the white that becomes the metaphorical 
raw material of this picture. The near-barbaric post-colonial demands of black Africans 
and the exclusion of possibilities of civilized conciliation are the building blocks of this 
tale. (Leaving out of the equation for the moment the coloured characters as whores, 
seducibles, plaintiffs and prosecutors-with-attitude.)” (Gerwel 2; qtd. in Kannemeyer 
530-31)   
  
As the article’s title suggests (“Is this the right image of our nation?”), Gerwel’s critical focus is 
on the correctness of Coetzee’s representation of the country. Dealing with the question about the 
“right image” of one’s nation, one may ask whether the Coetzee’s novel should be read purely as 
“South African literature” so that he should take any responsibility for his “fictional recreation” 
of “our nation.”  
Here we need to remember Coetzee’s counter-critical remark that “Stories are defined by 
their irresponsibility” (Doubling the Point 246). What he concentrates on his writing is not such 
historical, realistic testaments to the colonial history of South Africa. Although he feels 
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sympathetic with Nadine Gordimer’s position,47 he is resistant to the meta-narrative in the 
literary realism. Though Attwell designates the history issue from the “great question,” I have 
argued that the other question of how to tell a truth in autobiography without self-deception has 
been a great interest to Coetzee since at least 1985, when he wrote the essay “Confession and 
Double-Thoughts.” I propose that Coetzee’s interest in truth-telling in autobiographical writing is 
an antidote to what he terms as “orthodox history” of South Africa. Whether it is derived from 
his own reaction to the apartheid system would be another issue to be clarified with in-depth 
biographical research.  
For reference, I suggest reading Coetzee’s essay “The Novel Today.” Written during the 
state of emergency, the essay professes Coetzee’s belief in the novel and its possibility as a truth. 
Ultimately, Coetzee’s comparison of the novel and history in this article is based on an argument 
“about truth, about greater or lesser truth” (2). Facing “intense ideological pressure like the 
present,” Coetzee observes that “in South Africa the colonization of the novel by the discourse of 
history is proceeding with alarming rapidity.” That means there is a “tendency” in South Africa 
“to subsume the novel under history (2-3). However, Coetzee argues that the novel, in its 
“rivalry” to history, may arrive at “a greater truth” than “history” by virtue of the novel’s “own 
procedures and issues” (3): 
[…] in times of intense ideological pressure like the present, when this space in which 
                                   
47 I believe Coetzee’s remark about Gordimer also can be applied to himself: 
Since early in her career Gordimer has been exercised by the question of her own place, 
present and future, in history. The question has two forks: What will the verdict of history 
be on Europe’s project of colonizing sub-Saharan Africa, of which she has willy-nilly 
been part; and what historical role is available to a writer like her born into a late colonial 
community? (“Nadine Gordimer” Inner Workings 255)     
Pointing out such influences as Sartre and Camus, Coetzee argues that Gordimer adopted “the role of 
witness to the fate of South Africa” (255). He also says that “At the heart of the novel of realism is the 
theme of disillusionment,” and the example is Don Quixote. He adds, “Gordimer is an heir of the tradition 
of realism that Cervantes inaugurates” (“Nadine Gordimer” Inner Workings 256). 
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the novel and history normally coexist like two cows on the same pasture, each minding 
its own business, is squeezed almost to nothing, the novel, it seems to me, has only two 
options: supplementarity or rivalry. It cannot be both autonomous and supplementary. If 
the novel aims to provide the reader with vicarious first-hand experience of living in a 
certain historical time, embodying contending forces in contending characters and 
filling our experience with a certain density of observation, if it regards this as its goal 
for the rest—for what I will call its principal structuration—depending on the model of 
history—then its relation to history is self-evidently a secondary relation. (3)   
 
Coetzee’s sense of responsibility as a writer as well as a witness to the scandalous regime in 
status quo must be incisive in this essay. While he implicitly criticizes the censorship in the 
apartheid system of South Africa, he insists on the autonomy of the novel: “Storytelling can take 
care of itself” (3). I do not think that Coetzee’s criticism of history here does not purport to claim 
the novel’s superiority in depicting the reality of South Africa. He just supposes that both history 
and the novel are “a kind of discourse” (4), and this fully reminds us of Hayden White’s 
argument that “Viewed simply as verbal artifacts histories and novels are indistinguishable from 
one another” (Tropics of Discourse 122). After all, Coetzee’s defense of the novel implicates his 
anxiety about “truth” whose notion and value were distorted and depreciated in the apartheid 
system. Thus, as Salman Rushdie puts, “the novel is one way of denying the official, politicians’ 
version of truth” (“Imaginary Homelands” 14). If a truth in the novel depends on a “particular 
way” in its literary representation, then novel writing does not need to follow the model of 
history. And we realize that Coetzee’s reservation to literary realism is in parallel with his 
opposition to what he calls the “orthodox history” of South Africa.48  
                                   
48 Coetzee’s evaluation of Lukács’s literary criticism is the example. In an interview with Attwell, Coetzee 
says : 
I happen to think Lukács’ judgment [about Kafka and Joyce] wrong, conditioned by more than a 
little moralistic prejudice; nor do I think much of what he has to say about Tolstoy and Balzac. 
Nevertheless, the general positon Lukács takes on what he calls realism as against modernist 
decadence carries a great deal of power, political and moral, in South Africa today: one’s first 
duty as a writer is to represent social and historical processes; drawing the procedures of 
representation into question is time-wasting; and so forth. (Doubling the Point 202).    
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE DISTANCE OF SYMPATHY  
“So much depends… upon distance.” (Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse 207) 
 
4.1 Sympathy of Perception and Moral Judgment 
In Disgrace, after watching two tethered sheep that will be killed for his neighbor’s 
feast, David Lurie feels reluctant to join there. Facing an unexplainable emotion within himself 
towards the animals, Lurie says to Lucy that “I am disturbed. I can’t say why” (127). In spite of 
that uncomfortable presentiment, as Lurie and Lucy “live too close to Petrus,” he goes to 
Petrus’s party considering their relationship with the powerful neighbor. When served the meat, 
Lurie says to himself that “I am going to eat it and ask forgiveness afterwards” (131). Perhaps, to 
“ask forgiveness” would palliate his guilty consciousness for the diet. What appears to be 
incomprehensible beforehand is Lurie’s unexpected concern for the animals: 
A bond seems to have come into existence between himself and the two Persians, he 
does not know how. The bond is not one of affection. It is not even a bond with these 
two in particular, whom he could not pick out from a mob in a field. Nevertheless, 
suddenly and without reason, their lot has become important to him. (126)  
 
Lurie’s “bond” with “the two Persians” must be spontaneous and instantaneous (“suddenly and 
without reason”). Nonetheless, as we see, Lurie does not know why he is “disturbed” and how 
there comes to be a “bond” between the animals and himself. He just happened to watch them 
tied up there. The event that a mere observation of those “slaughter-animals” makes David Lurie 
have a serious concern for them needs an explanation. My argument is that Lurie’s “perception” 
works here and this perception indicates the “ability to discern, acutely and responsively, the 
salient features of one’s particular situation” (Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge 37). Definitely, the 
“particular situation” here is applied to the destiny of the two Persian sheep. In order to look into 
the “bond” and the invisible commotion within Lurie’s mind, I propose to read alongside a 
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passage in Mencius, particularly in terms of examining the relationship between perception and 
sympathy: 
The King was sitting in the hall. He saw someone passing below, leading an ox. The 
King noticed this and said, ‘Where is the ox going?’ ‘The blood of the ox is to be used 
for consecrating a new bell.’ ‘Spare it. I cannot bear to see it shrinking with fear, like an 
innocent man going to the place of execution.’ ‘In that case, should the ceremony be 
abandoned?’ ‘That is out of the question. Use a lamb instead.’ …[Mencius says] “It is 
the way of a benevolent man. [David Hinton’s translation is that “That’s how Humanity 
works” (28).] You saw the ox but not the lamb. The attitude of a gentleman towards 
animals is this: once having seen them alive, he cannot bear to see them die, and once 
having heard their cry, he cannot bear to eat their flesh.” (Mencius 9-10, translated by 
D.C. Lau) 
 
This anecdote is from the part where the King Hsüan asks Mencius if he could be a true king. 
Mencius replies with yes as he already heard the story above. Killing an animal for the 
consecration of a new bell was an official ritual in his kingdom at that time. But the King showed 
his compassion for the ox in his sight and gave an order to replace it of the lamb. Mencius thinks 
that the benevolence of the ruler for the ox could be applied as well to his people as the King 
compared the animal with an innocent man. What Mencius values from the King’s act is not only 
his compassion but also his specific attention to the animal passing before his eyes. Though one 
would be skeptical about whether the ox is really shivering for its death, the King recognizes it 
with his careful attention and his pity for the animal makes the sacrifice intolerable. Certainly, 
what makes this difference is that the King “saw the ox but not the lamb.” That means there is a 
strong relationship between sympathy and perception.  
Furthermore, replacing the ox by the lamb indicates that the former becomes a singular 
being or status lacking in the latter, since the specific object observed by the subject engenders a 
very vivid, emotional image in the passive mind.49 To apply Nussbaum’s explanation, the 
                                   
49 In terms of the sympathetic gaze between the animals and humans, the ox can be compared with the 
Derrida’s cat described in the article “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)” (2000). The 
notable thing is that while the ox is seen by the King, Derrida in his nudity is conscious of the gaze of the 
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King’s “perception” is “not merely aided by emotion but is also in part constituted by 
appropriate response” (79). Of course, the King’s response, the analogy between the ox and an 
innocent man is, in a degree, dependent upon the King’s imagination. But, sympathy, if we just 
follow Adam Smith’s theory, is fundamentally the outcome of our imagination.50 What matters 
is that his ethical motif such as the benevolence for the nameless, speechless other does not come 
from an abstract concept, but from a meaningful perception of the particular. And this must 
accompany our emotional response. If we can use Elizabeth Costello’s words here, the King does 
not refuse to “think [himself] into the place of [his] victims, as did everyone else” (Elizabeth 
Costello 79) and this notion of victim as an innocent being must include the King himself.  
Unlike the King, David Lurie could not save the sheep. Lurie knows if he pays for them 
Petrus will buy new ones. Though Lurie is dismayed that such slaughtering is too near in this 
African country life (124-26), he himself becomes later a “dog-man” or “dog-undertaker” in Bev 
Shaw’s clinic where he helps to euthanize “unwanted” animals, mainly dogs. Then what we 
observe in the second half of Disgrace is that Lurie’s intimacy with the lives of animals goes 
together with the gradual change of his perspective for animals. Lurie’s perception of the sheep 
is meaningful in the process of the change of his mind. Contrary to the previous notion that 
animals have no souls following the dogma of “Church Fathers” (78), Lurie imagines practicing 
“mourning” for the sheep (127). That means Lurie has started to think about the dignity of 
animals when they are treated like “things.” Although he never thought himself as a 
                                   
cat. That is, while there happens to be an exchange of gaze between the two, it triggers a sort of reversion 
in feeling an emotion, like shame, between the two (378-79). 
 
50 Adam Smith says that “By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves 
enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same 
person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though 
weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them” (The Theory of Moral Sentiments 9).   
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“sentimentalist,” an emotional turmoil visited upon him when he drove back after helping Bev 
Shaw’s work on a Sunday evening: “he actually has to stop at the roadside to recover himself. 
Tears flow down his face that he cannot stop; his hands shake” (142-43). And so, because “he 
does not seem to have the gift of hardness,” Lurie does not let the dead dogs dumped like wastes 
but instead carries them to the incinerator. For Lurie, this is his own way of paying respect to 
their death. However, the honor or dignity that Lurie attributes to the animals incurs a confusion 
for its application. Concretely speaking, whether those animals in the course of “Lösung” (142) 
by humans deserve a sort of “mourning” is obviously a problematic, ethical issue, as subtly 
intimated in the case of the slaughtered sheep. Freud argues in “Mourning and Melancholia” 
(1917) that the act of mourning is a slow disengagement of libido from a loved object. But is it 
applicable to animals? Lurie’s affection for the animals is connected to the idea that they cannot 
be treated merely like “things.” What is compensated then might be the absolution of the guilty 
consciousness which he first has felt when eating the sheep’s flesh in Petrus’s party. Of course, 
there is no obligation that other guests in the party and other workers in the incinerator should 
have the same feeling like him. Lurie’s acts in his circumstances are fundamentally self-
interested. I think it is significant to note that, in regard to the question why Lurie has taken on 
this job for the dogs, the narrator replies that it is “For himself, then. For his idea of the world, a 
world in which men do not use shovels to beat corpses into a more convenient shape for 
processing” (146). We see here Coetzee divides Lurie’s motivation into two levels. “For himself” 
must imply Lurie’s personal concern, such as his conscience or self-respect. Derek Attridge 
regards it as “a profound need to preserve the ethical integrity of the self” (187). Then, the 
meaning of “For his idea of the world” makes us think about what the “world” here connotes. 
Lurie’s “idea” fundamentally bears on the relationship between the self and “the world,” in 
  94 
which Lurie wishes to live without troubles not only with his conscience or self-respect but also 
with other people. In other words, he wishes to believe in what Hannah Arendt calls “the concord 
with the world” (“On Humanity in Dark Times” 4). In a similar way, when Elizabeth Costello 
says that that her vegetarianism “comes out of a desire to save my soul” (Elizabeth Costello 89), 
the valorization of the “soul” implies a certain relationship with her world. Without assuming the 
soul’s dignity, her taste cannot have a ground to ask tacitly its positive recognition by others. As 
Costello wishes her taste of vegetarianism to be respected in her world, Lurie’s sympathy has his 
dignity weighed in with regards to the dignity of animals. In spite of their self-interested thoughts 
for animals, both Lurie and Costello have a yearning for the concord with the world that 
implicitly seek to gain some agreements by others. It is because the self is not a solipsistic being.  
At the ending part of Disgrace, Bev Shaw asks David Lurie if he will give up his 
befriended dog in the clinic, and Lurie says, “Yes, I am giving him up” (220). Mike Marais 
associates this decision as Lurie’s “self-sacrifice” since it is “in the dog’s interests.” In light of 
“the dog’s interest,” Marais argues, “His [Lurie’s] own deed, desires, feelings, predilections and 
presuppositions are totally immaterial.” Marais continues, “To sympathize, Lurie must lose, 
indeed sacrifice or offer, himself. Contrary to the Levitical injunction, he must love his neighbor, 
the dog, generously—not as himself, but despite himself. (“J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace and the 
Task of Imagination” 78). However, I am not convinced whether Lurie’s decision really does 
justice to the dog’s “interest.” Marais must view Lurie’s sympathy from the self-negation or self-
sacrifice where his personal attachment should be abstained. Despite its orientation for the 
alterity of the animal, Marais’ reading is debatable. The reason is that as the existence of the 
Derrida’s cat cannot be “conceptualized” by the philosopher (“The Animal That Therefore I Am” 
379), the dog’s ultimate “interest” likewise cannot be determined by us. As Elisabeth Arnould-
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Bloomfield remarks in the article “Posthuman Compassions,” Derrida’s skepticism over the 
assessment of pain of others including animals problematizes such anthropocentric approach to 
the suffering of animals. Arnould-Bloomfield puts, “Derrida’s compassion…depends on the 
suggestion that animal and human pains are ontologically identical but share only otherness and 
unknowability” (1470). If only in terms of the unknowable pain of the dog, that Lurie’s 
sympathy here cannot but have a self-interested dimension at bottom where his emotional 
engagement, such as “love,” is at the core. Before the process of the dog, the narrator puts that 
“the dog would die for him, he knows” (215). Coetzee does not explain in detail what is behind 
this decision, but we need to remember that the subject who feels the “dishonour” is actually not 
the dogs but Lurie himself in the clinic (146). In confrontation with the suffering and indignity of 
the dog, Lurie’s decision may come out of his love for the animal, which Eric Meljac calls 
“delicate compassion” (159). In that sense, it is significant to read that the disgraced hero Lurie 
learns the meaning of “love” in Bev Shaw’s clinic (219).   
Though Lurie’s emotional movement aforementioned may have an aspect of self-
revelation for himself, its consequence does not remain only for his relationship with animals. 
The expansion of sympathy leads him to stretch out his imagination to the position of Lucy in the 
rape incident in which he tries to be the victim of the rape, and this trial also prompts him to 
reflect over his violation of Melanie Isaacs, which, in turn, makes him think from the standpoint 
her father. Therefore, what is at stake is, as D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie commonly argue, the 
distinction between self-interest and selfishness. They point out that while Adam Smith uses 
“selfishness” in a pejorative sense like neglecting others, he uses “self-interest” in the context of 
a “proper regard to our own private happiness and interest” that is a necessity in virtue (22). So, I 
understand that, to borrow Foucault’s term, both Lurie’s and Costello’s “care of the self” is not 
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centered on their egoism but on the self’s somewhat coherent relationship with the world:  
The ethical fashioning of the self is first of all this: to make of one’s existence, of this 
essentially mortal material, the site for the construction of an order held together by its 
internal coherence…This ethics demands exercises, regularities, and work: but without 
the effect of anonymous constraint. Training, here, arises, neither from civil law, nor 
from religious prescription: “This government of the self, with the techniques that are 
peculiar to it, takes its place ‘between’ pedagogical institutions and the religions of 
salvation.” It is not an obligation for everyone, but a personal choice of existence. 
(Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject 531) 
 
In terms of the negation of egoism and its relation to sympathy, we will review later the concept 
of “taste,” where the inter-subjective relationship mediated by the function of “common sense” 
sets a possibility of reconciliation. Cary Wolfe remarks that both Lurie’s and Costello’s attitudes 
toward animals show “one of the central ethical issues of our time: our moral responsibilities 
toward nonhuman animals” (Philosophy and Animal Life 3). We cannot treat this animal issue 
here in detail, but, to say again, Lurie’s sense of responsibility toward animals is not initiated by 
any abstract, theoretical ideas. He just perceived some animals and determined that “their lot has 
become important to him.” Since he could not ignore the uneasy emotion evoked within himself 
after watching the sheep and the dying dogs and, at the same time, as this issue has posed Lurie 
the question of how to live, he thought about what he could do for them. Indeed, we may say that 
Lurie’s responsibility is not separated from his inner feeling, and that feeling underlies his 
thinking about “the idea of the world” to which he wishes to belong. This is like what Adam 
Bede says that “It isn’t notions sets people doing the right thing—it’s feelings” (Adam Bede 
180). As Martha Nussbaum claims, “an ethics of impartial respect for human dignity will fail to 
engage real human beings unless they are made capable of entering imaginatively into the lives 
of distant others and to have emotions related to that participation” (The Poetic Justice xvi). So, 
if such sympathetic imagination can contribute for our public reasoning and moral judgments, it 
is because it can guide us to see a concrete, specific world of a person. George Eliot puts 
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emphasis on our careful attention to the concrete, “special circumstances”:  
[…] moral judgments must remain false and hollow, unless they are checked and 
enlightened by a perpetual reference to the special circumstances that mark the 
individual lot.  
All people of broad, strong sense have an instinctive repugnance to the men of 
maxims; because such people early discern that the mysterious complexity of our life is 
not to be embraced by maxims, and that to lace ourselves up in formulas of that sort is 
to repress all divine promptings and inspirations that spring from growing insight and 
sympathy. And the man of maxims is the popular representative of the minds that are 
guided in their moral judgment solely by general rules, thinking that these will lead 
them to justice by a ready-made patent method, without the trouble of exerting 
patience, discrimination, impartiality—without any care to assure themselves whether 
they have the insight that comes from a hardly-earned estimate of temptation, or from a 
life vivid and intense enough to have created a wide fellow-feeling with all that is 
human. (The Mill on the Floss 403)  
   
For Eliot, sympathy is also one of the important virtues required in moral judgments, but it is not 
found in fixed maxims; rather, sympathy dwells in the concrete, sensitive understanding of the 
lives of others. It is because “emotion links itself with particulars” (“The Poet Young” 199). In 
the Mill on the Floss, for example, when Tom hears about the scandal that Maggie and Mr. 
Stephen Guest will be married, what he thinks about is the “disgrace” of his family, rather than 
the “death [of Maggie]” (391). It is true that this feeling has social contexts, but Tom’s feeling 
does not grow further into sympathy for his sister Maggie. He is too doctrinaire in maintaining 
the ideology of family and his community, because his moral judgment is too limited and 
blinded, which disallows him to see his other, Maggie, in her standpoint. It is, first of all, the lack 
of “the trouble of exerting patience, discrimination, impartiality” that drives him to ignore 
Maggie’s concrete real situation. As “Tom, like every one of us, was imprisoned within the limits 
of his own nature,” readers are advised to be lenient with Tom’s severity for Maggie (404). 
However, what George Eliot ultimately emphasizes is that “the responsibility of tolerance lies 
with those who have the wider vision” (404). We understand that this wider vision as, in other 
words, the “widening of sympathy,” which Bodenheimer regards as “central to George Eliot’s 
philosophy of art” (The Real Life of Mary Ann Evans 83). Among those characters in George 
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Eliot’s novels who come to acquire this “wider vision,” Dorothea in Middlemarch (1872) is an 
exemplary character. In regard to the relationship between the expansion of sympathy and Kant’s 
concept of “enlarged mentality,” I think about the connection between the “imagination” and 
“common sense” in his third Critique.51 As a way for approaching to the sympathetic 
imagination and its ethical meaning in this research, a review of Kant’s third Critique, 
particularly related to the analysis of “taste” is indispensable. The following is a brief summary 
of Kant’s “taste” theory.  
In The Critique of Judgement (1790), Kant assumes pleasure as quintessential element 
affiliated with our aesthetic judgment. And Kant calls the faculty of that judgment “taste.” 
Although the pleasure or displeasure a person feels about an object is subjective and contingent, 
Kant argues that if one judges the beauty of an object with disinterested mind, the personal 
judgment of taste must involve “a claim to validity for all men,” “a claim to subjective 
universality” (32).52 But as Kant says, such a claim is less logical than aesthetic because this 
universality or general validity has reference “not to the cognitive faculties (concepts), but to the 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure for every subject” (33). So it is a mistake to suppose that the 
aesthetic judgment postulates the agreement of everyone. Nevertheless, by assuming the 
existence of common sense (sensus communis) Kant thinks it is possible to link our subjective 
feeling with those of others. This common sense invokes not only our sensational (sensus) but 
                                   
51 Hannah Arendt regards this “enlarged mentality” as “the condition sine qua non of right judgment” and 
adds that “one’s community sense makes it possible to enlarge one’s mentality” (Lectures on Kant’s 
Political Philosophy 73). According to Arendt, the faculty of judgment including “taste” usually deals 
with the particular and its basic notion owes something to the function of imagination where “common 
sense” is presupposed, and that is how aesthetics and the sympathetic imagination, and finally moral 
judgments are intertwined to each other.  
 
52 To apply David Hume’s words in “Of the Standard of Taste,” a critic of “Taste” “must preserve his 
mind free from all prejudice” (145, italics original). As in the case of Adam Smith, it is true that Hume’s 
attention to the “sentiment” of taste has implications for our moral judgment. 
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also our social (communis) feeling as we think “from the standpoint of everyone else” (84). 
Therefore, he keeps the notion of “the universal communicability of a feeling” through our 
common sense, though he admits that it is an “ideal norm” (49). Although an objective principle 
of taste is impossible because our taste is not based on concept but subjective feeling like 
pleasure, Kant holds the thread of a belief that taste is communicable and universal insofar as the 
judgment of taste tends to seek its validity through public agreement. 
Hannah Arendt remarks that “[c]ommon sense for Kant did not mean a sense common to 
all of us, but strictly that sense which fits us into a community with others, makes us members of 
it and enables us to communicate things given by our five private senses” (Responsibility and 
Judgment 139). Arendt adds that Kant thought common sense could work “with the help of 
another faculty, the faculty of imagination.” Needless to say, this imagination indicates one’s 
thinking “from the standpoint of everyone else”:  
Common sense, by virtue of its imaginative capacity, can have present in itself all those 
who actually are absent. It can think, as Kant says, in the place of everybody else, so 
that when somebody makes the judgment, this is beautiful, he does not mean merely to 
say this pleases me (as if, for instance, chicken soup may please me but may not be 
pleasant to others), but he claims assent from others because in judging he has already 
taken them into account and hence hopes that his judgments will carry a certain general, 
though perhaps not universal validity. The validity will reach us as far as the 
community of which my common sense makes me a member—Kant, who thought of 
himself as a citizen of the world, hoped it would reach to the community of all 
mankind. Kant call this an “enlarged mentality,” meaning that without such agreement 
man is not fit for civilized intercourse. The point of the matter is that my judgment of a 
particular instance does not merely depend upon my perception but upon my 
representing to myself something which I do not perceive. (Responsibility and 
Judgment 140)  
  
The work of “representing to myself something which I do not perceive,” equals the capacity of 
imagination. But as Kant himself does, we can ask if taste is “a natural and original faculty” or if 
it is only “the idea of one that is artificial and to be acquired by us” (49).53 This question, in 
                                   
53 According to Kant, taste, if to avoid a “lapse to crudity and a return to the rudeness,” needs of 
  100 
terms of sympathy, can be presented otherwise like this: Is the sympathy an innate feeling? Or, 
does it need to be nurtured and so “enlarged” by any effort? If so, we can inquire whether there is 
any duty or responsibility in feeling sympathy. In order to answer these questions, I return to the 
emphasis on “the concrete” and “the particular” that need to be elaborated with the concept of 
“imagination.” This is because sympathy as an emotion is also an inter-subjective feeling. 
Ultimately, what I want to argue is that Kant’s taste theory helps us to understand sympathy as an 
ethical concept. In relation to this work, Arendt’s research focusing on “thinking” and 
“judgment” provides us with useful ideas.    
In the article “Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship” (1964), Arendt talks about 
controversies touched off by the book Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963). Arendt argues there that, 
instead of attributing war crimes and their causes to the collective responsibilities, we should 
find individual, responsible subjects for each misdeed, because “There is no such things as 
collective guilt or collective innocence; guilt and innocence make sense only if applied to 
individuals” (29). For Arendt, what matters in this distinction is the operation of “thinking” in 
one’s moral judgment. That is, if an individual, however he or she was admittedly compelled to 
do some war crimes in an enforced system, was not able to use its own judgment, that cannot be 
an excuse. Being cautious to identify those non-participants in the Nazi-period who are resistant 
but not so ideologically disinclined to their evil state following their moral norms, Arendt points 
out other possible moral standards they would keep in their minds: 
                                   
examples of “what has in the course of culture maintained itself longest in esteem” (77). So, he seems to 
endorse the effect of one’s cultural tradition nurturing his or her taste. But when we say that our taste 
should be trained with those good examples of canons, the pedagogical idea and system of canons then 
enter the sociological field that is independent of the debate over the existence of aesthetic value in 
canons. That is, the aesthetic valorization of canons should be reviewed in terms of its perception and 
reception in society. That is the sociology of taste. As Pierre Bourdieu’s research shows in Distinction 
(1979), the disinterested mind before artistic objects, which Kant regards as a requirement in the 
appreciation of arts, is no more effective in the politics of taste. 
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Their criterion, I think, was a different one: they asked themselves to what extent they 
would still be able to live in peace with themselves after having committed certain deeds; 
and they decided that it would be better to do nothing, not because the world would then 
be changed for the better, but simply because only on this condition could they go on 
living with themselves at all. Hence, they also chose to die when they were forced to 
participate. To put it crudely, they refused to murder, not so much because they still held 
fast to the command “Thou shalt not kill,” but because they were unwilling to live 
together with a murderer—themselves.  
The precondition for this kind of judging is not a highly developed intelligence or 
sophistication in moral matters, but rather the disposition to live together explicitly with 
oneself, to have intercourse with oneself, that is, to be engaged in that silent dialogue 
between me and myself which, since Socrates and Plato, we usually call thinking. This 
kind of thinking, though at the root of all philosophical thought, is not technical and does 
not concern theoretical problems. The dividing line between those who want to think and 
therefore have to judge by themselves, and those who do not, strikes across all social and 
cultural or educational differences. (44-45)  
 
I argue that that, in a wide sense, “this kind of thinking” in the course of Socratic self-dialogue or 
self-reflection is not so different from the “care of the self” that Foucault explains. In that trying 
to seek a “concord with the world,” I also think that these “non-participants” would be the same 
type of persons like David Lurie and Elizabeth Costello. Simply speaking, they show that one 
can live one’s own life by his or her choice, and it is to listen to its inner voice of conscience 
without tarnishing its dignity. As Arendt aptly remarks, “Whatever the voice of conscience may 
be, it cannot be said to be ‘silent,’ and its validity depends entirely upon an authority that is 
above and beyond all merely human laws and rules” (The Life of the Mind 215). Instigated by the 
“voice of conscience,” the action of “to think and…to judge by themselves” is linked with the 
imagination of otherness, and this constitutes a principle for one’s moral judgment for its 
correctness and impartiality, as we have reviewed in the concept of common sense.54  
                                   
54 For example, when Hannah Arendt reports on Adolf Eichmann’s “banality of evil” through hearing his 
testimony, the critical focus is on the absence of his thinking. Arendt says, “a more specific, and also more 
decisive, flaw in Eichmann's character was his almost total inability ever to look at anything from the 
other fellow's point of view” (Eichmann in Jerusalem 47-48). She continues, “The longer one listened to 
him, the more obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely connected with an inability to 
think, namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else” (49, my emphasis). 
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Arendt repeatedly says that Eichmann’s sheer thoughtlessness is the result of his 
inability for the imagination of alterity. It is not so difficult to understand that here the faculty of 
thinking implies the sympathetic imagination. As Ursula K. Le Guin says, “The imagination is a 
fundamental way of thinking, an essential means of becoming and remaining human” (The Wave 
in the Mind 207). What is deplorable is that those collaborators in the Nazi period not only 
ignored those victims in the death camps but also did not fully think from the standpoints of 
them. In a word, Costello says, “They lost their humanity”:      
They lost their humanity, in our eyes, because of a certain willed ignorance on their 
own part. Under the circumstances of Hitler’s kind of war, ignorance may have been a 
useful survival mechanism, but that is an excuse which, with admirable moral rigor, we 
refuse to accept…The signing of the articles of capitulation and the payment of 
reparations did not put an end to that state of sin. On the contrary, we said, a sickness of 
the soul continues to mark that generation. It marked those citizens of the Reich who 
had committed evil actions, but also those who, for whatever reason, were in ignorance 
of those actions. It thus marked, for practical purposes, every citizen of the Reich. Only 
those in the camps were innocent. (Elizabeth Costello 64) 
 
As Arendt does, Coetzee recalls those Jewish victims in the Holocaust to talk about the failure of 
humanity and sympathy.55Obviously, Costello’s analogy in this lecture between “those in the 
camps” and those animals in the meat industry aims to expose the cruelty to the animals. Apart 
from the relevance of the analogy, what is mostly criticized in Costello’s remark is the abeyance 
of thinking on the part of those perpetrators which lead to their “willed ignorance” of the victims. 
Needless to say, this “willed ignorance” is related to the lack of sympathy that “refused to think 
themselves into the place of the victims.” In questioning one’s responsibility, it is significant that 
Hannah Arendt regards “thinking” not only as an ability and but also as a requirement in judging 
one’s morality. Particularly when ignorance is concerned, it is necessary to take into account 
                                   
55 To borrow Giorgio Agamben’s expression, “the Jew [in the death camp]” was “the non-man produced 
within the man, or the néomort and the overcomatose person, that is, the animal separated within the 
human body itself” (Agamben, The Open 37). 
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what a thinking or knowing subject is mindful about his or her ignorance. As Aristotle explains 
in Nicomachean Ethics, there is a qualitative difference between “acting on account of 
ignorance” and “acting in ignorance.” In Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins’s translation of 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle puts as follows: 
Acting on account of ignorance seems different also from acting in ignorance, for he 
who is drunk or angry is not held to act on account of ignorance but rather on account 
of one of the things stated, [drunkenness or anger,] and not with knowledge but in 
ignorance. Everyone who is corrupt, then, is ignorant of what he ought to do and to 
abstain from; and through this sort of error, people become unjust and bad in general. 
But one does not wish to use the term involuntary when somebody is ignorant of what 
is advantageous; for the ignorance involved in ones’ choice is the cause, not of what is 
involuntary, but of one’s corruption. Nor is the ignorance of the relevant general 
[principle] the cause of an act’s being in voluntary (for people are indeed blamed on 
account of this sort of general ignorance); the cause, rather, is the ignorance pertaining 
to the various particulars, both the circumstances of the action and what it concerns. In 
these latter case, there is both pity and forgiveness, since he who is ignorant of any of 
these particulars acts involuntarily. (44-45) 
 
The point is that ignorance, whether it is involuntary or not, cannot be an excuse for “one’s 
corruption,” because a subject is supposed to have a kind of duty to know previously “what he 
ought to do and to abstain from.” Such critique on the absence of thinking is the very words 
Arendt applies when analyzing “the banality of evil” in Adolf Eichmann’s case who was “one of 
the major organizes of the Holocaust” but “never realized what he was doing.” In that situation, 
therefore, the act of thinking is a must. 
 
4.2 Is Sympathy a (Kantian) Duty? 
George Eliot's sympathy with “the responsibility of tolerance” also sounds like a must, 
especially for “those who have the wider vision” (The Mill on the Floss 404). And with an 
anecdote in Mencius I have discussed that a subject’s feeling of sympathy could be possible 
through its careful attention to the concrete, particular object. But I wonder whether sympathy 
could be universal if its arriving is contingent upon one’s subjective emotions. My question is, if 
one’s feeling of joy or sorrow or even love with other people cannot be willed or enforced but, 
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rather, is passively given, how can the emotions including sympathy work actually as a manner 
of morals, not in a negative but in a positive way? To put it succinctly, what is the legitimacy of 
sympathy as a duty, like a kind of categorical imperative? In particular, as a response to the 
lecture of Elizabeth Costello, I would like to ask whether there should be any duty or 
responsibility for us in applying the sympathetic imagination to animals.  
Coetzee’s view of animal rights in Elizabeth Costello must start from the sympathetic 
imagination. But, in a degree, it is arbitrary. Elizabeth Costello’s comment below shows how 
“the capacity to imagine themselves as someone else” depends on some subjective conditions:  
The heart is the seat of a faculty, sympathy, that allows us to share at times the being of 
another. Sympathy has everything to do with the subject and little to do with the object, 
the ‘another,’ as we see at once when we think of the object not as bat (‘Can I share the 
being of a bat?’) but as another human being. There are people who have the capacity to 
imagine themselves as someone else, there are people who have no such capacity (when 
the lack is extreme, we call them psychopaths), and there are people who have the 
capacity but choose not to exercise it.” (70)      
 
If sympathy is originated from one’s inclination according to “the capacity,” it cannot be a duty 
because everyone cannot have the same capacity. The relativity has no constraint as a strict moral 
principle. Such subjective conditions of sympathy are rather close to those of taste. Costello’s 
vegetarianism is the very example of the connection between sympathy and taste. But my 
reading is that Coetzee’s critique focuses on the third kind of people “who have the capacity but 
choose not to exercise it.” We may understand the word “choose” here as the will. And especially 
“a good will,” in Kant’s term, was absent from the minds of those killers and neighbors who 
helped or ignored intentionally the genocide of Jewish people in the death camps. Interrogating 
their responsibilities, Costello points out that sympathy cannot be a matter of one’s capacity but 
instead it should be willed as a moral necessity. That is, it should be active in each mind. 
Nevertheless, as the poet Abraham Stern criticizes (94), one would feel it odd and even 
disrespectful to compare the Jewish people with the animals slaughtered in the meat industry. 
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Nor can it be confirmed easily that sympathy is really unconditional as she argues: “There are no 
bounds to the sympathetic imagination” (80). In order to investigate the concept and validity of 
sympathy in terms of duty —about which George Eliot is said to regard so “peremptory and 
absolute” as “the sovereignty of impersonal and un-recompensing Law” (Haight 464)—I 
primarily attend to Kant. 
For Kant, only the consciousness of duty through our practical reason constitutes a key 
principle of moral laws. In moral philosophy, Kant values the role of the emotions positively 
only when they work as incentive for our respect of moral laws. He calls it “moral feeling.” But 
its source is definitely from reason, not from the passions or imagination (Critique of Practical 
Reason 201). Appealing entirely to the emotions for a universal moral law is insufficient and 
even dangerous because they are fundamentally “pathological” (200). The negativity of the 
emotions relates one’s moral judgments to his subjective conditions like desire, interest, or need. 
Since these negative features of the emotions signify the heteronomy of a moral subject, they 
cannot be asked positively and objectively as a concept of duty. Although a moral good that 
results from certain emotion like sympathy can be desired, Kant asks if there is “the subjection of 
the heart to duty” (264). If not, the good is just “fleeting and transitory,” which means that it 
cannot be principled. Kant even says that “It is very beautiful to do good to human beings from 
love for them and from sympathetic benevolence, or to be just from love of order; but this is not 
yet the genuine moral maxim of our conduct” (206).   
Therefore, Kant’s notion of the Categorical Imperative as the ultimate moral maxim, 
which means “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time 
will that it become a universal law” (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 73), presupposes 
the autonomy of the will. This autonomy of the will guarantees our freedom, “the ability to be 
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governed by reason” (Scruton 80). Without supposing it we cannot regard each individual as a 
human being with dignity, as “an end in itself” (86) Neither can be thought of responsibility:  
If I say of a human being who commits a theft that this deed is, in accordance with the 
natural law of causality, a necessary result of determining grounds in preceding time, 
then it was impossible that it could have been left undone […] and they [determining 
grounds] therefore leave no transcendental freedom, which must be thought as 
independence from everything empirical and so from nature generally, whether it is 
regarded as an object inner sense in time only or also of outer sense in both space and 
time; without this freedom (in the latter and proper sense), which alone is practical a 
priori, no moral law is possible and no imputation in accordance with it. (Critique of 
Practical Reason 216-17)   
 
It cannot be denied that Kant’s moral philosophy based on freedom and duty has strength in 
clarifying the subject of responsibility. And it is also evident that some of George Eliot’s works 
have the Kantian connections, particularly when George Eliot deals with the relationship 
between causality, freedom, and responsibility in Adam Bede, The Mill on the Floss, and Daniel 
Deronda. What concerns here reading George Eliot and J.M. Coetzee alongside is that, unlike 
Kant, both writers treat sympathy as an issue of duty and responsibility. While Kant’s main 
concern in building up his moral philosophy is, as Roger Scruton explains, to make it “objective” 
with the help of our “practical reason,” at the risk of simplification, however, George Eliot’s and 
Coetzee’s moral arguments owe much to the functions of our practical feelings including 
sympathy, which are affected by our subjective, situational or existential conditions. Especially 
Coetzee shows a strong skepticism on the notion of “reason” when it is presented as an evidence 
of human beings’ superiority to animals. For Coetzee, “reason is simply a vast tautology” 
(Elizabeth Costello 70).56 Less severe in denouncing the role of human reason than Coetzee, and 
                                   
56 In explicating the notion of “tautology” in “reason,” I read Nietzsche’s criticism below as one of the 
most telling views on such an anthropocentric concept of “reason”: 
“If somebody hides a thing behind a bush and, seeks it again and finds it in the self-
same place, then there is not much to boast of, respecting this seeking and finding; thus, 
however, matters stand with the seeking and finding of “truth” within the realm of 
reason. If I make the definition of the mammal and then declare after inspecting a 
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more appealing to the emotion than Kant, George Eliot tries to integrate our intellectual reason 
with moral sentiments: 
There is not a more pernicious fallacy afloat in common parlance, than the wide 
distinction made between intellect and morality. Amiable impulses without intellect, 
man may have in common with dogs and horses; but morality, which is specifically 
human, is dependent on the regulation of feeling by intellect…Now that highest moral 
habit, the constant preference of truth both theoretically and practically, pre-eminently 
demands the co-operation of the intellect with the impulses. (“Dr Cumming” 44) 
 
Hannah Arendt argues that the distinction between will and inclination becomes “the cornerstone 
of Kantian ethics” (The Life of the Mind 57). And in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Kant puts that “It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, 
that could be considered good without limitation except a good will” (49). To avoid 
misunderstanding, Kant’s good-will follows the order of duty and so its context is not from 
“benevolence” in a common sense. The motive of benevolence is “a species of mere inclination 
(Scruton 91). Nevertheless, can it be thought that benevolence, as a branch of sympathy, is 
separated from one’s personal desire or inclination? For example, Costello’s vegetarianism 
comes “out of a desire to save my soul” (89). Is that selfish or not? I suggest that, as a natural 
common feeling, sympathy be discussed at the level of inter-personal feeling. That is, it might 
not be objective as Kant argues, but it could be inter-subjective. That means it leads us to 
recognize ours “social feelings” (Arendt) and can be communicated like “social expressions.” 
Nietzsche’s concept of benevolence below could be another version of that sympathy. And we 
know the idea of inter-subjectivity came to be discussed later by Kant himself in his third 
                                   
camel, “behold a mammal,” then no doubt a truth is brought to light thereby, but it is of 
very limited value, I mean it is anthropomorphic through and through, and does not 
contain one single point which is “true-in itself,” real and universally valid, apart from 
man. The seeker after such truths seeks at the bottom only the metamorphosis of the 
world in man, he strives for an understanding of the world as a human-like thing and by 
his battling gains at best the feeling of an assimilation.” (“On Truth and Falsity in Their 
Ultramoral Sense” 183) 
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Critique.   
Benevolence [Wohlwollen]—Among the little but immeasurably frequent and thus very 
influential things to which science ought to pay more attention than to the great, rare 
things, benevolence, too is to be reckoned; I mean those social expressions of a friendly 
disposition, those smiles of the eyes, those handclasps, that comfortable manner with 
which almost all human action is as a rule encompassed. Every teacher, every official 
brings this addition to what he does as a matter of duty; it is the continual occupation of 
humanity, as it were its light-wave in which everything grows…Good-naturedness, 
friendliness, politeness of the heart are never failing emanations of the unegoistic drive 
and have played a far greater role in the construction of culture than those much more 
celebrated expressions of it called, pity, compassion and self-sacrifice. (Human, All Too 
Human 38, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale)    
 
Hangs-Georg Gadamer argues that “he [Kant] totally excluded the concept of sensus communis 
from moral philosophy” (Truth and Method 32). Gadamer’s critique on the Kant’s 
“subjectivization of aesthetics” is basically focused on the idea that narrowing down the function 
of common sense into the aesthetic experience of taste militates against the social, inter-
subjective feelings including sympathy. Then, what we have discussed hitherto is the limitation 
of moral, practical reason from the subjective emotions in Kant’s thoughts. Besides criticizing 
such Kant’s separation of moral philosophy from the aesthetic judgment, my research now 
attends to the interpersonal relationship suggested from the notion of taste.  
 
4.3 Inter-subjectivity in Taste and Commensality 
 
To shed light on Kant’s political philosophy, Arendt surveys his third Critique as a main 
text. And Arendt derives the concept of “inter-subjectivity” from Kant’s theory about aesthetic 
judgment or taste, which she regards as intended for social communication. This social aspect in 
taste is concisely put in the Kant’s saying that “In Taste egoism is overcome.” To paraphrase, 
insofar as one’s taste is connected with sensus communis, while keeping his or her personal 
preference the subject is asked to be “considerate.” This viewpoint is also required from us so 
that we should “overcome our special subjective conditions for the sake of others.” Therefore, 
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Arendt establishes Kant’s “inter-subjectivity” from the negation of egoism by which one’s 
disinterested pleasure in taste is possible (Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy 58-70). 
Following Kant, Arendt distinguishes the faculty of thinking from that of judging and asserts 
their different applications. That is, in dealing with the question of right and wrong, the subject is 
asked to use his or her practical reason independently. Yet, when trying to relish a sensual 
pleasure including taste, the subject desires other people’s participations and conviviality as well, 
if not always. That is, “You must be alone in order to think; you need company to enjoy a meal” 
(67) 
Hence, if one’s individual pleasure in taste can be also a communal one, a few questions 
related to (dis)agreement or compromise between various tastes are necessary. The first question 
is about the possibility of agreement in between different tastes. As we have reviewed, a kind of 
“standard” in taste is an ideal, but not a normative one for each judgment. Since it cannot have 
any regulation for other different judgments, a conflict is inherent and so inevitable. In Elizabeth 
Costello, for example, Costello’s vegetarianism becomes the major cause that incurs troubles 
with her daughter-in-law Norma. Norma says that her grandchildren could not join their dining 
table because “Elizabeth does not like to see meat on the table, while Norma refuses to change 
the children’s diet to suit what she calls ‘your mother’s delicate sensibilities’” (60). As David 
Hume remarks, “a delicate palate, on many occasions, may be a great inconvenience both to a 
man himself and to his friends” (“Of the Standard of Taste” 143). In the situation that “hostilities 
are renewed almost at once” from Costello’s entrance to the family, my inquiry is whether it is 
possible to reconcile two people, like Norma and Costello, who have different tastes. And if it is 
possible or not, then why or how. Although “Norma and his mother [Costello] have never liked 
each other” (61), and even though such Costello’s delicate taste may be a subterfuge behind 
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which, we may guess, stands a long-aged antagonism between the two characters in the novel, I 
am curious about the possibility of their sitting in the same dining table with sincere hospitality, 
instead of any hostility. To borrow Derrida’s expression, when Costello is treated like “an 
undesirable foreigner” or “a hostile subject” at Norma’s home, could there be such 
“substitutions” between the host and the master if these are the “laws of hospitality”?: 
So it is indeed the master, the one who invites, the inviting host, who becomes the 
hostage—and who really always has been. And the guest, the invited hostage, becomes 
the one who invites the one who invites, the master of the host. The guest becomes the 
host’s host. The guest (hôte) becomes the host (hôte) of the host (hôte). These 
substitutions make everyone into everyone else’s hostage. (Of Hospitality 125) 
 
The second question is related to the first. If we just adhere to the literal meaning of 
taste, when eating is not only affected by a culinary flavor but also decided by some ethos like 
religious credo or any pursuing beliefs, with whom would the dieter can enjoy its meal? Provided 
that Costello’s vegetarianism as well as her doctrine on the lives of animals belongs to the 
minority, her dining table would be gradually estranged from others. We read the poet Abraham 
Stern sends Costello a letter in which he says, “At the kernel of your lecture…was the question 
of breaking bread. If we refuse to break bread with the execution of Auschwitz, can we continue 
to break bread with the slaughters of animals?” (94). Then Stern blames Costello’s talk because 
of her analogy between the meat industry and the death camps, about which the poet denounces 
as “blasphemy.” Since he cannot agree to regard the victims in the camps as the same kinds of 
those slaughtered animals, he refuses to “break bread” with her. So “breaking bread” signifies 
more than satisfying one’s appetite. Reminding us of the Christian ritual, the act of communion 
must imply the participant’s concord and solidarity as well with its fellow.57 The poet’s refusal, 
                                   
57 As Montaigne advises, the choice of friends for one’s dining table would be prior to the selection of 
menu for everyone: “Since with that same Epicurus I say that we should be less concerned with what we 
eat than with whom we eat, and I approve of Chilo’s refusal to promise to come to a banquet at 
Periander’s before finding out who the other guest were. No recipe is so pleasing to me, no sauce so 
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of course, indicates the opposite, his distaste. 
However, in order to share foods in the same dining table, we cannot say there is any 
duty for Costello to respect other people’s distastes. A debate continues between Costello and 
Norma in another dinner place prepared by Appleton College, particularly about “disgust” in 
eating meats. Norma contends that any taboo on a diet that results in “disgust” is ultimately 
based on an anthropological reason and so arbitrary. But it is also true that, in doing so, Norma 
shows her cultural prejudice: “Disgust is not universal….The French east frogs. The Chinese eat 
anything. There is no disgust in China” (87). Norma continues that such a dietary ban as 
forbidding a specific meat is related to the system of social distinction “for an elite group.” For 
the counter example, Costello tells the story of Gandhi’s marginal experience in England due to 
his education of vegetarianism by his mother and acknowledges a sort of self-interested 
viewpoint in her taste of vegetarianism because she says “[i]t comes out of a desire to save my 
soul.” If, according to Ben Highmore, discernment of taste makes us socially vulnerable on the 
one hand and “distaste is signaled through a register of affects sliding from condescension to 
disdain to scorn to contempt” on the other hand (“Bitter after Taste” 124), we can see both 
Costello’s vulnerability and Norma’s distaste are interlocked. While Norma’s belief on human 
reason strongly convinces her of humans’ superiority to animals so that she underrates Costello’s 
ideas on animals as “shallow relativism” (91), Costello’s rhetoric appeals to what Michael 
Marais calls “a profound anti-intellectualism” (“Impossible Possibilities” 3) that rejects reason 
and instead calls for sympathy based on corporeal sensibility.58  
                                   
appetizing, as those which derive from the company” (The Complete Essays 1252). 
 
58 For example, Costello’s comparison of the Holocaust and mass slaughter of animals below touches on 
the audience’s sympathetic imagination in visualizing the victims in their minds: 
The particular horror of the camps, the horror that convinces us that what went on there 
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However, Costello’s position apparently lacks “consistency” especially when she says 
that “I’m wearing leather shoes” and “I’m carrying a leather purse” (89). A self-mocking irony is 
that Costello is aware of her whim and makes herself vulnerable to other people’s criticism. 
Costello knows her distinction of eating meat and wearing leathers is not so much based on 
principled ideas but just dependent upon “Degrees of obscenity” (89). Needless to say, such 
“Degrees of obscenity” in her taste are largely concerned with her subjective sentiments. Though 
Elisa Aaltola argues that whereas “animal ethics has tended to emphasizes theory, principles, 
reason, and speaking for the animal, Coetzee emphasizes poetry, virtues, emotions, and letting 
the animal speak to us,” it is foreseeable that logical weakness in Costello’s inconsistency gives 
rise to adverse skepticism. (“Coetzee and Alternative Animal Ethics” 119). Norma’s hostile 
attitude toward Costello ends up by disregarding Costello’s thought as “pseudo-philosophical 
arguments” (113).  
Inferring from the conclusion, we cannot but anticipate that those grandchildren’s diet 
would follow the mother Norma’s instruction rather than the grandmother Costello’s. Norma 
declares to her husband John that she does not want to feel “guilty about eating [meats] in front 
of [them]” (114). As Costello says, if, like Gandhi’s mother, “mothers can have a good influence 
on their children” (88), Norma would be willing to maintain her influence for children. Hence, 
although a reasonable thought might fancy a picture that each taste is appreciated while their 
conviviality is preserved, those different roles plus contrasting views on animals set a barrier that 
                                   
was a crime against humanity, is not that despite a humanity shared with their victims, 
the killers treated them like lice. That is too abstract. The horror is that the killers 
refused to think themselves into the place of their victims, as did everyone else. They 
said, “It is they in those cattle cars rattling past.” They did not say, “How would it be if 
it were I in that cattle cart? They did not say, “How would it be if I were burning?” 
They did not say, “I am burning, I am falling in ash.” (79) 
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undoes the inter-subjective relationship between them.  
Contemplating over the reconciliation between different tastes that I have suggested, my 
perspective is not so inclined to pessimism notwithstanding. We can fully understand Norma’s 
guilty consciousness before the children that would come from her motherhood, which I think 
must be beyond the human “rationality” that Norma names as a distinction from animals (92). 
Meanwhile, since Costello’s distaste for meats is caused not only by her compassion for animals 
but also by her gustatory disgust of “the juices of death wounds” (83), we can also consider that 
her seemingly inconsistent taste is, in a degree, conditioned by some unique sensibility like that 
bodily repulsion to the diet. Therefore, for the first step to approach their circumstantial 
standpoints in taste, I cannot but repeat Kant’s dictum: “be considerate.” In a broad sense of 
inter-subjectivity, each can admit its partiality and adopt “enlarged mentality” at the same time. 
Actually, we read what Costello problematizes in her talks is not about eating meat but our 
willed ignorance on the lives of nonhuman animals and the cruelty in the meat industry. Norma’s 
misunderstanding is that the “relativism” that Norma points out in Costello’s view on animals 
cannot be reduced to those various levels of intelligence in animals nor that kind of “the respect 
due to a flea” confused with “the respect due to the dog on which the flea feed” (Frederic Ferré, 
“Moderation, Morals, and Meat” 324). By all means, Norma’s notion following Descartes that 
nonhuman animals are “just biological automata” is, in itself, controversial (92) and shows her 
own ignorance otherwise.59 
                                   
59 Coetzee’s criticism of reason or rationality scattered in fictions, interviews, and other essays is mainly 
in the context of its anthropocentric perspective and ignorance towards the inner lives of animals. When 
asked about critics’ responses to animal themes in his novels, Coetzee replies:   
The test case is my novel Disgrace, in which animals figure quite prominently. Most 
reviewers have more or less ignored their presence (they mention that the hero of the 
novel “gets involved with animal rights campaigners” and leave it at that). In this 
respect they—naturally—mirror the way in which animals are treated in the world we 
live in, namely as unimportant existences of which we need take notice only when their 
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We are informed throughout Costello’s lectures and through the final dialogue with her 
son John that what Costello really seeks is “kindness” that includes “kindness to animals” (106) 
and “human kindness” as well (115). We realize this “kindness” is related to the matter of “heart” 
when we read Coetzee’s interview in 2004 regarding animal rights. As the interviewer from the 
Swedish web magazine Satya asks Coetzee, “What is your relation to animal rights philosophy? 
In what way do you think fiction can contribute to the question?” Coetzee replies as follows:   
Strictly speaking, my interest is not in legal rights for animals but in a change of heart 
towards animals. The most important of all rights is the right to life, and I cannot 
foresee a day when domesticated animals will be granted that right in law. If you 
concede that the animal rights movement can never succeed in this primary goal, then it 
seems that the best we can achieve is to show to as many people as we can what the 
spiritual and psychic cost is of continuing to treat animals as we do, and thus perhaps to 
change their hearts. (“Animals, Humans, Cruelty and Literature,” emphasis mine) 
 
Coetzee’s expectation about “a change of heart towards animals” through his fiction writing 
must depends on readers’ engagements with sympathy. As we have discussed in the previous 
chapter, Coetzee values the heart as an ultimate element in feeling sympathy. Likewise, Costello 
argues that the heart is “the seat of a faculty, sympathy” and accuses those Nazi collaborators of 
the corruption that they “closed their hearts” (Elizabeth Costello 79). And, in addition, in the 
chapter of “The Humanities in Africa,” Costello links the heart to humanity and caritas, all of 
which imply the working of the heart underlies our affective benevolence and even unconditional 
love for the other. Finally, in the last chapter of “At the Gate,” Costello preserves the heart as the 
ultimate reliance in keeping the sense of reality as she extends its corporeality to every living 
being’s pulse. That is, Costello’s sympathy is described as transmitted or emanated from the 
pulsation of blood by the operation of the heart, and the existence of blood in all animals testifies 
                                   
lives cross ours: 
 See “Animals, Humans, Cruelty, and Literature: A Rare Interview with J. M. Coetzee.” Satya. 2004. 
Web. Oct. 13, 2017. 
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to the reality of the common value in each animal: 
It is morning. She is at her table on the pavement, working on her statement, trying out 
a new approach. Since she boasts that she is secretary of the invisible, let her 
concentrate her attention, turn it inward. What voice does she hear from the invisible 
today?  
For the moment, all she hears is the slow thud of blood in her ears, just as well she 
feels is the soft touch of the sun on her skin. That at least she does not have to invent: 
this dumb, faithful body that has accompanied her every step of the way, this gentle, 
lumbering monster that has been given to her to look after, this shadow turned to flesh 
that stands on two feet like a bear and laves itself continually from the inside with 
blood. Not only is she in this body, this thing which not in a thousand years could she 
have dreamed up, so far beyond her powers would it be, she somehow is this body; and 
all around her on the square, on this beautiful morning, these people, somehow, are 
their bodies too. (210)    
 
We remember Mencius says that “once having heard their cry, he cannot bear to eat their flesh” 
and explains such reticence is how humanity works. That is, humanity is enacted with an 
emotional moving, with a specific, concrete attention to a particular living being. Like David 
Lurie’s unexpected concern for the sheep, Costello’s humanity is not separated from the 
perception of her corporeality and not from her childhood memory of the frogs (217). And so her 
sympathetic perception penetrates into the cry of the animal, for example, the ram in the 
Odyssey. Costello recollects her reading experience of an episode in the Odyssey, in which 
Odysseus sacrifices a ram in order to meet Tiresias. She pays attention to the vivid, bloody 
representation of the sacrificed ram and argues that “The ram is not just an idea, the ram is alive 
though right now it is dying” (211). Though one might be skeptical for Costello’s direction of 
“open your heart and listen to what your heart says” (82) for a practical answer to the animal 
right issue or to the debate for eating meats, I agree with Coetzee that, even though they could 
not reach a consensus, there needs to be a certain change of an attitude with the moving of the 
“heart,” at least for the participation and discussion of the difficult problem originated from the 
matter of taste.  
In light of preparing a common ground in the taste issue, I review the significance of 
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commensality in particular. As its etymological meaning suggests, this term has some 
correspondence to the notion of “breaking bread.” What I argue is that the start of commensality 
or, in other expression, conviviality, cannot be expected without bringing in such hospitality plus 
orderly manners for our counterpart’s sitting in. In developing this idea, I refer to Albert O. 
Hirschman who searches for the origin of “civil society” from the act of “eating together around 
a table.” He takes the example of the ancient Greek banquet and proposes that “a direct link 
exists between the banquet and the emergence of Athenian Democracy” (Crossing Boundaries 
23). Nonetheless, Hirschman remarks that “[c]ommensality includes friends and family, but 
excludes irreconcilable enemies” (19). Its definition of solidarity is therefore not always positive 
as seen from the case of the Germanic Männerbund which, Hirschman claims, foreboded the SA 
and SS movement of the Nazi period (26). Significantly, Hirschman makes us heed to the 
different styles or manners between the Greek symposium and the German students’ beer 
drinking and their different social outcomes. As Hirschman mentions both Georg Simmel’s and 
Norbert Elias’s studies in his essay, their sociological insights about the history of civility focus 
on the discourses of manners. Interestingly, in a letter to Paul Auster, Coetzee also comments on 
table “manners” and their control over one’s “passions”: 
What interest me are the customs that have developed around the table. Thus, despite 
the fact that the table is precisely a place to which one brings one’s animal appetites in 
order to satisfy them, manners prescribe that appetite should be reined in and—at least 
formally—yield place to appetites of others (“Please, after you!”). Furthermore, it is not 
“good manners” to sate one’s appetite in silence: the dinner table becomes a sort of 
conclave where family matters of the more superficial kind are aired. In these family 
conversations, the first rule is that the passions should not be let loose, however much 
they may rage under the surface. (Here and Now 120) 
 
The essence of table manners that Coetzee points out above is related to the attitude of “being 
considerate.” It should be noted that the social code here is not that kind of an enforced but that 
of a customary, voluntary one in its deliberation. According to Coetzee, the participant is asked 
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to have a virtue of self-discipline and, at the same time, to show its will for a good humor in the 
table. With those civil manners comes a reciprocity based on the feeling of benevolence. This 
means the morality of “being considerate” presupposes the limit and moderation in which he or 
she freely eats something in the dining table.  
The link between social manners and the banquet also can be found in George Eliot’s Adam 
Bede. The description of Arthur Donnithorne’s birthday party is fully reminiscent of an idyllic 
banquet image in the British countryside. While a variety of people gather together in the Chase 
to celebrate Donnithorne’s coming-of-age day, Adam’s entrance draws attentions from other 
guests. It is because Adam as a craftsman is reluctantly admitted to “dine up-stairs with the large 
tenants.” What we sense behind the tension between Mr. Casson and Adam is an assumed 
distinction in the dining table according to their social positions:  
  Owing to this arrangement, Adam, being, of course, at the bottom of the table, fell 
under the immediate observation of Mr Casson, who, too much occupied with the 
question of precedence…‘You’ve niver dined before, as I remember.’   
‘No, Mr Casson,’ said Adam, in his strong voice, that could be heard along the table; 
‘I’ve never dined here before, but I come by Captain Donnithorne’s wish, and I hope 
it’s not disagreeable to anybody else.’  
‘Nay, nay,’ said several voices at once, ‘we’ve glad ye’re come. Who’s got anything 
to say again’ it?’ (Adam Bede 260-61).  
 
The host Captain Donnithorne’s hospitality toward Adam disregards the hierarchy surrounding 
the table. Availing himself of the opportunity given by his birthday, Arthur tries to polish his 
relationship with those tenants by proposing toast for his grandfather. Despite that “[t]he farmers 
thought the young Squire knew well enough that they hated the old Squire, and Mrs Poyser said 
‘he’d better not ha’ stirred a kettle o’sour broth’ ” (265), those invited in the feast listen to his 
words and drinks together. It is because such “neighborly kindness” in this “pleasant meeting” 
cannot be rejected (266). With the gentry’s expression of benevolence, an egalitarian mood from 
Mr. Irwine’s toast speech that “every sensible man knows how necessary that humble everyday 
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work is, and how important it is to us that it should be done well” (267) boosts up the jovial 
conviviality of the banquet. It might be true that, as Christin Devine argues in the article 
“Celebrating Class Difference: The Coming-of-Age Feast in Adam Bede” (2004), the feast scene 
in Adam Bede shows George Eliot’s middle-class consciousness for an organized social class 
system (28-35). Nevertheless, when George Eliot describes in detail another feast scene in the 
Poysers’ farmhouse for the harvest supper at the end of the novel where the gathered laborers 
enjoy eating “roast beef’ and drinking “ale” with the great sounds of “the clatter of knives and 
pewter-plates and tin-cans,” she must appreciate such a convivial aspect in their dining rather 
than look down on their clumsy table manners (516). As Pierre Bourdieu remarks, one’s taste can 
be in harmony with others in an “ethics of convivial indulgence,” although someone would not 
welcome that “eating and drinking together” can “sweep away” his or her reticence.60 At least, 
insofar as eating a meal with someone is a meaningfully social act, as the Korean novelist 
Hwang Sok-yong says, our taste connected with memories can be expanded for the 
“reconciliation with the strange and different”: 
Anyone who once performed fasting for some reasons, such as being ill, would 
realize how the eating of every breakfast, lunch, and dinner is so crucial an issue during 
the day. The act of having a meal for our survival or health helps us to divide our time 
properly, since it gives a timely pause to our activity in daylight. Without eating 
anything, one would feel that the day gets longer than usual and everything suddenly 
                                   
60 I think that George Eliot’s compassionate stance toward working classes in Adam Bede and their jovial 
conviviality is ascertained again in this harvest super scene in which what Bourdieu calls “convivial 
indulgence” has a positive, communal value:    
The art of eating and drinking remains one of the few areas in which the working 
classes challenge the legitimate art of living. In the face of the new ethics of sobriety 
for the sake of slimness, which is most recognized at the highest levels of the social 
hierarchy, peasants and especially industrial workers maintain an ethics of convivial 
indulgence. A bon vivant is not just someone who enjoys eating and drinking; he is 
someone capable of entering into the generous and familiar—that is, both simple and 
free—relationship that is encouraged and symbolized by eating and drinking together, 
in a conviviality which sweeps away restraint and reticence. (Distinction 179) 
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becomes meaningless. And one of the precious discoveries through the fast is that all 
the varieties of human relationships vanish, including meeting, parting, conversations, 
facial impressions, and so on. The surroundings around him or her just appear to be 
desolate and quiet. Communication with others is, of course, no longer possible, and 
even the feeling of one’s existence disappears. Time without diets cannot be felt as 
real…. 
Since I have decided to write about food, why I recollect, first of all, the experience 
of fasting is due to an image in my mind about the young Jesus with a cup of wine and 
a piece of black bread. We know what we call “the Last Supper” of Jesus has been an 
inspiration for numerous painters for centuries of years, and such symbolic meanings as 
his blood and body in the supper are now preserved in a similar ritual in the Catholic 
Church. To restore the meaning of meal in terms of its original purity has been regarded 
as the start point for every reformist movement…. 
We have lost all tastes. Some elements for a delicious meal: sweats of labor, a jovial 
conviviality in sharing, the land we have inhabited for long time, the family with us till 
our death, a meeting and reconciliation with the strange and different, a few days spent 
with our beloved, and, above all, the poverty and need. All these optimize the memory 
of our taste to the best condition…Food implies human relationships, and it is a kind of 
catalyst retrieving our old memories. (Taste and Memories 2-4, my translation) 
 
4.4 The Distance of Alterity 
That sympathy has a fictional element in its performance is theoretically concerned with 
its imaginary feature. And Elizabeth Costello’s lesson tells that “sympathy has everything to do 
with the subject and little to do with the object.” All these facts imply that, at worst, the subject’s 
imagination could be a fantasy and the object or the other can be indifferent to our sympathy. 
Although Costello says that “it is because of their indifference to me that I believe in 
them[frogs]” (217), the frogs’ vitality has nothing do with her subjective judgment. Then, what if 
the object refuses our sympathy or ignores our expression of a good will? That sympathy could 
be a projection of one’s partial perspective toward the object is what I have discussed in George 
Eliot’s chapter. What I ask now is whether sympathy has a real merit especially for a truthful 
understanding of others. In order that the work of the sympathetic imagination should be based 
upon the reality of the other, I argue that its significance should be distinguished from fantasy, of 
which meaning is close to the ideal, artificial invention of something rather than to the practical 
reasoning of our reality. Therefore, when articulating the ethical characteristics of the 
  120 
imagination, I presuppose that it also has some cognitive natures related to the understanding of 
our other. We know Adam Smith points out such “concord or dissonance” on the part of the 
other’s affection with our sympathy, particularly in terms of our correct sympathetic 
identification.61 That means our sympathetic conjecture sometimes could be wrong. For 
instance, before the real pain of someone, sympathy could be pointless. Virginia Woolf in the 
essay “On being ill” (1926) discusses how in illness benevolence becomes naught and sympathy 
disoriented:  
Here we go alone, and like it better so. Always to have sympathy, always to be 
accompanied, always to be understood would be intolerable. But in health the genial 
pretence must be kept up and the effort renewed—to communicate, to civilize, to share, 
to cultivate the desert, educate the native, to work by day together and by night to sport. 
In illness, this make-believe ceases. (320-21) 
 
Woolf remarks one’s bodily pain cannot be communicated with because it is entirely a private 
thing and there is only the “poverty of the language” (318). Woolf’s disillusionment with this 
“make-believe” of sympathy, therefore, indicates helplessness and even pessimism before the 
distance between the sufferer and the observer. If an abnormal state of a patient disrupts his or 
her ordinary communication with others as Woolf argues, the inversion or denial of inter-
subjectivity in this case requires us to see sympathy from a different perspective. Most of all, 
Woolf’s refusal of sympathy, I think, poses a serious question about Coetzee’s claim that “there 
are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination.”  
Coetzee’s persona Costello claims that “If I can think my way into the existence of a 
                                   
61 Adam Smith writes as follows: 
When the original passion of the person principally concerned are in perfect concord 
with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just 
and proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when, upon, brining the 
case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with what he feels, they 
necessarily appear to him unjust and improper, and unsuitable to the causes which 
excite them. (The Theory of Moral Sentiments 16) 
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being who has never existed, then I can think my way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee 
or an oyster, any being with whom I share the substrate of life” (80).  That is, if a writer’s 
novelistic imagination can embody a character in the novel, she believes such imagination also 
can reach into the consciousness of an animal. By saying this what she (and so Coetzee) 
criticizes is about Thomas Nagel’s question of “what is it like to be a bat?” from the eponymous 
article of 1974. Nagel’s main point is that such sympathetic identification is impossible because 
of “the subjective character of experience” (436). Nagel argues that “[i]f the subjective character 
of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, then any shift to greater 
objectivity –that is, less attachment to a specific viewpoint—does not take us nearer to the real 
nature of the phenomenon: it takes us farther away from it” (444-46). So, at the level of 
consciousness, Nagel takes a stance of solipsism. Meanwhile, Costello puts that “his denial that 
we can know what it is to be anything but one of ourselves seems to be tragically restrictive, 
restrictive and restricted” (Elizabeth Costello 76). Coetzee continues this idea with his 
conversation with Arabella Kurtz:  
I relate our whole discussion to an essay by the philosopher Thomas Nagel that has 
acquired near scriptural status, called ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ Nagel’s crucial move 
is to distinguish between two forms of the question: What would it be like for a human 
being to be a bat? and What is it like for a bat to be a bat? In its first form, he says, the 
question is answerable; in the second form it is not. I disagree with Nagel. I think that 
by a strenuous effort of sympathetic projection one can reach a flickering intuition of 
what it is like for a bat to be a bat. But this does not amount to the claim that one can 
have intuitions of what it is really like for a bat to be a bat. In Nagel’s terms, the only 
true, real knowledge one can have of what it is like to be anyone or anything in the 
world is a form of knowledge of what it is like to be oneself. Other such knowledge 
may be true, but its truth is the truth of fictions. This includes knowledge of what it is 
like for a neonate to be a neonate. (The Good Story 136)  
 
Coetzee clarifies that his disagreement with Nagel is about the sympathetic identification. 
Despite that we cannot arrive at the exact knowledge of the other, “by a strenuous effort of 
sympathetic projection,” Coetzee believes, one can have a “intuition” for the other. At least for 
Coetzee, the sympathetic projection cannot be discouraged because it is a trial to transcend the 
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confine of solipsistic consciousness. Of course, his reservation for the factualness of the intuition 
cannot contradict Nagel’s theory sufficiently. As both George Levine and Jonathan Lamb 
likewise explicate, the claim of sympathy in this case could be an “anthropomorphic fiction” (“J. 
M. Coetzee and Realism” 183). 
George Levine treats the same Nagel’s question in the last part of Realism, Ethics and 
Secularism (2008) and links it to his thesis on the “unknowable reality of the other” in Victorian 
literature (248). Among those “unknowable others” in Victorian realist novels Levine refers to 
the character Mr. Casaubon and quotes the famous question “why always Dorothea?” in chapter 
twenty-nine of Middlemarch.62 George Eliot’s suggestion is that when Mr. Casaubon’s 
“equivalent center of self” is recognized, his alterity cannot be assimilated to Dorothea’s point of 
view (Middlemarch 252). In a similar vein, Levine notices the heartbeat of the squirrel which he 
takes as an example that represents the absolute otherness of the other: 
That element of tragedy which lies in the very fact of frequency, has not yet wrought 
itself into the coarse emotion of mankind; and perhaps our frames could hardly bear 
much of it. If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be 
like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel’s heart beat, and we should die of that roar 
which lies on the other side of silence. As it is, the quickest of us walk about well 
wadded with stupidity. (182)  
 
Levine applies the Nagel’s question to the squirrel and asks “what it is like not to be me” or 
“what it is like to be a squirrel,” since the illusion is an indispensable element in the literary 
imagination. What he reads and values from the Victorian literature is “its powerful affirmation 
of the unknowable reality of the other” (248-49). Levine says, “George Eliot uses an animal, the 
squirrel, to represent that which we do not know, which we can barely imagine, barely dare to 
image” (253). Thus, if it is true that “human souls have only a very limited range of music, and 
                                   
62 According to Alex Woloch, Mr. Casaubon is not a minor character but becomes minor “within a 
complex narrative system” and George Eliot there interrogates “the distributed pattern of 
characterization” in the realist novel (The One vs. the Many 45-46). 
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will not vibrate in the least under a touch that fills others with tremulous rapture or quivering 
agony” (AB 96), the limited range of our sympathy with animals must lead to an agnosticism. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the unknowable reality of and our limited knowledge of the other that 
result in our respect for the alterity, George Eliot does not seem to forsake our sympathetic bond 
with the unknowable entity of animals. For instance, unlike the squirrel, Adam Bede’s dog Gyp 
appears as an intimate, sentient being that can read the hero’s inner mind and catch his certain 
mood as much as Adam notices “Gyp’s mental conflict” (AB 46). When Dinah visits Adam’s 
house to comfort her mother in chapter eleven, we see Gyp’s reception of the stranger Dinah is 
decided by “[t]he kind smile with which Adam uttered that last words.” Recognizing Gyp’s 
emotive sensation, Dinah exclaims “Poor dogs!” and says that “I’ve strange feeling about the 
dumb things as if they wanted to speak…they [the dogs] may well have more in them than they 
know how to make us understand, for we can’t say half what we feel, with all our words” (118). 
Therefore, Dinah thinks that Gyp’s otherness cannot be conjectured. If human understanding is 
mediated by the insufficient human language, we cannot conclude that the dogs have no 
language with our relative knowledge. While George Eliot, in Levine’s criticism, regards 
sympathy has a limit in facing the alterity of the animal, Coetzee’s “imaginative sympathy” in 
the novels such as Disgrace and Elizabeth Costello challenges the limit.  
Coetzee acknowledges that sympathy is a fiction. But Coetzee finds a positive, ethical 
meaning in the fictional sympathetic imagination. What I attend to from the writer’s reflection 
below is the evaluation of the fictional element in sympathy and its bearing on truthfulness:  
Broadly speaking, I see sympathy as an inborn faculty in human beings which may or 
may not grow, may or may not atrophy, may or may not be fostered; I also see it as 
capable of extending itself beyond fellow human beings to other forms of life. 
Sympathetic identifications allow us to enter other lives and to live them from the 
inside. It goes without saying that the other lives we live at such times are not 
necessarily the true lives of the others to whom they belong. Even when the other life 
which we are (for the time being) living is not a real life but the kind of life we 
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encounter when we read novels, it is not necessarily the true life of the other that we are 
living—witness the very different understanding different readers have of characters in 
novels. I would contend that our sympathetic identifications have a fiction-like status, 
and that our sympathetic intuitions can be relied on only to yield fictional truths.” (The 
Good Story 134, my emphasis)  
   
As Coetzee puts in his novel, sympathy is regarded as “an inborn faculty” for everyone and so it 
is a natural, common feeling, and the sympathetic identification is possible even with non-
existent beings. What he adds is that sympathy contains “fictional truths.” Although the concept 
of “fictional truths” is a little vague, this term reminds us of his other concepts such as 
“construct” or “a foundational fiction to which we more or less wholeheartedly subscribe, a 
fiction that may well be indispensable for a just society, namely, that human beings have a 
dignity that sets them apart from animals and consequently protects them from being treated like 
animals” (Giving Offense 14). Coetzee here must say that there is a need for us to realize the 
fictional constitution of our reality, of whose fictional representation includes “this institution, 
this medium called the novel” (EC 39). Of course, that the law, morality or any institutional 
belief draws on the fictional truth is not merely Coetzee’s own idea. In Twilight of the Idols 
(1889) Nietzsche calls up the name of George Eliot when he speaks of those who “are rid of the 
Christian God and now believe all the more firmly that they must cling to Christian morality.” 
Nietzsche argues that “This is an English consistency: we do most wish to hold it against à la 
Eliot.” Nietzsche’s sarcasm aside, what is revealed by his criticism is that George Eliot’s 
obsession with the notion of “Duty” has, more or less, fictional grounds.  
In the introduction, I have argued that sympathy, like perspective, is an effect of 
distance. Whether the distance is substantial or fictional, some philosophers including Adam 
Smith hold that the sympathetic imagination depends on distance between the spectator and the 
object. In the genre of the novel in particular, according to Bakhtin, distance is regarded as “an 
integral part of the author’s design, for it alone guarantees genuine objectivity in the 
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representation of a character” (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 64). Bakhtin continues, “[a] 
character’s discourse is created by the author, but created in such a way that it can develop to the 
full its inner logic and independence as someone else’s discourse, the word of the character 
himself ”(65, italics original). We understand the character’s “independence,” like Mr. 
Casaubon’s case, is redeemed by its distance to the author. This is like what Ursula K. Le Guin 
discusses from her characters:  
As a writer I must be conscious that I am my character and that they are not me. I am 
them, and am responsible for them. But they’re themselves; they have no responsibility 
for me, or my politics, or my morals, or my editor, or my income. They’re embodiments 
of my experience and imagination, engaged in an imagined life that is not my life, 
though it may serve to illuminate it. I may feel passionately with a character who 
embodies and emotions, but I must be wary of confusing myself with that character. 
(The Wave in the Mind 236).   
 
What I have understood by reading George Eliot and Coetzee alongside is that both 
recognize the necessity of fictional representation of reality as it is an ethical way to respect the 
otherness. They share the idea whether this otherness can be approached by sympathy is not only 
a literary but moral question and, if necessary, the distance of sympathy should be invented. In 
that sense, Coetzee’s play with “reality” in the first chapter of Elizabeth Costello corresponds to 
George Eliot’s beginning of Adam Bede:  
There is first of all the problem of the opening, namely, how to get us from where we are, 
which is, as yet, nowhere, to the far bank. It is a simple bridge problem, a problem of 
knocking together a bridge. People solved such problems every day. They solve them, 
and having solved them push on.   
Let us assume that, however, it may have been done, it is done. Let us take it that the 
bridge is built and crossed, that we can put it out of our mind. We have left behind the 
territory in which we were. We are in the far territory, where we want to be. (1) 
 
As Eliot also writes in Daniel Deronda, any start of a story is inseparable from the “make-
believe of a beginning” (7). Like Eliot, Coetzee thinks that this make-believe can be a “bridge” 
to our reality, whose representation is distinguished from history about which Coetzee 
emphasizes in the article of “The Novel Today.” In an interview for his novel Atonement (2001), 
  126 
Ian McEwan says that “Within one novel you can live inside many different people’s heads, in a 
way that you of course cannot do in normal life.” That is, writing or reading a fiction is a way to 
expand on our experience with the sympathetic imagination. McEwan continues: 
Knowing, or sensing what it’s like to be someone else I think is at the foundation of 
morality. I don’t think the novel is particularly good or interesting when it instructs us how 
to live, so I don’t think of it as moral in that sense. But certainly when it shows us 
intimately, from the inside, other people, it then does extend our sensibilities. (qtd. in 
Serpell 111) 
 
The extension of our “sensibilities” or, in other words, the expansion of sympathy McEwan 
implies here must have some correspondences with both George Eliot’ and J. M. Coetzee’ ideas 
on morality and the novel. If, as George Eliot says, “imagination is a licensed trespasser” (Adam 
Bede 71), there would be no reason to withhold our sympathetic imagination for other realties 





























“A picture held us captive. And we couldn’t get outside it, for it lay in our language, and 
language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably.” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations #115) 
 
If, by imagination, it would be permissible to appoint an intermediary between George 
Eliot and J.M. Coetzee in terms of literary history, which might be analogous to locate the 
middle point between nineteenth-century realism and the contemporary fiction, I would like to 
call up a modernist: Virginia Woolf. As an essay on George Eliot shows (“George Eliot”(1919)), 
Woolf admired Eliot’s works very much and also provided some insightful reading of her 
characters in particular, in which Woolf claimed a biographical connection between the writer 
and heroines. But Woolf asserts, in another essay “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” (1924), an 
arrival of new sensibility in creating characters, where she opposes the mannerism in the 
Edwardian writers to her Georgian writers’ experimental styles, such as T.S. Eliot and James 
Joyce. In that essay, Woolf shows little interest in evaluating how the previous writers developed 
“a technique of novel writing” (80). Wolf detests their conventions of detailed description laced 
with facts and things in the novel as a “materialist” one, an outmoded model, which, she argues, 
could not reach the character’s “life,” or “human nature,” and so she says that she threw away 
“that ugly, that clumsy, that incongruous tool out of window” (82). But, what if George Eliot also 
wrote her fiction, like the Edwardians, “very powerfully, searchingly, and sympathetically out of 
the window”?  
        In drawing a characterization in the previous novels, then, it is remarkable that Woolf 
symptomatically uses the metaphor of window; while Wolf argues that the Edwardian writers 
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tend to see and write something out of window, Woolf puts a Mr. Bennett’s inner view from a 
bedroom window. Of course, this contrast of perspectives in/outside the window is a kind of two 
sides of the same coin; it is merely an illusion from the shift of the observer’s position, and the 
window as an epistemological frame to conceptualize the reality is still there.  
Though Mr. Bennett’s way of representing the outside world is said to be full of old 
clichés following the traditional realism style and so it is close to a realistic painting from a 
window, the window frame is certainly applied in George Eliot’s novels. For example, in 
Middlemarch, Eliot describes a scene in which Dorothea comes to feels “the largeness of the 
world” with an eye-contact of the outside world from her window: 
[…] there was light piercing into the room. She opened her curtains, and looked out 
towards the bit of road that lay in view, with fields beyond outside the entrance-gates. 
On the road there was a man with a bundle on his back and a woman carrying her baby; 
in the field she could see figures moving—perhaps the shepherd with his dog. Far off in 
the bending sky was the pearly light; and she felt the largeness of the world and the 
manifold wakings of men to labor and endurance. She was a part of that involuntary, 
palpitating life, and could neither look out on it from her luxurious shelter as a mere 
spectator, nor hide her eyes in selfish complaining. (741, my emphasis) 
 
While it is critical for Woolf to create the interiority of a character, George Eliot’s imageries 
outside the window have some symbolic meanings. Between the observer and the observed, 
there comes a corresponding vision. The depicted people and landscape are certainly picturesque, 
but finally they are merged into a unity configuring the expansion of Dorothea’s sympathy, her 
escape from egoism, and her spiritual awakening, which I paraphrase in Kant’s words the 
“enlarged mentality.” My reservation is about whether we should criticize the window frame like 
above merely as an old-fashioned model for Victorian realism as Woolf did in her critique of Mr. 
Bennett’s writing. This cannot be a question of which mode between realism and modernism is 
superior in the writer’s approach to the reality of the novel. In fact, Eliot’s self-consciousness 
about the novel’s form which cannot be a perfect tool to represent a character in its totality 
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precedes that of Woolf. That the make-believe in the novel depends on some literary conventions 
and they are also changing is not a new idea from Woolf. As Woolf confesses her difficulty and 
asks her readers to be tolerant for “the spasmodic, the obscure, the fragmentary, the failure” in 
the representation of Mrs. Brown (87), Eliot also asks us to be patient with her imperfect, 
fragmentary reflection of a reality and, at the same time, tries to be impartial in the description of 
a character. The question of “Why always Dorothea?” in Middlemarch must be read as such a 
self-reflective attitude of the author in figuring otherness. Therefore, if the convention of 
“omniscience” in literary realism is condemned by some modernists for its monologic narration, 
a counter-criticism from realists is possible, as seen from a Julian Barnes’s novel:  
  ‘The author in his book must be like God in his universe, everywhere present and 
nowhere visible.’ Of course, this has been keenly misread in our century. Look at Sartre 
and Camus. God is dead, they told us, and therefore so is the God-like novelist. 
Omniscience is impossible, man’s knowledge is partial, therefore the novel itself must 
be partial. That sounds not just splendid, but logical as well. But is it either? The novel, 
after all, didn’t arise when belief in God arose; nor, for that matter, is there much 
correlation between those novelists who believed most strongly in the omniscient 
narrator and those who believed most strongly in the omniscient creator. I cite George 
Eliot alongside Flaubert.   
More to the point, the assumed divinity of the nineteenth-century novelist was only 
ever a technical device; and the partiality of the modern novelist is just as much a ploy. 
When a contemporary narrator hesitates, claims uncertainty, misunderstands, plays 
games and falls into error, does the reader in fact conclude that reality is being more 
authentically rendered? (Flaubert’s Parrot 76) 
 
Barnes introduces George Eliot as a representative example of the nineteenth-century realist who 
applies the omniscient perspective in the novel while denying its effectiveness in our real world. 
I would like to end up this epilogue by reviewing Coetzee’s allusion to the Leibnizian 
Monad theory, which, like what he has said before about “foundational fiction,” however it is 
fictional, could function for “a good society”:  
…To my mind, it will be enough if we can settle on fictions or ourselves which we can 
inhabit more or less comfortably, fictions that interacts sans friction with the fiction of 
those around us. In fact, that would be my notion of a good society, even an ideal 
society: one in which, for each of us, our fiction (our fantasy) of ourselves goes 
unchallenged; and where some grand Leibnizian presiding force sees to it that all the 
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billions of personal fictions interlock seamlessly, so that none of us need stay awake at 
night wondering anxiously whether the world we inhabit is real. (Coetzee and Kurtz 
177) 
 
Coetzee knows that “a good society” where one can live in his own imaginary world without 
trouble with others is idealistic. But it is true that this idea echoes his Jerusalem Prize acceptance 
speech in 1987 where he talked about the hero’s fictional life in Don Quixote. Coetzee values the 
hero’s “willed act of the imagination” and deplores the non-possibility for such an act in his 
South African context, where the pressure of reality is so harsh (99-100). Then, in the self-
sufficient world of a fantasy, the window frame becomes meaningless and there would be no 
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